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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of how to interpret Islamic writers without imposing generic 
frameworks of later and partly Western derivation. It questions the overuse of the category 
“Sufism” which has sometimes been deployed to read anachronistic concerns into Islamic 
writers. It does so by a detailed study of some of the key works of the 13th century writer Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah (d. 709/1309). In this way it fills a gap in the learned literature in two ways. Firstly, it 
examines the legitimacy of prevalent conceptualisations of the category “Sufism.” Secondly, it 
examines the work of one Sufi thinker, and asks in what ways, if any, Western categories may 
tend to distort its Islamic characteristics. The methodology of the thesis is primarily exegetical, 
although significant attention is also paid to issues of context. 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One sets up the problem of Sufism as an organizational 
category in the literature. In doing so, this part introduces the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, and 
justifies the selection from his works for the case study in Part Two. Part Two provides a 
detailed case study of the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. It opens with some of the key issues involved 
in understanding an Islamic thinker, and gives a brief overview of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s life. This is 
followed by an examination of materials on topics such as metaphysics, ontology, 
epistemology, eschatology, ethics, and soteriology. In each case it is suggested that these topics 
may be misleading unless care is taken not to import Western conceptuality where it is not 
justified by the texts. Emphasis is placed on the soteriological character of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
writings, to which the Western terms “theology” and “philosophy” are only partly appropriate. 
Part Two concludes with a short study of the interaction between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn 
Taymiyya designed to illustrate how a less Western conceptual approach may modify aspects of 
the existing reception of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s thought.  
 
The central point of the thesis is that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah needs to be reread, taking more account of 
the Islamic contexts of his work. The thesis does not pretend to settle every issue of 
interpretation and it only deals with some of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s texts. In arguing for contextual 
Islamic approaches to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah as opposed to the more standard generic readings, such as 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah as “Sufi” or “philosopher,” the thesis raises issues relevant not only to Islamic 
studies, but also to studies in comparative religion generally. While limited by its focus on only 
one writer, it hopefully may stimulate further research into how Islamic writers may best be 
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studied in ways which respects their religious commitments, while acknowledging the need to 
relate their work to concepts of Western origin. 
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Part I 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The problem of Sufism’s relation to Islam has a long history both within the works of Muslim 
scholars throughout the history of Islam and within the works of modern scholars who have 
attempted to survey the field. Sufism’s relation to Islam has often evoked two diametrically 
opposed positions, on the one hand of those who posit Sufism as something foreign to and 
outside of Islam and, on the other hand, those who posit that Sufism is an integral aspect of 
Islam.  
 
This thesis problematises generic understandings of “Sufism” and exemplifies a more 
contextual approach by an in depth study of a 13th century Sufi. It is divided into two parts. The 
first part deals with the problems with the categorisation of Sufism. The second part is a study 
of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre in order to evaluate a) the interrelations between his works and b) 
what, if any, are the relations to and affirmations of an Islamic paradigm. This work can be 
situated amongst emerging studies which are acknowledging the limited and limiting 
approaches that have tended to impose alien frameworks on works that are deemed foreign, 
both linguistically and culturally.  
 
Part two of this work has a tiered structure. Each chapter, while focusing on one aspect of Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s work, acts as the basis for each successive chapter. The chapters are arranged to 
facilitate a highlighting of the interconnections within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works between domains. 
This part, as explained later, will utilise the concept of provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s works. The goal is to show that the interconnections between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
works are not limited to certain topics.  
 
Part two opens with a chapter introducing Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and his works. This chapter places Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah within his historical context, through an overview of his life, while also providing his 
historical and transhistorical importance. This chapter also looks at some of the issues that arise 
within Sufi studies, such as Qur’anic hermeneutics and the science of Prophethood, and 
determines how these could be dealt with in the study that follows. 
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The fourth chapter examines Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s use of the Oneness of God (tawhid) as a 
metaphysical principle. Through examining his analysis of the Islamic affirmation of Oneness 
(kalimah tawhid) “there is no god but Allah” (la ilaha illa’llah) it will be shown that, for Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, tawhid is the only viable and sound basis for metaphysics. It will be seen, in turn, that the 
problem of rizq is a direct result of this metaphysical scheme. Thus, the domain of metaphysics 
is seen to be the source of the problem of rizq. It will be shown that the metaphysical 
consistency throughout his works is applied in varying ways when developing, analysing, and 
solving the problem of rizq.  
 
The fifth chapter examines the ontological implications of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics and 
how, within this domain, the problem of rizq takes prominence. As provision occurs within the 
ontological domain, this domain is seen to be the site of the problem of rizq. One of the themes 
explored, which arises as a consequence of his metaphysics, is ontological poverty (faqr). If 
Allah is the principle of existence then everything other than Allah, being contingently existent, 
has ontological dependence. This raises the issue of an evident relation between ontological 
poverty (faqr) and selfish calculation (tadbir). It will be shown that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s argument 
against acting according to one’s selfish desires is, in some ways, an argument against acting 
contrary to tawhid.  
 
The sixth chapter examines the epistemological impact of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics and 
ontology. The move towards the realisation of creation’s ontological poverty will be shown to 
be achieved through an ever increasing awareness of Divine Unity within/underpinning 
multiplicity. The epistemological domain is the location of the solution to the problem of rizq. 
Here it will be seen that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology is an extension of his metaphysics and 
ontology.  
 
The seventh chapter delves into the eschatological issues that, within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, 
can be seen to result from the problem of rizq. From an eschatological perspective, the problem 
of rizq is both widened and problematised. It is widened in that the problem of rizq is seen to 
be an aspect of the overarching soteriological concern for both this world and the next. The 
problem of rizq is, however, problematised in that in being a concern of gaining provision for 
the next world, the provision of this world is forgone in preference for the next. This is 
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problematic in as far as it is seen to be antithetical to the issues detailed in the preceding 
chapters. Irrespective of the domain that one is concerned with, the problem of rizq can be 
seen to have a pedagogical function in that it provides impetus for the individual for pursuing 
both this world and the next.  
 
The eighth chapter examines the moral implications of embodying the metaphysics of tawhid 
and the implications this has for the problem of rizq. It will be shown that through the 
perfection of ethical behaviour (adab), as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah encourages, the metaphysics of tawhid 
becomes embodied. Here is will be seen that it is within the ethical domain that the solution to 
the problem of rizq is enacted. 
 
The ninth chapter focuses on the individual’s soteriological development through overcoming 
the problem of rizq and embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. While his soteriological 
semiotics is alluded to throughout this work, due to its centrality, its analysis is held over until 
this chapter. There are two reasons for this, a) an understanding of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview 
is indispensible for understanding his views on soteriology and b) it is here that the importance 
of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics for resolving the problem of rizq becomes apparent.  
 
The tenth chapter takes a differing approach to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s dependence on an Islamic 
paradigm. This chapter examines the well known, though little commented on, relationship 
between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya is renowned for, amongst other things, 
his criticisms of what he saw as heterodox practices of many Sufis. The degree to which Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah adhered to an Islamic paradigm can be examined through his responses to these 
criticisms. 
 
Throughout this analysis of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre his use of the Qur’an and the Hadith, as the 
foundational texts of Islam, is foregrounded. There are instances, however, where verses of the 
Qur’an and Hadith have been included because they are a) alluded to in a manner familiar to 
those familiar with these sources or b) illustrate his consistency with these sources when they 
are not mentioned. This has been done in order to show the degree to which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
and those thinkers like him, depends on an inherently Islamic context for understanding their 
works. 
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The Transmission of Sufism 
 
The transmission of Sufism into Europe has a long history. It began in earnest in the Middle 
Ages with the translation of Islamic texts into Latin and has continued since then with varying 
degrees of intensity. The colonialisation of Muslim countries that occurred from the 17th 
century onward saw a renewed interest in attempts to understand a doctrine that appears both 
foreign and familiar. Orientalists attempted to chart the major thinkers and foregrounded what 
they saw as the major texts. Subsequently, an extensive scholarly literature emerged in several 
European languages. 
 
Nonetheless, this literature is not without its biases. This bias has shifted over time. The 
medieval translations were almost exclusively works of science or philosophy. Aside from issues 
of translation, which were often very problematic with a marked tendency to Latinise Semitic 
expressions, these works were often divorced from their Islamic context. The problem was 
arguably exacerbated by European colonialism with its sense of superiority. In the case of 
Sufism, Orientalists indentified bodies of material they valorised as important but then often 
highlighted the similarities in content and sophistication of certain aspects of Islamic thought 
with the European intellectual heritage. This was often done at the expense of the inherently 
Islamic nature and context of the works concerned. Attention to sources sometimes made 
Sufism a patchwork of Greek, Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian philosophy, only loosely 
connected with the Qur’an. While this, to some degree, resulted from some Islamic scholars of 
Sufism Islamicised non-Islamic materials and then developed readings of Sufism based on their 
own specific interpretations of what is and what is not Islam, it does not account for the degree 
to which some Sufi works have been divorced from an Islamic context. Clearly “Sufism” needs 
to be conceptualised in clearer and more critical terms and without reference to essentialist 
conceptions of either Greek philosophy (which was also very diverse and historically variable) or 
a narrow reductionist view of Islam. 
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Limitations 
 
A prominent issue that frequently arises within works on Sufism is an insufficient 
contextualisation of the materials. This can result in studies that deny the possibility of Sufism 
being indigenous to Islamic paradigms as well as studies that deny the possibility of influences 
external to Islam on particular Sufi literature or practices. As a result, there is some confusion 
about what the terms “Sufi” and “Sufism” cover. In following the twofold aim, this work uses a 
strategy that consists of two movements. Firstly, in order to determine whether or not Sufism is 
indigenous to Islam, it assumes that there is an integral relation between Sufism and an Islamic 
paradigm. Secondly, in order to test this assumption, an analysis of the works of one individual 
who is regarded as an important Sufi thinker is undertaken to determine if there are 
correlations or disjunctions between their work and an Islamic paradigm. For this study, the 
works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah have been chosen. In breaking down Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview into 
various domains, the strategy has been to examine his views and then to determine how 
consistent they are with the foundational texts of Islam.   
 
Focusing on the works of one thinker opens this work to certain limitations. While this has the 
benefit of limiting the scope of the work, it also limits the any generalisations that may be made 
within the fields of Islamic or Sufi studies. As a result, caution must be exercised when 
presenting evidence for Sufism’s relation to Islamic paradigms. Care is also needed in handling 
the issue of Islamic orthodoxy. It is important both to avoid reading in a single interpretation of 
what Islam is and not to negate the plurality that exists within any tradition.1 Here views will be 
said to be compatible with Islamic paradigms when there is evidence that can be read to 
support them within the Qur’an or the Hadith. It should also be noted that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
work is presented for the Western educated reader and is organised in terms of categories 
drawn from the Western philosophical tradition, categories which were not, of course, 
deployed by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah himself. This is a standard practice in the field, but it means that 
nuances are called for. In some cases the Arabic meaning is difficult to convey in Western 
terms. 
Given the aim of this work of examining the relation of Sufism to Islam, this work is open to a 
criticism of the division of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview in accordance with categories generally 
associated with what may be called the Western philosophical tradition. While it would be a 
                                                          
1
 For a tradition that bases itself on the affirmation of the Onenes of God (tawhid), the idea of a plurality of 
interpretations is not as controversial as it might seem, as is evinced by the four schools of Sunni law.  
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stretch to state that “Arabic literature is boring unless it bears a family resemblance to 
European literature,”2 it is acknowledged that there is some necessity for what Kilito terms 
“cultural translation.” It is hoped that in the current study it may be regarded as “a 
praiseworthy pedagogical operation” in as far as “it is based on a sense of openness and 
respect for the Other and [one’s] cultural frame of reference.”3  As Kilito states,4 cultural 
translation “which is widely followed by scholars” is not necessarily innocent, for it can often 
obscure that which is “translated” both intentionally and unintentionally. It is for this reason 
that it is openly acknowledged that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah did not utilise categories such as 
metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, etc. and that the division of his worldview, as presented 
in his existent works, into these categories is, while useful for this study, somewhat arbitrary. If 
we take, as an example, soteriology as a category, then two comments can be made 
highlighting the manner in which cultural translation can be deemed a hinderance. Firstly, as 
will become apparent from the study below, it would not be incorrect to state that Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s oeuvre does not have a metaphysics or an ontology or an epistemology, each of his 
works are focused solely on soteriological matters. If elements of these others categories are to 
be found, as has been suggested in each chapter, then they exist in so far as the serve Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s soteriological concerns. Secondly, it could also be stated that, strictly speaking, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah does not have a soteriology. Given the etymology and philological development of 
“soteriology” and its relationship to salvation, saviour, and, by extension, redemption from sin, 
then “soteriology” can be seen to have inherently Christian underpinnings. If this is accepted as 
the case, then it would be an imposition on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview to state that each of his 
works are focused solely on soteiological matters. With these concerns in mind, the categories 
upon which each chapter is based are utilised in as far as they provide a useful means for 
highlighting certain aspects of the works discussed with a desire to show “openness and respect 
for the Other and [one’s] cultural frame of reference.”5 
 
Problematising “Sufism” 
 
                                                          
2
 Abdelfattah Kilito, Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language, trans. Wail S. Hassan (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 2008), 15 
3
 Ibid, 10. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
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The history of Sufism as a category of academic study has a rich history. Some of the earliest 
studies on Sufism can be found in the works of Barthélemy d’Herbelot de Molainville (1625-
1695), a French Orientalist, François Bernier (1625-1688), a French physician and traveller, and 
François Pétis de la Croix (1653-1713), a French Orientalist and diplomat. As early as the 
Seventeenth century, in the works of these individuals, there emerged two trends that continue 
to impact the field of Sufi studies: academic/scholarly studies, which analysed primary texts, 
and anthropological studies, which documented particular expressions of Sufism. In examining 
a range of these early studies it has been said that they are marked by: 
A discipline that started as a first and foremost philological, text-centred 
exercise gradually evolved into a subdivision of “cross-religious” studies 
pursued by curious amateurs (diplomats, travellers, colonial officials), 
Biblicists, and area studies specialists, or “Orientalists.”
6 
The legacy of these early studies is twofold.  
 
Firstly there is the legacy for works that are primarily academic. Often coming from scholars of 
the Bible and Orientalists, “authors of such works were reluctant to consider mystical 
propensities to be intrinsic to the Islamic religion.”7 Intentionally or not, these authors often 
“viewed Islam as inferior to Christianity,” the result of which was a prevailing view that Islam 
was “incapable of producing the vaulted spirituality and sophisticated theology they observed 
in Sufi texts.”8 Thus, despite any conclusive evidence to support it, Sufism was seen as being 
extrinsic to Islam. The severity of this can be seen in the fact that all major histories of Islam 
published in Europe between 1850 and 1890 “tended to draw a sharp distinction between 
Sufism and mainstream Islam.”9 Despite no such sharp distinction being apparent within the 
anthropological literature of the time, there are numerous examples that attempt to show 
Sufism’s alleged Hindu, neo-Platonic, Christian, or other origin, a trend that continues within 
modern academic literature.  
 
                                                          
6
 Alexander D. Knysh. “Historiography of Sufi Studies in the West,” in A Companion to the History of the Middle 
East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 107. 
7
 Ibid., 109. 
8
 Ibid., 109. 
9
 Ibid., 109.  
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Secondly there is the legacy for works that are primarily anthropological. The “empirical” data 
of these early anthropological studies are often mired in the colonialist perspectives of the 
observers. This literature has been seen to be predominantly produced by “colonial 
administrators who presided over the conquest and ‘pacification’ of indigenous Muslim 
populations” and, as such,  
the data that its authors perceived to be ‘authentic’ and ‘objective’ is, in fact, 
permeated by underlying colonial and imperial assumptions and stereotypes 
about the Muslim societies in question.
10
 
This inherent bias has been documented in works produced by the French and British,11 the 
Russians,12 and the Dutch,13 though without exhausting such instances.  
 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries scholars tested the views of their 
predecessors. A primary concern for “all these scholars … [was] to identify the place of Sufi 
teachings, literature, and practices vis-à-vis ‘orthodox’ Islam.”14 Indicative of the scholarship of 
this era is the work of Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) who presented the view that “Sufi exegetes 
embraced the allegorical method of Qur’an interpretation, which set them apart from the 
‘mainstream’ Sunni commentators who focused on the historical, legal and philological aspects 
of the Muslim scripture.”15 While views such as this placed Sufism within an Islamic paradigm, it 
did so at the expense of placing it in opposition to Islamic thinkers and works that were deemed 
“mainstream,” “popular,” and, ultimately, “orthodox.” In accounting for a supposed 
“otherness” within Sufi teachings, literature, and practices, many scholars continued to assert 
foreign sources and influences. Despite any conclusive evidence for this view, it can be seen to 
                                                          
10
 Alexander D. Knysh, “Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm: The Issue of Motivations of Sufi Resistance Movements 
in Western and Russian Scholarship,” Die Welt des Islams 42 (2002): 140.  
11
 Knysh, “Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm”; Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies.” 
12
 Knysh, “Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm”. 
13
 Martin van Bruinessen, “Studies of Sufism and Sufi Orders in Indonesia,” Die Welt des Islams 38 (1998). 
14
 Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies,” 112. 
15
 Ibid., 112. 
18 
 
be a result of a late nineteenth century shift in the academic study of religion where “the 
project of developing a scientific study of religion was framed in a quest of origins.”16 
 
The early twentieth century witnessed a rapid expansion in the number of scholars and works 
specialising in Sufi studies. However, these often continued the biases of their predecessors, as 
it has been noted “by building on the foundations established by a handful of nineteenth-
century pioneers, their twentieth-century successors generated a considerable body of 
academic literature.”17 The anthropological approach continued to frame its observations in 
accordance with questionable agendas as “the field data assembled by colonial administrators-
cum-scholars was definitely shaped by their colonial and imperial presuppositions and 
anxieties.”18 During this period, within academic approaches to Sufis studies “there emerged 
two major approaches to Sufism in western scholarship.”19 Without necessarily negating each 
other, a “historicist” approach emerged, which “emphasised the concrete circumstances of 
Sufism’s evolution across time and space,” as well as a “trans-historical,” which viewed the 
contents of Sufism as consistently emphasising “the eternal human aspiration to a higher reality 
and to a unitive/monistic vision of the world.”20 As the study of the trans-historical aspect of 
Sufism attracted “researchers who were similarly committed to a religious vocation,” some 
critics of the literature of this era have noticed “a ‘Christianisation’ of some aspects of Sufi 
thought.”21 Nevertheless, the works produced during this period of scholarship “laid solid 
textual and factual foundations for the study of Sufism in western academia.”22 
 
Second half of the twentieth century saw a shift in focus within religious studies. The shift being 
referred to here is largely due to the critique of Orientalism and the rise of post-Orientalist and 
                                                          
16
 Marcia Hermansen. “The Academic Study of Sufism in American Universities,” The American Journal of Islamic 
Social Studies 24 (2007): 29. 
17
 Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies,” 118. 
18
 Ibid., 118. 
19
 Ibid., 118. 
20
 Ibid., 112. 
21
 Hermansen, “The Academic Study of Sufism,” 30. 
22
 Knysh, “Historiography of Sufi Studies,” 121. 
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postcolonial approaches to the academic study of the world’s religions.23 With regard to the 
field of Sufi studies 
one can say that Sufi studies have successfully survived the critique of 
western “Orientalism” launched in the 1960s and 1970s by Abdul Latif 
Tibawi and Edward Said, who indicted its representatives for their 
“complicity” with the western colonial project and the resultant “deliberate 
distortion” of Islam’s image in the west.
24 
However, unpacking a definition of having “successfully survived” this critique can be taken to 
mean that very little has changed, for “overall we find surprisingly little ‘soul-searching’ among 
the western ‘Sufiologists’ of the last decades of the twentieth century.”25 Examples of this can 
be seen in the two articles that specifically deal with Sufi materials within Rethinking Islamic 
Studies,26 both of which deal specifically with postcolonialist approaches to the position of 
hagiographical materials within academic discourse without touching on the contextualisation 
of Sufism and the potential impact that this may have for scholarly studies.  
 
The problem of contextualising Sufism can be seen to arise from two distinct, though 
interrelated, areas of scholarship. Firstly there is a general problem of cultural translation that 
arises within comparative philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and any form of cross-cultural 
hermeneutics. It is recognised that “comparative philosophy often imports hermeneutical and 
philosophical methods to the study of non-Western texts that succeed in distorting or simply 
missing the significance of those texts … in the context of their home cultures”27 such that there 
is a “dramatic distortion of alien traditions through the imposition of hermeneutic and 
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doxographic frameworks … entirely foreign to the traditions themselves.”28 This distortion 
becomes increasingly dramatic when it is acknowledge that “many early Western studies or 
religion carried with them European ideas and presuppositions of what religion was or ought to 
be.”29 This scholarly imperialism raises concerns that “asymmetrical translations and 
transcreations of non-Western texts displace the indigenous understanding by reframing and 
reencoding the signs precisely within a Euro-centred imaging or the world whose cognitive 
claims are derived from the historical experiences of European (modernist) cultures.”30 These 
are issues that are being examined in relations to several of the world’s traditions, including, 
though not limited to Indian Philosophies,31 Judaism,32 and Islam.33 In terms of the study 
provided here, it is intended that, by attempting to explore the internal logic of the texts, 
insight can be made by judging the materials according to their own claims.  
 
The second area where the problem of contextualisation arises is within Sufi studies. This can 
be seen as being an example of the problematic nature of a practical implication of cross-
cultural translation. As is discussed in the next chapter, the study of Sufism suffers from 
methods of categorisation that impose upon it ill fitting constraints that are, at times, at conflict 
with the claims and internal logic of the materials. One example, explored further below, is that 
of categorising Sufism as a form of mysticism. While this type of categorisation does give it “a 
family resemblance to European literature,”34 it does so at the expense of limiting, to the point 
of negating, the paradigm which “Sufi” works claim as the underpinning framework.  
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The Works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
 
Although almost all of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works have been translated into one or another 
European language, especially English and French, an analysis of the connections between his 
works remains undeveloped. In his introduction to the first complete English translation35 of 
the Kitab al-Hikam from the original Arabic, Danner wrote:  
 
His principal work is of course the Kitab al-Hikam ... It was immediately 
successful and is considered by subsequent generations as a masterful 
summary, in easily learned aphorisms, of the truths of the Path. 
Next in importance to the Hikam is his work Miftah al-falah wa misbah al-
arwah (“The Key of Success and the Lamps of Spirits”), a concise and 
comprehensive exposition of the Sufi method of Invocation (dhikr). It is 
perhaps the first work in Sufism that gives the general and technical aspects 
of the dhikr in a single book. A short book, the Miftah is written in a lucid 
style replete with citations drawn from the Quran and Hadiths, not to 
mention the early Sufis. It was written in the last decade or so of his life and 
is quite popular in present-day Sufi circles. 
A companion-piece to the Hikam is his Kitab at-Tanwir fi isqat at-tadbir 
(“Light on the Elimination of Self-Direction”), which is a simple and clear 
exposition of the Shadhili approach to the virtues, such as patience, sincerity, 
hope, love, fear, and the like. But they are all seen as contained in a single 
synthetic virtue, which is that of “the elimination of self-direction” (isqat at-
tadbir). It is a question of the disciple’s aligning his own tadbir with that of 
God’s. The book ends in a series of intimate discourses (munajat) of rare 
beauty on the matter of tadbir. Since the work contains a reference to the 
great Tunisian Sufi, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Marjani (d. 699/1299), 
followed by the usual formula for the deceased, we may conclude that it was 
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written in the last decade of Ibn ‘Ata’illah’s life. The book abounds in 
citations from the first two masters of the Shadhiliyya. 
His biographical work, Kitab al-Lata’if fi manaqib Abi l-‘Abbas al-Mursi wa 
Shaykhihi Abi l Hasan (“The Subtle Blessings in the Saintly Lives of Abu l-
‘Abbas al-Mursi and His Master Abu l-Hassan”), is not so much a 
reconstruction of their lives as it is a record of what they said. It is somewhat 
autobiographical in that it has numerous references to the religious and Sufi 
notables of Ibn ‘Ata’illah’s time. Without the Lata’if, it would be practically 
impossible to say more than a few lines on the life of Ibn ‘Ata’illah himself. 
This work is important for its transmission of the observations of the first 
masters of the Shadhiliyya, and as such is one of the basic sources for the 
early period of that order. All future works from Shadhili masters invariably 
refer to the Lata’if for their citations. Apart from its straightforward prose, it 
contains numerous ahzab from the Shadhili masters. It seems to be amongst 
his last compositions. 
His small work, al-Qasd al-mujarrad fi ma’rifat al-Ism al-Mufrad (“The Pure 
Goal Concerning Knowledge of the Unique Name”), is likewise written in 
sober style. It sets out the doctrine of the Supreme Name, Allah, both in itself 
and in relation to the other Divine Names of God in Islam. There is a veritable 
metaphysical theory linking all of his exposition of the Divine Names. The 
Qasd is not as well known as his previous works, but it figures as part and 
parcel of the corpus that was handed down as coming from him. Its date of 
composition is difficult to assess. 
His other writings are of minor importance, even though one of them, the Taj 
al-arus al-hawi li-tahdhib an-nufus (“The Bride’s Crown Containing the 
Discipline of Souls”), seems still to be quite popular. Composed largely of 
extracts from his Hikam, Tanwir, and Lata’if, it is a composite work, and this 
may account for its popularity. It might have been composed by him as a 
memory aid or a brief synthesis of his other works, but it definitely lacks any 
interior unity. This might well be one of his last writings. 
Apart from the aforementioned titles, Ibn ‘Ata’illah’s remaining 
compositions, such as his Unwan at-tawfiq fi adab at-tariq (“The Sign of 
Success Concerning the Discipline of the Path”), a gloss on a poem by Abu 
23 
 
Madyan on the relations between master and disciple, as less well known. Of 
his lost works we have only titles.
36
 
 
This account of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s main works overlooks their interconnections. While it is 
mentioned that the Kitab at-Tanwir is “a companion-piece to the Hikam,” that aphorisms from 
the Hikam occur within other works, and that, when read in conjunction with the Hikam, “the 
other books of Ibn ‘Ata’illah, such as the Tanwir, the Qasd, the Lata’if, and the Miftah, open up 
still further angles of insight,” it concludes that “the Hikam itself, when properly understood 
and assimilated, ends up by being its own best commentary.”37 This overlooks any further 
interconnections between these texts. Most subsequent studies have almost uncritically 
accepted and utilised the above passage, as can be seen within Appendix 1. Furthermore, a 
summation such as this does not attempt to contextualise those works which means that a key 
aspect to comprehending them is missing. This work draws predominantly from the literature in 
English and French.38 Furthermore, no attempt is made to delve into manuscripts or examine 
the large body of traditional commentary literature.39  
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Chapter 2 – Problematising Sufism 
 
This chapter examines some of the prominent methods of defining Sufism and highlights the 
problems inherent within these definitions. It also considers some of the prominent biases 
within the literature on Sufism.  
 
Approaches to the Term “Sufism” 
 
It has been said that “today Sufism is a name without a reality, but formerly it was a reality 
without a name.”1 It could be said, with regard to contemporary approaches to Sufism, both 
popular and scholarly, that “Sufism” is merely a name, an umbrella term so broad that its 
content, or reality, remains an unresolved dispute. Without attempting to resolve this dispute it 
is possible to see that some of the prominent scholarly methods for categorising Sufism do not 
adequately contextualise the material under examination. In order to understand how Sufic 
materials are misrepresented it is first necessary to examine examples of how Sufism is 
miscontextualised.  
 
“Sufism” as “Islamic Mysticism” 
 
There is a large body of literature in English that treats “Sufism” and “Islamic mysticism” as 
synonyms. It is apparent in works ranging from Nicholson’s (1914) The Mystics of Islam to 
Knysh’s (2000) Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, amongst others.2 Without documenting the 
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history of this conflation, it is possible that this view of Sufism arose from the idea that it was 
extraneous to Islam and that it is a syncretic mixture of previous doctrines. Whilst Arberry’s 
work is dated, his assertion that “it is proposed for the sake of brevity to accept … that the Sufis 
owed much or little of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, 
Hermetic, Zoroastrian or Buddhist example”3 can be seen to persist in both scholarly and 
popular literature with statements like the Qur’an “provides little explicit treatment of mystical 
themes”4 and that “Islam took much longer to develop than has usually been supposed, and 
that in the slow process of development Christian materials were used to build the mystical 
side of the religion, the side which was to become Sufism.”5 Yet, irrespective of how the term 
‘Islamic mysticism’ arose, it abounds in both popular and scholarly literature to such an extent 
that it is commonly accepted to answer “what is Sufism?” with “Islamic mysticism” without 
taking into account the problematic nature of the term “mysticism.”  
 
An understanding of the term “Islamic mysticism” depends on what is meant by “mysticism.” A 
main problem here is that, despite varying conceptions of mysticism, discussions detailing 
which kind of mysticism Sufism supposedly represents are lacking. There is a plethora of 
different kinds of mysticism, such that “in 1899 Dean W. R. Inge listed twenty-five definitions,”6 
and a detailed discussion of each would take us too far afield.7 If “mysticism” is understood in 
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its etymological sense relating to the mysteries inherent within each religion, then this issue 
would not arise, for there are numerous “Sufi” works that discuss unveiling and perceiving the 
unseen.8 The conflation of “mysticism” and “Sufism” may be the result of early studies which 
focused on unique cases, such as al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bistami,9 where ambiguous statements 
have caused controversy. Within the history of Islam such statements have led to accusations 
of apostasy due to the view that such individuals are claiming identity with God (ittihad) and 
has been a source of controversy levelled against the Sufis at various times throughout 
history,10 a point rejected by most given the title Sufi.11 This understanding of “mysticism” as a 
rejection of orthodoxy may be evident in other traditions though, despite claims of identity 
with God by some who have been labelled “Sufis,” “a careful study of even the strongest claims 
for mystical identity with God across the three [Jewish, Christian, and Islamic] traditions 
demonstrates that few mystics have consciously adopted an antinomian stance or broken with 
the common religious practices and institutional claims of their tradition.”12 Irrespective of how 
it arose, this view of “mysticism” often involves a general ambivalence towards the revealed 
law such that it is said that “the mystic does not have respect for the laws of religion since he 
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has another and more direct route to the truth, that of experience of God.”13 One method for 
supposedly clarifying any possible confusion between Sufism and other forms of mysticism is to 
add that “there were mystics in the Islamic world who could be characterized in this way, but 
the system of mysticism is just as systematic as any other form of intellectual enquiry.”14 While 
at first glance there appears to be a distinction between Sufism as Islamic mysticism and other 
forms of mysticism, there is no contrast between mysticism as a rejection of revealed law and 
the rigorous adherence to the revealed law (shari’a) stressed by numerous Sufis. The necessity 
of Sufis adhering to the revealed law (shari’a) is evident in statements including, though not 
limited to, al-Junayd’s saying that, regarding the Sufi path, “our knowledge must be controlled 
by conformity with the Qur’an and the Sunna”15 and Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili’s saying that “if 
your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Qur’an and Sunna, hold fast to these two and 
take no notice of your unveiling; tell yourself that the Qur’an and Sunna is guaranteed by God 
Most High, which is not the case with the unveiling inspiration and mystical perceptions.”16 
Rather, positing Sufism as a sort of “systematic” form of mysticism misses a crucial aspect of 
the relationship between the Sufi and the law (shari’a). 
 
With the large number of possible types of mysticism, the term itself can be considered 
problematic. The problem is that “no definition could be both meaningful and sufficiently 
comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some point or other, have been described as 
‘mystical’.”17 As has been suggested “the process of mysticism’s reinvention in departicularized 
form needs itself to be particularized and seen in its own historical complexity.”18 This issue is 
compounded with a separate, though equally problematic, issue of the umbrella term 
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“Sufism.”19 It has been recognised that “Sufism is not a simple and monolithic entity but a 
collection of rich and diverse traditions with numerous currents that sometimes compete with 
each other.”20 Whilst it is problematic, it would be premature to discard the term “Sufism” 
given that its conflation with “mysticism” can be seen to mis-contextualise the material it 
supposedly covers. This is especially so, given the difficulty in determining which, if any, form of 
mysticism Sufism conforms to. In this regard it is useful to ask “to what extent ... does the use 
of a term created in the modern Christian West distort the meaning of key figures, movements, 
and texts from the traditions of Judaism and Islam,”21 especially when it is used 
indiscriminately. As “the term has no real counterpart in other traditions, it is not surprising 
that the suitability of mysticism as a neutral, global term has been questioned by some 
scholars,”22 yet a gap remains in the literature which discusses “Sufism” as “Islamic mysticism.” 
Rather than attempting to bridge this gap, this work attempts to highlight the need for a closer 
reading of primary materials in order to suggest the need for revisiting these broad, and 
sometimes limiting, categorisations.  
 
A consequence of the problematic nature of the terms involved is that there is the potential to 
de-Islamisize Sufism. By equating “Sufism” with “Islamic mysticism” it can force studies of 
Sufism to conform to the paradigms used to analyse other forms of mysticism. Others have 
suggested that there has been a “disproportionate emphasis of earlier Western translations 
and secondary studies” that, while “quite understandable in terms of pioneering European 
scholars’ natural interests,” has left a “legacy of that problematic initial definition of ‘Islamic 
mysticism’.”23 This initial definition has reinforced “a potent combination of theological 
presuppositions and questionable historical paradigms that together have largely blocked a 
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more adequate scholarly perception of Islamic ‘mysticism’.”24 This lack of adequate scholarly 
understanding is partly from “an unwarranted tendency on the part of many Western scholars 
to underemphasise in Islamic intellectual thought those Arabic and Persian ideas ... as well as 
those original and particularly Sufic themes which are not essentially related to Greek 
philosophy or to [other] monotheistic traditions,” the result of this being an approach that 
“tends to reduce Sufic themes to an outgrowth of Greek philosophy or a mere dimension of 
Islamic religion.”25 As a result of this “non-Muslim observers from many backgrounds have 
continued to read their own models of ‘religion’ and religious authority – including equally 
inappropriate notions of ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘orthopraxy’ – into the most diverse Islamic 
settings.”26 In support of this it has been noted that “the notion of [Sufism as] mysticism relied 
on a culturally Protestant, temporally modernist and intellectually cosmopolitan construction of 
religion in which the authority of the solitary individual’s direct, unmediated experience was 
seen to be the fountainhead of authentic religiosity across all cultures and all people.”27 There 
is some truth in this claim. Indeed, at times Sufism has been “assigned the part of the 
syncretistic bastard in the family of world religions.”28 In contrast to this, there is the traditional 
view that “the realisation of the spiritual virtues and their relation to the metaphysical ground 
and destiny of human souls – is itself at the very centre of the explicit, ‘exoteric’ Qur’anic 
text.”29 Equating Sufism with forms of mysticism de-contextualises its heritage. The assertion 
that Sufism is as a syncretic outgrowth of multiple traditions, and other similar views which 
attempt to equate Sufism with mysticism, distorts the material under examination because it 
fails to adequately contextualise Sufi works.   
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An alternative to describing Sufism as “Islamic mysticism” has been to understand Sufism as 
“Islamic esoterism.” In understanding Sufism as “Islamic esoterism” it is helpful to see that 
exoterism (ilm az-zahir) and esoterism (ilm al-batin) are in no way contradictory or conflicting,30 
nor is priority given to one or the other. Esoterism is the internal complement of exoterism for 
“what, in exoterism, are dogmas and observances, become, in esoterism, unconditioned truth 
and ways of realisation.”31 The corollary of this is that “in Islam as in all other traditions, it 
would not be possible to have an authentic esoterism without exoterism.”32 However, these 
terms too are problematic and their boundaries are not clear cut. One example of the 
problematic nature of this bifurcation is that that “the division of Islam into an esoteric Path 
and an exoteric Law was not as clear-cut a phenomenon in its early history as it was to be later 
on”33 and it could be suggested that within certain circles this division is still not clear-cut. A 
glance at the texts or practices of those deemed to be Sufis shows the blurred nature of these 
distinctions for their works encompass both aspects without strictly categorising as exoteric or 
esoteric.34 Furthermore, the use of “esoteric” in this context has been seen as problematic in 
that “the popular but uncritical tendency to render the word al-batin as ‘esoteric’ derives from 
the spiritual hermeneutics of the Western Romanticism and Occultism,” which implicitly affirms 
the above mentioned bifurcation by distinguishing Sufism from “fulfilling the socio-political 
religious laws.”35 It has been acknowledged that “the spiritual aspects of Islam were neither 
absent before the twelfth century, when organised Sufi orders started to play a major role in 
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Muslim societies, nor were they ever codified within such orders,”36 which supports the view 
that Sufism is not a source of esoterism independent of the Islamic tradition.37 While it can be 
admitted that there is something that sets “Sufi” texts apart from other Islamic texts, to assert 
that it is their esoteric nature is too simplistic.  
 
Despite the practice of conflating Sufism with what is generally understood as mysticism, a 
further issue needs to be highlighted. While Sufism and mysticism “are by no means 
interchangeable expressions,”38 it must be recognized that this conflation has gained such 
currency within both popular and scholarly materials that it has almost become standard to 
refer to Sufism as Islamic mysticism.  
 
“Sufism” as “Islamic Sufism” 
 
While not as entrenched as “Islamic mysticism,” the labelling of Sufism as “Islamic Sufism,” and 
to a lesser extent “Qur’anic Sufism,”39 are also problematic. It is seen to be problematic 
because “Islamic Sufism” implies the idea that there are kinds of Sufism, some of which are 
Islamic and other which are not.40 The use of the phrase “Islamic Sufism” differs from the issues 
surrounding “Islamic mysticism” in that its problematic nature is often acknowledged. Rozehnal 
writes that “for some ‘Islamic Sufism’ may sound redundant,” although utilised this expression 
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to convey “Sufism as the essence of Islamic orthodoxy, an authentic discourse and practice 
firmly grounded in the dictates of normative law (sharia) and prophetic precedent (sunna).”41 
Even in popular literature this problem has been acknowledged. Examples include statements 
including, though not limited to, as one author states “there is no form of Sufism other than 
Islamic, I was compelled to use the adjective Islamic before Sufism, so that the uninitiated may 
not confuse it with other such non-Islamic movements which due to utter ignorance are styled 
Sufism.”42  
 
A further issue with the term “Islamic Sufism” is that it often hides a particular cultural bias. 
Hammer writes that “books such as Sufism and Psychology and Sufism as Therapy are only 
imaginable in a culture that is impregnated with the vocabulary of popular psychology.”43 
Similarly, while Hammer is critical of ideas such as “universal Sufism” and “Global Sufism,” the 
distinction between “Islamic Sufism” and “Western neo-Sufism” plays on a cultural bias that 
views Sufism as a universalist, or at least non-Islamic, tradition. Given that Hammer is 
commenting on the radical change of approaches to Sufism as it transitions from one cultural 
context to another, of which there are multiple examples,44 this could have been flagged. 
Rather than comparing “Islamic Sufism” with “Western neo-Sufism,”45 it could have been a 
comparison between Sufism, of which a quality is that it predominantly arises within an Islamic 
cultural context, and neo-Sufism, which could be said to occur predominantly within a non-
Islamic cultural context. Had this been done, both the cultural bias and tautology within the 
term “Islamic Sufism” could have been avoided.   
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In order to discard the idea of “Islamic Sufism” as a tautology it is necessary to examine the 
possibility of a non-Islamic Sufism. For this it is necessary to look at the source of the Sufis’ 
adherence to the revealed law (shari’a), and the Prophetic example from which it is derived, in 
order to determine if there is an equivalency in other traditions. The Qur’an states that “verily, 
in the Apostle of Allah you have a good example” (33:21) and again “say [O Prophet]: ‘If you 
love Allah, follow me, [and] Allah will love you” (3:31). In both instances the focus is on 
following the example of the Prophet, which, aside from the Qur’an, is a main source for the 
revealed law (shari’a). From their adherence to the revealed law (shari’a), it is possible to see 
why “devotion to the Prophet is signalled as one of the key characteristics of the great Sufi 
masters.”46 That the imparting of a revealed law is a function of a messenger is apparent in the 
Qur’anic statement “We have sent unto you an apostle from among yourselves ... to impart 
unto you revelation and wisdom” (2: 151). “Revelation,” in this verse, is a translation of al-kitab, 
literally the book, referring to the Qur’an. “Wisdom” (al-hikma) in this verse, can be taken to 
refer to both the Prophetic example (Sunnah) and to the revealed law (shari’a). Thus, within 
Sufism adherence to the revealed law (shari’a) involves adhering to and following the good 
example of the Prophet Muhammad. 
 
Within the Qur’an there is evidence that can be read to suggest the possibility of a non-Islamic 
Sufism. It is apparent in the statement that “indeed, you have had a good example in Abraham 
and those who followed him” (60: 4). If, as mentioned, adherence to a revealed law (shari’a) is 
akin to following the example of a messenger, then “those who followed him” can have two 
interpretations, one regarding the genealogy of Abraham, the other regarding the companions 
of Abraham. Firstly, this could refer to the Prophets and Messengers from Abraham’s sons 
Ishmael and Isaac, who are the forefathers of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian traditions 
respectively. If this is the case then this Qur’anic passage merely indicates models of salvation 
with a common genealogical root in Abraham. Secondly, it could, more specifically, refer to the 
direct followers of Abraham who embodied his example. While these two readings are not 
mutually exclusive, in both cases the existence of prophetic models preceding Islam is 
acknowledged. This would in no way come as a surprise to Muslims for whom it is an article of 
faith to acknowledge all prophets and messengers from Adam to Muhammad. However, it is 
important to point out that this passage is phrased in the past tense, which in Arabic refers to 
completed actions. Thus linguistically, there is an indication that following Abraham’s example 
is completed and, as a result, no longer viable.  
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It may be suggested that the Qur’an merely precludes an active non-Islamic Sufism whilst 
maintaining the possibility of pre-Islamic forms of Sufism. There are two responses to this. 
Firstly, the term “Islamic Sufism” is a relatively new phenomenon as is the claim by certain 
groups to be representative of non-Islamic Sufism and thus this idea of a pre-Islamic Sufism is 
not at stake in this case. Secondly, Abraham states that that those who follow him are “those 
who have surrendered themselves to God” (22: 78), literally “the Muslims,” and not amongst 
“those who are Sufis.” This seems to preclude the idea that “those who follow him” (60: 4) are 
a form of non-Islamic Sufism. However, it could be suggested that adherence to the example 
set by a Prophet, being a key feature of Sufism, is to be found amongst pre-Islamic groups. The 
Qur’an seems to affirm the view that there were such groups, such as “those who follow him” 
(60: 4). However, just as there is a distinction between Prophets, it is useful to distinguish 
between the groups that follow them. As a result, it can be seen to be useful to reserve 
“Sufism” for referring to those who follow the example of the Prophet Mohammed. This has 
two consequences. Firstly, it preserves the inherently Islamic nature of Sufism. Secondly, by 
localising “Sufism,” rather than using it as an umbrella term for a trans-historic methodological 
approach to prophethood, the phrase “Islamic Sufism” becomes tautological. 
 
The phrase “Islamic Sufism” arose to assert the integral relationship between Islam and Sufism. 
The necessity for this can be seen to arise from assertions such as “the Sufis owed much or little 
of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, Hermetic, Zoroastrian or 
Buddhist example”47 or that is was a sort of “Jewish Christianity,” by which is meant “the 
recognition of Jesus as the Messiah along with the observance of Jewish law,”48 such that “one 
expects Christianity to anticipate Sufism.”49 While these views of Sufism are too crude to be 
useful, they do indicate a prevailing view of Sufism as a syncretic belief system. Furthermore, 
this view prevails despite the fact that some of the greatest commentaries on the Qur’an and 
Islamic practices come from those recognised as great Sufi authors, such as Ibn ‘Arabi, Ahmad 
al-Ghazali, and Abd al-Qadir Jilani. Yet, despite this, the prefix “Islamic” in the phrase “Islamic 
Sufism” has had less of an effect of clarifying Sufism’s integral relationship with Islam. Contrary 
to its initial intentions, the phrase “Islamic Sufism” has had the effect of implying the possibility 
of a non-Islamic Sufism. 
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One attempt to assert the possibility of a non-Islamic Sufism has, unwittingly, lent more weight 
to the view that “Islamic Sufism” is a tautology. Taji-Farouki distinguishes between “Islamic 
Sufism,” where “the spiritual path is conceived in terms of an Islamic frame of reference,” and 
“Universal Sufism,” where “Sufi resources [are] divorced from their Islamic framework and used 
as techniques in human transformation.”50 While “Universal Sufism,” as it is here conceived 
with “no requirement to embrace Islam,”51 seems to overlook the “techniques in human 
transformation” inbuilt within the Islamic framework, it also overlooks the relationship 
between Sufism and Islam inherent within its own definition. “Universal Sufism” is made 
universal through separating “Sufi resources” from “their Islamic framework,” thus positing an 
intrinsic relationship between Islam and Sufism. This, as a result, means that, in this instance, 
the phrase “Islamic Sufism” is a tautology.  
 
The above examples of the use of “Islamic Sufism” have been predominantly directed towards a 
non-Islamic audience. For this reason it is beneficial to examine the work of Abu l-Wafa al-
Taftazani (1930 – 1994) which uses “Islamic Sufism” in work directed specifically towards an 
Islamic audience in order to gain a better understanding of how this phrase has gained 
currency. Within al-Taftazani’s work there is a “presentation of Sufism as ‘Islamic mysticism’, 
where the change from the generic noun tasawwuf to the attributive compound al-tasawwuf 
al-islami is meant to indicate that Sufism was generically different (to other forms of mysticism) 
and that it originated from the orthodox (Sunni) norms of the Qur’an and the Sunna of the 
Prophet.”52 In its intention, al-Taftazani’s use of al-tasawwuf al-islami can be seen to be no 
different from other uses of “Islamic Sufism”; however, rather than confronting non-Muslim 
prejudices about the sources of Sufism, it is attempting to confront Muslim prejudices about 
the practices of Sufism. It is important to note that al-Taftazani is writing in Egypt where “state 
control of the Sufi orders was reorganised and bureaucratised in the form of an administrative 
body ... which published regulations, organised events, and was indirectly accountable for the 
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orders’ activities.”53 This administrative body, “eventually called the Supreme Council for Sufi 
Orders,” was “specifically charged with regulating Sufism in Egypt” in accordance with what was 
deemed “proper Islamic principles.”54 Irrespective of al-Taftazani’s relation to the Supreme 
Council, the influence of this administrative body cannot be overlooked in the decision to use 
“al-tasawwuf al-islami” in discussing Sufism. The Supreme Council apparently defended “the 
existence of Sufi orders ... by emphasizing the mainstream features of Sufi devotions”55 and, in 
this regard, al-Taftazani, in using “Islamic mysticism,” can be seen to echo this form of defence 
by curtailing his mode of expression. Thus, while al-Taftazani’s use of “al-tasawwuf al-islami” is 
similar in effect to other uses of “Islamic Sufism,” his case is different due to the proselytising 
influence of the Supreme Council curbing his mode of expression.   
 
The Term “Sufism” 
 
While the terms “Islamic mysticism” and “Islamic Sufism” problematise two conceptualisations 
of Sufism, the term is problematic in itself. There are three dominant approaches in attempting 
to understand the term “Sufism,” each of which can be seen to be inadequate. These are the 
etymological approach, the historical approach, and an approach that treats “Sufism” as a kind 
of Islamic learning, each of which can be seen to be inadequate for contextualising Sufism. 
 
Firstly, there is an etymological approach to the term “Sufism.” A main problem with this 
approach to Sufism is that there is a presupposition regarding its content without any clear or 
adequate definition. Many scholars examine the various possible etymologies for the word 
“Sufi” in an attempt to understand the referent with varying alternatives advanced, such that 
“any number of definitions and descriptions can be culled from their [scholarly] studies.”56 Of 
the alternatives offered, that which is given preference often reveals more about the bias of 
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that author57 rather than adequately defining “Sufism” such that it has even been advanced 
that it has no true etymology.58 As a result, despite it being a common starting point for 
understanding “Sufism,” an etymological approach does not yield significant insight into the 
content of “Sufism.”59 Furthermore, it is often overlooked that debate over the origins of the 
term “Sufi” does not cover new ground as “there was controversy over the origins of the term 
sufi among the authors of the early texts, and modern scholars have reproduced this 
controversy at different levels in their own writing.”60 As a result the material is reiterated 
without giving further insight. 
 
One aspect of the problem of an etymological approach to defining Sufism is that there is some 
confusion regarding that to which “Sufi” refers. With some writers there is a conflation of the 
terms “Sufi” and “dervish.” This has led to some writers attempting to create a distinction 
between these two terms that does not correspond to traditional usage. For instance it has 
been suggested that “the term ‘dervish’ indicates more the dimension of practice, while ‘Sufi’ 
designates more that of theory: the dervish is a Sufi in action, and the Sufi is a dervish in the 
abstract.”61 One reason that the term “Sufi” may be considered abstract is that “within the 
Sufic tradition, the term Sufi is applied only to the initiate who has reached the end of the 
path.”62 The term “Sufi” can be considered to have an abstract quality in that it refers to the 
goal to be achieved and, as such, those who could be described by it would not claim to be a 
Sufi themselves. As a result, the use of the word “Sufi” as a generic term for anyone connected 
to a Sufi order indicates a lack of understanding of a) the term itself and b) its relation to the 
soteriological framework or Sufism.  
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Secondly, there is a historical approach to “Sufism.” This method attempts to define “Sufism” 
through its historical development. Such a history shows that around the 3rd Century AH/9th – 
10th Centuries CE there were certain individuals whose hermeneutic approach to Islam seemed 
to include certain practices others did not. In the 11th – 13th Centuries CE there was a 
development which saw a large body of texts being produced in all areas of Islamic learning and 
again those texts labelled as “Sufic” seemed to, without excluding other areas, include certain 
ideas that other texts did not. If the label “Islamic mysticism” is excluded, for the reasons 
mentioned above, then “Sufism” becomes little more than an umbrella term encompassing a 
wide variety of practices, people, and texts which, due to their diversity, would seem to have 
little in common. De Jong and Radtke’s (1999) edited collection of papers Islamic Mysticism 
Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics proceeds with the assumption that 
each of the controversies and polemics are directed against the same thing, namely “Sufism,” 
without contesting the idea of “Sufism” itself despite a disparate range of issues being 
addressed. This is problematic because “historically, this aspect of Islam has given rise to 
diverse traditions of spiritual techniques, individual and collective rituals, metaphysical and 
Theosophical expositions, hagiographic writings, and mystical love poetry, as well as 
institutional forms of discipline, education, and mentoring – all of which have been called 
Sufism,”63 albeit without distinguishing the position of the labeler with regard to Sufism.64 Also, 
it must be acknowledged that there is some confusion in the view that Sufism has “given rise to 
diverse traditions” given that “all ... have been called Sufism” retroactively. Furthermore, “in 
current academic language it [Sufism] serves as a generic, catch-all sociological term,” the result 
of which “is an entrenched view of contemporary Sufism as a monolithic, superstitious, 
syncretic cult mired in profiteering and political wrangling.”65 While it could be disputed that 
this reductive view of Sufism is held by “most Western scholars of Islam,” it is interesting to 
note that it is a view that “parallels the attacks leveled against Sufism by its Islamist 
detractors.”66 
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Histories of Sufism are problematic in as far as they proceed with the assumption that “Sufism” 
is predefined such that when it is applied to the history of Islam all the “Sufis” become readily 
apparent. Without denying that there is “Sufism” in the works of those included, the popular 
approach of providing a list of “Sufis” can range from being an arbitrary selection of Muslims to 
having a normative affect on approaching the works of such individuals.67 Opposed to this, 
elements of “Sufism” can be found in those thinkers labelled as “anti-Sufi.”68 While a historical 
approach does yield some reference points with regard to that which is considered “Sufic,” 
showing where the boundary lies with regard to that which is accepted as “Sufism,” it must be 
acknowledged that it does not provide a definition. 
 
Thirdly, there is an approach that treats Sufism as a category of Islamic learning. The problem 
with this approach is not that it draws an integral link between Sufism and Islam, for despite 
assertions that it is “necessary to attack a position often taken for granted, namely that it 
[Sufism] grew out of the Koran,”69 it has rarely been “taken for granted” with some continuing 
to hold that the Qur’an “provides little explicit treatment of mystical themes.”70 Rather, a 
problem with treating Sufism as a category of Islamic learning is that Sufism does not adhere to 
a strict categorisation in the way categories such as Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), Hadith studies, 
Islamic law (fiqh), Arabic Grammar, or any other category of Islamic learning does. These 
categories of Islamic learning have defined boundaries with regard to content, for example 
those examining the authenticity of Hadith study the legitimacy of the chains of transmission 
(isnad), while those examining Islamic law (fiqh) examine how laws can be extrapolated from 
the Qur’an and Hadith. There is some degree of interaction between these disciplines, an 
example of which is those examining Islamic law (fiqh) are dependent on those examining the 
authenticity of Hadith to determine which Hadith can be used for extrapolating laws. However, 
even a cursory glance at some of the better known Sufi works shows many examples of cross-
disciplinary studies encompassing the breadth of Islamic learning whilst containing an element, 
which, for lack of a better word, could be called “Sufic” that is rarely found in works that belong 
                                                          
67
 Examples of these kind of lists include Claud Field, Mystics and Saints of Islam (London: Francis Griffiths, 1910) 
and Karamustafa, Sufism, 3 – 5, and “What is Sufism,” 250. 
68
 For instance, regarding Ibn Taymiyya’s “Sufi” elements see George Makdisi, “Ibn Taymiya: A Sufi of the Qadiriya 
Order,” American Journal of Arabic Studes 1 (1973) and Th Emil Homerin, “Ibn Taimīya's al-Sūfīyah wa-al-Fuqarā,” 
Arabica 32 (1985). 
69
 Baldick, Mystical Islam, 9. 
70
 McGregor, Sancity and Mysticism, 2. 
40 
 
strictly to one of the other categories of Islamic learning. Whilst further study is required to 
establish this point, it is evident that it is problematic to view Sufism, due to its cross-
disciplinary nature, as strictly another discipline of Islamic learning. 
 
Systematic Sufism 
 
Again, is it often suggested that Sufism is not systematic. This claim persists because Sufi texts 
are generally not holistic, in the sense of encapsulating the system, from which it is inferred 
that Sufism is incomplete and thus limited. While it is possible to agree with this conclusion, it 
would be for different reasons. The assertion that Sufism has no system arises from the basis 
that no system can be derived from the examined texts. However, this overlooks a) the 
purposes of the texts and b) the paradigm that underpins them. The purpose is sometimes 
explicit, being composed in response to a specific request. Though, even when the purpose is 
unclear, it is evident that the texts are underpinned by a doctrine not covered within the text 
itself. Even works such as al-Ghazali’s Ihya ulum al-din or Ibn ‘Arabi’s Futuhat al-makkiyya, even 
though the breadth of both is almost incomparable, each is incomplete without an Islamic 
paradigm. As a result, Sufi texts need not be self-contained, though this in no way implies that 
they are unsystematic or incomplete. As will be shown in the study that follows, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s works affirm this view in that they freely quote the Qur’an and Hadith and include 
elliptical statements that would be incomprehensible without knowledge of Islam.  
 
It can be seen that, in part, the view that Sufism is incomplete and unsystematic arise from the 
view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam. While the view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam emerged 
amongst Orientalists,71 it persists with statements like the Qur’an “provides little explicit 
treatment of mystical themes.”72 It persists despite Nicholson, who in his early work advanced 
the view that “Sufism cannot be traced back to a single definite cause,”73 later retracted his 
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original position, stating that it is a “fact that Sufism, like every other religious movement in 
Islam, has its roots in the Koran and the Sunna.”74 The view that Sufism is ancillary to Islam has 
been refuted by Rabbani,75 among others,76 by advancing the argument that if Sufism is 
ancillary to Islam then so is Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic law (fiqh) as none of these 
were evident during the advent of Islam. Danner supports this, writing that “the Sufis are well 
aware that nothing called Sufi existed in the time of the Prophet”77 and that “the four major 
schools of Sunnite jurisprudence ... all go back to their founders who lived in the second/eighth 
and third/ninth centuries,”78 during which the term ‘Sufi’ gained currency. The problematic 
nature of the existence of Sufism is not unique to modern scholarship, for example, as a young 
man Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah did not hold this view, and only later came to see Sufism as being integral to 
Islam. It was Abu Al-Abbas’ knowledge of Islam, especially the interconnections between its 
exoteric and esoteric aspects, which convinced Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah of the integral connection. While 
such interconnections may remain a matter of dispute, they have been repeatedly affirmed, 
especially in works labelled “Sufic.” 
 
One Further Difficulty 
 
Even acknowledging the long history of the problem of defining “Sufism,” and the issues this 
gives rise to, only covers part of the issues with the use of this category. The lack of a consensus 
on the etymology of the term is further problematised due to disagreements on claims on, and 
ascriptions of, being a Sufi. This point touches on the distinction between authentic Sufism and 
pseudo-Sufism, an issue that cannot be fully discussed here. The problem as it stands is that, on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
accept … that the Sufis owed much or little of what they did or said to Christian, Jewish, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, 
Hermetic, Zoroastrian or Buddhist example.” Not only did Arberry believe that Sufism was a syncretic mixture of 
previous doctrines, he, Ibid., 136, further felt that “Sufism has run its course,” signalling deathblows to both 
Sufism’s originality and continuance. 
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one hand, Sufism has been used as a degenerate term to undermine, rightly or wrongly, various 
groups within the history of Islam,79 while, on the other hand, it can be seen to occupy an 
ambiguous position even within pro-Sufi texts and writers.80 If we take Ibn Taymiyya’s 
opposition to Sufism as a case in point, it is possible to see that his ascription of unorthodox 
practices to various Sufi groups arises as a result of misunderstanding the particular practices of 
these groups.81 The misunderstanding of Sufi views and practices has also caused fears of 
potential political turmoil due to the numbers various Sufi groups have gained in various 
regions across the Islamic world throughout its history, resulting in the ostracising, and 
suppression, of such groups in many of those regions.82 This is further problematised in 
modern, non-Muslim countries where “the terms ‘Sufi’ and ‘Sufism’ are being used to 
characterise a vast and composite field covering more traditional Sufi orders with an 
unambiguous and explicit Islamic frame of reference … as well as less traditional Sufi groups 
and movements, which apart from a limited nomenclature and a few practices have nothing in 
common with Islamic faith.”83 While these points require further analysis, they are sufficient to 
illustrate some of the reasons for the ambiguous and sometimes negative view of Sufism. 
 
Another, perhaps more interesting, reason for the difficulty of creating a clear distinction 
between Sufism and pseudo-Sufism can be found in apparently pro-Sufi texts and writers. The 
issue is that in some works there is the view of a Sufi as the culmination of soteriological 
development while in others the Sufi is discussed as merely a soteriological stage through 
which the aspirant passes to further soteriological development. While further study is required 
to understand these two conceptions of “Sufi,” and the reasons for its variegated used, one 
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thing is clear. Irrespective of whether a Sufi is someone who has reached their summit of 
soteriological development or someone who has reached a particular point within their 
soteriological development, the esteem given to the “Sufis” is high, even if they are not beyond 
the criticism of some writers. 
 
Some Consequences for the Study of Sufism 
 
There has been some acknowledgement that the scholarly approach to Sufism needs to be 
modified with the suggestion that the study of Sufism “requires that we re-evaluate some basic 
analytical assumptions underlying the study of Sufism.”84 While correct, this does not penetrate 
the issue as those “basic analytical assumptions” are often symptoms of the mis-categorisation 
of Sufism. There have been suggestions, especially with regard to Islamic materials, to challenge 
existing categorisations, apparent in the view that “somewhat uncritical, for a time, in Western 
work was the use of the category ‘scripture’ as a general – and rather taken-for-granted – rubic, 
under which the Qur’an was included.”85 Yet, such challenges are yet to be applied to the 
category “Sufism.” Acknowledging the above-mentioned classification errors is important for 
developing a better understanding of Sufism. However, simply acknowledging them does not 
readily propose a method for positively categorising Sufism. Sufism could be, for example, a 
form of Islamic mysticism though it should be recognised that there are “subtle and major 
differences of understanding in the Islamic case – differences [too] significant for a generic 
concept”86 and any discussion of Sufism as Islamic mysticism should document what kind of 
mysticism Sufism represents and how the Islamic case differs from others. However, discussions 
of Sufism within scholarly literature too often uncritically accept prior categorisations rather 
than questioning the legitimacy of the categorisation itself. 
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Despite the necessity for critical reflection and reassessment of its classification, “Sufism” can 
be utilised as a legitimate grouping. It is important to realise that “Sufism is not a static, 
homogenous ‘thing’ that can be studied in isolation,”87 thus a correct contextualisation is 
necessary. By acknowledging that it is active within Islamic contexts it is possible to see that 
Sufism, despite its diversity of manifestation, is continuous in its function. By contextualising 
Sufism as such it could be tentatively suggested that its function is to act as a counterbalance to 
extremist and dogmatic views within Islamic communities, which would go some way to 
explaining the diversity amongst those who have been labelled ‘Sufi’. 
 
It is possible to identify that Sufism combines two interrelated elements or that it performs two 
functions, both of which illustrate that Sufism is unmistakably underpinned by Islamic 
paradigms. Firstly, and proactively, Sufism can be seen to consist of a hermeneutic method that 
intends to highlight the predominantly soteriological elements within Islamic doctrine. In doing 
so, Sufism emphasises the constant and intimate relationship between the individual and Allah, 
often with emphasis on the personal responsibilities of the former if they are to realise, affirm, 
and embody the degree of intimacy towards the latter that exists irrespective of the individual’s 
awareness of it. As has been suggested: 
If the Qur’an and Tradition are at pains to teach what the relation of God to 
the world is, and what man must do to be saved, the purpose of the Sufis 
was to elucidate how, to elaborate a theoretical explanation of the modality 
of the relationship holding between Creator and creation.
88 
In this regard, Sufism can be seen as personal and proactive in that the focus is on the individual 
and their engagement in the soteriological process. While this is of primary importance for 
understanding Sufism, it is an element that is well known and is often the primary focus for 
texts on the topic.  
 
Sufism can also be seen to have a reactive element. This element is often overlooked in 
discussions on Sufism and it is important because it a) partly explains the reasons behind the 
prominence of particular Sufi figures within various eras and localities and b) places Sufism 
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undeniably within an Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, examining this reactive element allows 
for a there to be some consistency across the history of Islam for there to be a transhistorical 
thing deemed “Sufism,” despite varied and shifting concerns in those figures and texts labelled 
“Sufic.” Given that the primary and proactive element of Sufism is a continued access to the 
salvific growth of the individual, the reactive element can be seen to be an attempt to maintain 
this within the greater community. It is generally accepted that Sufism grew out of the activities 
of Islamic ascetics that arose within the 3rd AH/9th CE century, a movement that has been seen 
as a response to the growing focus of worldly concerns within the greater Islamic community.89 
This function of refocusing the community on the salvific nature of the Islamic doctrine is a 
trend that can be seen within most of the figures that are seen as having been great and 
important Sufi figures. Within the history of Sufism, this refocusing can be seen to have come 
about through both external and internal influences on the Islamic community that have been 
deemed as being a distraction from the soteriological development of the individual.   
 
A sample of “Sufic” figures can sufficiently illustrate the importance that this reactive element 
has had within Islamic communities. While the ecstatic utterances of Hallaj could be read as a 
reaction to the stifling aridity of the scholars of his era, there is perhaps stronger evidence for 
the reactive element of Sufism in the action of his Shaykh. Despite the outcry of many, it was 
not until Junayd, Hallaj’s Sufi teacher, agreed to sign what was effectively a death warrant that 
action was taken. Despite his reticence of agreeing to the warrant, Junayd’s actions can be read 
as attempting to maintain the salvific potential for those who were/could have been put off by 
such ecstatic utterances. Many of al-Ghazali’s writings can be seen to have arisen as a response 
to the utilisation of external, and to some extent un-Islamic, materials. A clear example of the is 
his Incoherence of the Philosophers, which effectively illustrates some of the contradictions 
inherent in those who have attempted to reconcile, and ultimately rely on, Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian materials with Islamic ones, particularly the Qur’an. Such contradictions are 
problematic for they undermine the position of revelation with regard to the individual’s 
salvation. Even Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position as Ibn Taymiyya’s infamous interlocutor can be seen in 
the same light, for, as text of their alleged debate shows, the latter was raising objections to 
certain practices and individuals that was liable to cause distraction or, at worst, harm to the 
generality of the Islamic community in the manner in which they carried out their daily 
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devotions. Despite there being no evidence that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was implicated in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
objections, he nevertheless marched against him. Thus it is possible that his primary cause for 
marching against and confronting Ibn Taymiyya was to attempt to curtail the enmity that such 
views were liable to raise between the Muslims within their community.  
 
Furthermore, the reactive element can also be found within contemporary expressions of 
Sufism. There has been, within the work of modern scholars, “about two decades of intellectual 
debate about whether Sufism had, in fact, changed its focus in a significant way during the 
eighteenth-century reform movements to emphasize Hadith studies and the Prophet’s role 
rather than the Gnostic monism of Ibn ‘Arabi.”90 Without commenting on this discussion 
explicitly, given what has been suggested here about the reactive element of Sufism, while a 
shift such as this might be perceived as a “significant” change in focus, it can also be seen as a 
necessary one for maintaining the salvific potential of Islam accessible to those who propose to 
realise it. Further support of this is evident in the fact that “Sufism has come to play a more 
important role among the more recent trends in cultural theorizing, since it is the expression of 
Islam that most incorporates local cultural elements and embodies local Islams.”91 This 
recognition of Sufism’s focus on locality and the local community could be seen as Sufism’s 
focus on attempting to maintain the salvific element within and through the community’s 
expression of Islam. While this is merely a sample of figures from the multitude of “Sufic” 
figures within the history of Islam, it sufficiently shows that a) the primary concern of the 
reactive element of Sufism is to Islamic communities and b) this concern is for the continued 
access to the salvific potential within Islam.  
 
Taken in conjunction, the proactive and reactive elements, both together and individually, 
illustrate reasons why Sufism cannot be considered as merely another discipline like other 
Islamic disciplines like Qur’an study and commentary, Hadith studies, jurisprudence, or any 
other. The proactive element of Sufism, in focusing on the soteriological development of the 
individual, draws from all other Islamic disciplines in as far as each of these disciplines can 
contribute to the individual’s salvation. The reactive element of Sufism, in focusing on an 
attempt to maintain the salvific potential within the community, will, at times, utilise certain 
uniquely Islamic disciplines to promote the accessibility of salvation, whether it be through 
                                                          
90
 Hermansen, “Academic Study of Sufism,” 36. 
91
 Ibid., 32. 
47 
 
Qur’anic commentary or Friday sermons, while speaking out against elements that threaten the 
community’s access to salvation, whether it be al-Ghazali’s writing against reliance on non-
Islamic philosophical sources, Junayd’s agreement to move against al-Hallaj, or even Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s march against Ibn Taymiyya. It is for these reasons that it is proposed that it is necessary 
to re-evaluate the materials and thinkers who have been collected under the label of “Sufism” 
in order to better understand the content of their works and what, if any, contribution they 
make to the history of Islam generally and Sufism specifically.  
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Part II  
Chapter 3 – The Case of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
 
Provision (rizq) as an entry point to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Oeuvre 
 
To highlight Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological cosmography, as well as some of the 
interconnections between his works, this work will attempt to explore these interconnections 
through the examination of the problem of Provision (rizq). Provision, or specifically its pursuit, 
belongs to the domain of creation, though this poses a rationally perplexing problem. The 
problem is as follows: as contingently existent beings, that is, as creations we are not self 
sufficient and, as such, require provision for our continued existence. However, as our existence 
and that of our provision comes from the same source, namely Allah, what impetus is there to 
seek provision and how are we to respond when provision is either granted or denied? This 
problem covers a diverse range of areas and its implications are equally diverse, covering 
domains such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, morality, eschatology, and soteriology. 
Far from providing a comprehensive analysis of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s views on these areas, each 
successive chapter will examine one area and its relation to the problem of rizq. This method 
should sufficiently show the continuity of goal and method throughout Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre, 
without making a comprehensive analysis necessary while foregrounding his reliance on an 
inherently Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, this analysis will highlight one of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
primary methodological tools, which is here being called his soteriological semiotics.1  
 
Rizq literally means “anything granted by someone to someone else as a benefit,” hence 
“bounty, sustenance, nourishment.”2 The Qur’an states “verily, unto Allah do we belong and, 
verily, unto Him we shall return” (2: 156), which is taken as an indication that all real benefit 
derives from Allah. This view is strengthened by verses such as “partake of the good things 
which We have provided for your sustenance” (2: 57), amongst others.3 In the Qur’an, 
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wherever rizq, or its related verbal forms, occur Allah is “virtually always the subject or implied 
agent.”4 That all sustenance rests on Allah is put beyond dispute in the Qur’anic statement that 
“there is no living creature on earth but depends for its sustenance on Allah” (11: 6). Thus, the 
problem of rizq includes questions of the pursuit of sustenance given that we and our 
sustenance depend equally on Allah, how sustenance should be pursued if ultimately it does 
not come through individual effort, and, perhaps most importantly, how this can be achieved 
without making partners with Allah.  
 
One, seemingly unrelated, use of the term rizq occurs within military terminology. Here, rizq 
refers to regular payments made to registered soldiers.5 In the Qur’an it states that Allah 
“grants abundant sustenance, or gives it in scant measure, unto whomever He wills”6 (42: 12) 
and that it is granted “in due measure” (42: 27). Just as the measure due to a soldier depends 
on the amount they have served, the measure due to the individual depends on their sincerity 
and consistency of worship, as the Qur’an states “seek, then, all sustenance from Allah, and 
worship Him and be grateful to Him” (29: 17). Similarly, just as the soldier struggles against 
opponents, which is known as the lesser struggle (jihad as-sagir) the individual struggles against 
their own ego, which is known as the greater struggle (jihad al-kabir). While the significance of 
this point will become evident in the chapter on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriology, it is important 
here to see that in moving from an egocentric worldview to a God-centred worldview that 
knowledge of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah) being the method for such 
transition, is crucial. Thus, rizq is not solely provision in a gross materialistic sense, but also 
includes the measure of knowledge each individual has, amongst other things. 
 
That rizq is not limited to materialistic sustenance has been discussed by various thinkers. 
Insight into the breath of this term can be gained from al-Ghazali’s commentary on the Divine 
name al-razzaq, the Provider, where he states that, 
Al-razzaq – the Provider – is the one who created the means of sustenance 
as well as those who are sustained, and who conveys the means to the 
creatures as well as creating for them the ways of enjoying them. Sustaining 
                                                          
4
 McAuliffe, “RIZK,” 568. 
5
 Clifford E. Bosworth, “RIZK,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), vol. VIII, 568. 
6
 This tenet, with minor variations, is repeated throughout the Qur’an. See 2: 212, 3: 27, 13: 26, 16: 71, 17: 30, 24: 
38, 28: 82, 29: 62, 30: 37, 34: 36, 34: 39, and 39: 52, among others. 
50 
 
is of two kinds: outward, consisting of nourishment and food, which is for the 
sake of what is outward, namely the body. Inwardly, it consists in things 
known and things revealed, and that is directed to our hearts and in most 
parts. This latter is the higher of the two modes of sustenance, for its fruit is 
eternal life; while the fruit of external sustenance is bodily strength for a 
short period of time. God – great and glorious – Himself attends to creating 
the two modes of sustenance and is graciously disposed to convey both 
kinds, but “He extends sustenance to whomever He wills and decrees” 
(42:12).
7
 
If there was still any question about the breadth of rizq, al-Ghazali further states that the Divine 
name al-muqit, the Nourisher, “means the same as Provider [al-razzaq], yet this name is more 
specific, since provision includes what is other than food as well as food.”8 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as 
focus is given to eschatological and soteriological concerns, greater emphasis is placed on 
inward sustenance, though this in no way undermines the procurement of outward sustenance. 
 
With regard to the study that follows, it is worth pointing out that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, despite his 
initial reservations, did not change his vocation as a religious scholar (faqih) upon becoming a 
Sufi (faqir), despite an alleged bifurcation between the religious scholar (faqih) and the Sufi 
(faqir). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah came from a long line of distinguished religious scholars (faqih) and “had 
gained a certain renown even though he was quite young.”9 “To his joy, he learned from the 
Shaykh [al-Mursi] that his entry into the [Sufi] Path did not prevent him from pursuing his 
studies of the Law” and upon mastering the Sufi path he did not discard one mode of learning 
for the other, as can be seen from that fact that “he spent the remainder of his life as an 
honoured and well-known Sufi master and Maliki faqih.”10 Thus, by mastering both the outward 
and inward teachings of Islam, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah justifiably received the title Crown of the religion 
(taj ad-din). In being both faqir and faqih, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is not alone amongst the Sufis, for 
many excelled in classical Islamic education as well as Sufi training. Numerous Sufi 
commentaries on the rites of Islam attest to this as they illustrate both the breadth and depth 
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of knowledge crucial for the effective practice of such rites. Unlike many Sufi figures, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s mastery of Islamic law is widely acknowledged.11 While this may be a factor contributing 
to the lack of scholarly analysis, establishing this would take us too far afield.   
 
Qur’anic Hermeneutics  
 
In contextualising Sufism within an Islamic paradigm it is necessary to understand the basis 
upon which it is founded, these being the Qur’an and the Hadith.12 The Qur’an is taken as the 
immutable, irrefutable word of Allah revealed to Muhammad. Against this text all things are 
weighed, one reason that the Qur’an is also known as the Criterion (al-furqan). The justification 
for utilising the Qur’an as a criterion is itself a Qur’anic injunction.13 The Qur’an, as the Speech 
of Allah, “is the barzakh or isthmus between man’s intelligence and God’s knowledge of things 
as they are in themselves ... whereby man can come to know things in themselves, without the 
distortions of egocentrism.”14 If this is true for the Islamic worldview, so too can it be seen 
within the general outlook of Sufism and many of those labelled “Sufis” explicitly assert this 
view. The above quoted statements of Junayd and Abu’l Hassan Al-Shadhili attest to this. Thus, 
while not distinct to the Shadhiliyya, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah adheres to Abu’l Hassan’s position of 
verifying his position by the Qur’an. 
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Part of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Qur’anic hermeneutics is intimately connected to his primary 
soteriological method, which involves identifying and deciphering the signs. The Qur’an states 
“We have indeed made the signs clear unto you, if you would only use your reason” (3: 118) 
and that “on the earth there are signs [of God’s existence, visible] to all who are endowed with 
inner certainty, just as [there are signs thereof] within your own selves” (51: 20 – 21). These 
signs (ayat), for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, are existent so that the Oneness of Allah (tawhid) can be 
understood and affirmed through multiplicity. While they are evident upon the earth and 
within the individual, they can be seen to be concentrated within the Qur’an, as each verse 
(ayat) is a sign, and the text as a whole can be considered a book of signs. Through Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s work it is apparent that deciphering these signs, being as they are the communication 
between Creator and creation, is a primary aspect of understanding and developing the 
soteriological status of the individual. While the signs (ayat) are there irrespective of their 
comprehension, the Qur’an states that “We have made all the signs manifest unto a people 
who are endowed with inner certainty” (2: 118). As a result of this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Qur’anic 
hermeneutics and soteriological method can be seen to consist of a twofold approach which 
involves a) the development of certainty (yakin) for the individual to be able to read the signs 
and b) company with someone who is “endowed with inner certainty” so that the signs (ayat) 
can be indicated to the individual in order to develop their certainty (yakin). 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s hermeneutic method does not simply extrapolate on the meaning of particular 
passages. Rather, he utilises a hermeneutic method which highlights the multiple levels of 
meaning that arise from the specific phrasing of the Qur’an. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not simply 
state that the Qur’an does not contain this or that. At times, he analyses a phrase or sentence 
to highlight why it was not phrased in another manner. An example of this is his commentary 
on the verse 7: 201 where he rules out the inclusion of ‘and’, ‘then’, and ‘hence’ because all 
have, among other things, an allusion to a temporality that he says is inconsistent with the 
verse.15 In another example, in commentating on the verse 4: 65, he points out that “He did not 
say, ‘But no, by the Lord,’ but rather, ‘But no, by your Lord,’ because in that wording there is a 
confirmation of the swearing and that sworn upon” which the other wording does not 
contain.16 Thus, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this passage cannot be worded in any other manner if it is to 
convey the intended meaning.  
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Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah utilises reason to inform his Qur’anic hermeneutics. Rational arguments are 
utilised in as far as they a) are secondary to revelation and b) affirm the revealed Word. This 
use of rational arguments within Sufi pedagogic methods is not unique to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Abu’l-
Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 465/1072), whose work the Risala is considered a major early Sufi text, 
believed that “Sufi Shaykhs should not shirk from using rational arguments in training their 
disciples when necessary.”17 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah endorses this view, utilising rational arguments 
where necessary, condones irrational views, and at times proposes supra-rational ones. Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah writes that “believers belong to one of two categories: those who have come to faith 
in God based on intellectual assent (tasdiq) and submission (idh’an), and those who have come 
to faith in God based on witnessing (shuhud) and direct experience (‘ayan).”18 Thus, for 
soteriological development, rational arguments are utilised in as far as they aid in achieving this 
goal. 
 
The Qur’an is a difficult text. The themes that take precedence depend on the hermeneutical 
approach.19 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s prime concern is soteriological. This focuses on the Creator’s 
relation with, and disposition towards, creation. By taking soteriological development as a 
prime concern, it appears that Allah is disposed to display mercy and guidance towards 
creation20 and that “the revealed Speech is dominated by the attributes of mercy and 
guidance.”21 A similar hermeneutic method is evident in al-Ghazali’s comment that “there is no 
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evil in existence which does not contain some good within it, and were that evil to be 
eliminated, the good within it would be nullified, and the final result would be an evil worse 
than the evil containing the good.”22 That Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is of a similar view is evident in 
statements such as “deprivation (al-man’) hurts you only because of the lack of your 
understanding of God in it.”23 Thus, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s hermeneutic method emphasises the signs 
of Allah’s mercy. Taha’s Qur’anic hermeneutics distinguishes between the Meccean suras, 
which focus on the Oneness of Allah, and the Median suras, which focus on the codification of 
daylily life, is useful here. While Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) tends to focus on the 
implementation of the codification of daily life, it could be stated that the focus of Sufi 
hermeneutics is on the embodiment of Allah’s Oneness within daily life. Critics of Sufism, both 
traditional and modern, attempt to make a case for Sufism’s hertodoxy by focusing on an 
apparent dichotomy between what is labelled “Sufi practices” and adherence to Islamic law 
(shari’ah). However, when the distinction between the two hermeneutic methods is 
understood, Sufism’s orthopraxy is apparent in as far as Sufi hermeneutics utilises the 
codification of daily life as a means to realise Allah’s Oneness (tawhid). This is not to suggest 
that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) downplays Allah’s Oneness (tawhid), rather it highlights a 
difference between merely adhering to Islamic law (shari’ah), on the one hand, and utilising this 
law as a means realising and embodying the earlier Qur’anic message of Allah’s Oneness 
(tawhid), found in the Meccian suras. While this explains, to some extent, the disjunction 
between the two hermeneutic methods, and the debates that ensued, this in no way 
overshadows other sources of conflict between these groups, such as vying for political favour, 
which, due to their complexity, cannot be covered here.   
 
The Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah) 
 
The view that Sufism is unsystematic overlooks the Sufi methodology known as the Science of 
Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). This involves the knowledge and implementation of the 
practices of the Prophet Muhammad. The focus on the practices implemented by Muhammad 
involves a distinction between the Sunnah, being the practices the Prophet implemented upon 
himself, and the shari’ah, being what can be extrapolated from them,24 as they are commonly 
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conflated. The Qur’an states “verily, in the Apostle of Allah you have a good example” (33:21), 
which can be taken as referring to Muhammad and his practices.25 Again the Qur’an states “Say 
[O Prophet]: ‘If you love Allah, follow me, [and] Allah will love you” (3:31). Verses such as these 
strengthen the view that the Prophetic example is “’God-given’ as opposed to being the fruit of 
human effort.”26 The result of this is, by basing oneself on the Prophetic model, a move away 
from self-centred worldview towards a God-centred worldview. By abrogating self-choice the 
individual moves from an affirmation of multiplicity that is implied therein towards an 
affirmation of Allah’s unity (tawhid) through the constant adherence to Allah’s choice for 
creation as it is evident within the Prophetic model. The process through which affirmation of 
Allah’s unity (tawhid) develops within the individual is what is here meant by soteriological 
development. Whilst it is somewhat self-evident, Sufism’s focus on the figure of Muhammad, to 
which countless texts and figures attest, places it within a uniquely Islamic paradigm. 
 
Access to the prophetic practices relates to the transmission of the science of Prophethood. 
The transmission of the science of Prophethood has two aspects, one historical and the other 
trans-historical. The historical aspect involves the collection Hadith, which are the reports of 
the statements and actions of the Prophet “transmitted to posterity by his companions”27 and 
later through “a chain of authorities (isnad),”28 and their eventual codification into the 
authentic (sahih) collections. The foundations of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) 
are contained within the Qur’an and the Hadith, the latter of which record the Sunnah. Without 
delving into any of the debates that surround this body of literature, it is important to note the 
breadth of this literature and as such is bound to contain material that each reader will be 
unaware of. For this reason it is considered necessary to accompany someone who has 
assimilated the prophetic model in as far as it is possible to adhere to “the Prophet’s etiquette, 
his moral and spiritual states, and, whenever possible, his inner realities.”29 This relates to the 
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trans-historical aspect of transmission. Just as the Hadith were initially collected, passed on, 
and verified through their isnad, so too was the trans-historical transmission of the virtues and 
practices of the prophetic model transmitted through a chain of authorities known as a silsilah. 
A silsilah designates a “lineage that is in unbroken succession from the Prophet.”30 With regard 
to the transmission of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) it should be noted that the 
historical aspect of transmission trumps the trans-historical aspect in as far as deviation from 
the historical aspect voids the salvific guarantee for additional practices not found in the 
prophetic model cannot be considered to affirm tawhid to the degree that they in the practices 
of a Prophet or Messenger.    
 
In light of the soteriological centrality of the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah), the 
reasons why many Sufis take great pains to adhere to, and stress the importance of, the 
prophetic model becomes evident. It is not just in the adherence to the prophetic model in acts 
of prayer, fasting, or other acts of worship that it is important. It is recognized that “the 
imitation of the Prophet’s Norm, or Sunnah, in the performance of the rituals and in moral and 
social matters is what gives to the Islamic religion its rock-like stability throughout the ages” 
such that “of all the major religions still extant, Islam is the only one that is essentially the same 
now as it was in the days of its founder.”31 From this it becomes apparent that a salvific 
guarantee exists to the extent that one embodies the prophetic model in all aspects of daily life 
and that “the relationship which is established between the saint and the prophet who is his 
model is not a vague ‘patronage’” for “it confers a precise and visible character on the behavior, 
virtues and graces” of the adherent.32 For this reason many stories illustrating the extent to 
which some go to adhere to the prophetic model are taken to be preposterous, and therefore 
hagiographic. It may seem odd, or at best benign, when we hear the story of “a certain scholar 
who refrained from eating watermelons” because, while he knew that the Prophet Muhammad 
had eaten them, he was not aware of “how he had done so, and this is why he abstained from 
them.”33  This illustrates an important soteriological principle, namely that actions made purely 
on self-choice are potentially detrimental in as far as they do not guarantee salvation. Even 
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esoteric insights are to be subjected to this same yardstick if they are to participate in the 
salvific guarantee. This view is reinforced by Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili’s statement that “if your 
mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Qur’an and Sunna, hold fast to these two and take 
no notice of your unveiling.”34 As it is the prophetic model that is the guarantee of sanctity, any 
action or moral value that is not in accord with the example of the prophet it represents, from 
this perspective, has no salvific guarantee. As a result, in as far as those labelled “Sufis” adhere 
to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) acts 
as a safety net protecting the inherently Islamic nature of Sufism.35 Furthermore, this highlights 
the importance of the transmission of the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah). While the 
adherent will strive to embody the prophetic example there will undoubtedly be blind spots 
that can potentially limit further soteriological development. For this reason the expertise of 
someone who conforms to the prophetic model is necessary. 
 
With regard to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, there is evidence that he too elaborates on the Science 
of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). The Qur’an states “We have sent unto you an apostle from 
among yourselves ... to impart unto you revelation and wisdom” (2: 151). ‘Revelation’, in this 
verse, is a translation of al-kitab, literally the book, referring to the Qur’an. ‘Wisdom’ (al-hikma) 
here can be seen as referring to the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). The justification 
for this is in the fact that the Prophet Muhammad bequeathed to humanity the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s first, and most famous, work, the kitab al-Hikam, literally ‘The Book of 
Wisdoms’, being essentially a collection of wisdom (hikma), can be seen, in this light, as an 
elaboration on the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah). It should be noted that the 
content of the kitab al-Hikam is not so much about the outward practices of the Prophet, but 
rather a commentary on the internal corollary of such activities. Thus, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be 
seen to be contributing to the understanding and implementation of the Science of 
Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). Furthermore, this can be seen as being acknowledged explicitly 
in statements such as “Allah opened the way of guidance through the prophets and 
messengers, so those who came after them walked their path, and the true believers persisted 
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in following them.”36 While acknowledging that a God-centred worldview was opened through 
all prophets and messengers for everyone to walk “their path,” Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that only 
“the true believers persisted in following them,” indicating that the salvific guarantee inherent 
in this path is only maintained through adherence to the Science of Prophethood (ilm al-
nabuwah). By taking Muhammad as his prophetic model, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to be 
taking an explicitly and exclusively Islamic paradigm as the basis for his work, and through 
which it needs to be seen if it is to be understood. 
 
The Importance of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
 
With the above-mentioned issues in mind, it could be stated that, with the type of analysis 
proposed here, the choice of Islamic thinker is somewhat arbitrary. Without denying this 
suggestion it should be recognised that utilising Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah as a case study fulfils several 
criteria for a study of this kind. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is well known and since his death in 709 AH/1309 
CE, his works have been widely translated and read. He is historically important in that amongst 
the masters of the Shadhiliyya37 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was the first to compose treatises. It is not that 
the founder of this Sufi order (tariqa), Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili, or his successor, Abu’l Abbas al-
Mursi, did not write or compose anything, as both are known to have written many letters and 
are renowned for their litanies (hizb).38 However, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the third of the Shadhiliyya 
masters, has the honour of composing the earliest works on the Shadhiliyya teachings and 
methods. He also has a trans-historical importance, given that since their composition his works 
have be constantly studied by an ever increasing variety and number of people. Furthermore, 
despite his works being widely available within European languages, upon which this study 
relies, an analysis of these and their interconnections has been overlooked. In treating Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah as an intrinsically Islamic thinker the analysis developed here show Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah to be a 
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uniquely Islamic soteriological cosmographer who deploys a soteriological semiotics in order to 
evoke within his adherents a performative cosmography.39  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works are the first compositions on the Shadhili method, without which little 
would be known of the first three leaders of the Shadhiliyya order, Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili, 
Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi, and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah himself.40 Moreover, it was the dissemination of his 
works, especially the Kitab al-Hikam, which helped popularise the Shadhiliyya. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
works also provide insight into the practice of Sufism. Regarding his works, Ibn Abbad of Ronda 
(d. 792 AH/1390 CE) wrote, in response to an aspirant, that “the book which you have by Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah, the Kitab at-Tanwir, comprises all that the books on Sufism, whether detailed or 
condensed, contain including both detailed explanations and concise expressions.”41 While 
Ahmad Zarruq (d. 899 AH/1494 CE) said that “the Hikam are to Sufism what the eyes are to the 
body.”42 More recently, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works have been used to “glimpse the ideas that were 
preached to the ordinary people”43 in Mamluk Egypt and have been considered sufficient to 
stand as the sole representative of Sufism.44 Without being exhaustive, it is evident that 
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because of his importance, both historical and trans-historical, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works deserve 
attention. 
 
Furthermore, beyond his importance, both historical and trans-historical, and the lack of 
modern scholarly analysis, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works are ideal for a study of this kind because they 
do not explicitly indicate any external influence. Whilst other Islamic thinkers explicitly discuss 
Greek or Indian philosophy and science or show a marked degree of influence, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
whilst not being alone, neither discusses or indicates any predominate influence from non-
Islamic materials. The sources he quotes, the people he mentions, and the examples he raises 
are all devoid of any apparent external influences. For this reason it is somewhat easier to 
foreground Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s inherently Islamic approach than it is with others who show such 
influences.  
 
The Life of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
 
Taj ad-Din Abu’l-Fadl Ahmad b. Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Karim b. ‘Ata’ Allah al-Iskandari al-
Judhami al-Shadhili, known simply as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, was born in Alexandria, Egypt, somewhere 
around the middle of the 7th AH/ 13th CE century in Alexandria.45 He was born into a 
“distinguished family of Malikite religious scholars,” of whom his grandfather was “either the 
founder or the reviver of a dynasty of scholars known as the Banu Ibn ‘Ata’illah.”46 Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah “received a traditional Islamic education ... under some of the best and most illustrious 
teachers of Alexandria.”47 He looked to be following in his grandfather’s footsteps “as an 
accomplished scholar in Maliki jurisprudence,” gaining “certain renown even though he was 
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quite young.”48 Even though his father was a disciple of Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili, the founder of 
the Shadhiliyya, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was initially opposed to Sufism because “his fellow students had 
warned him that anyone who delved into Sufism would never master the Law.”49 Thus, early in 
his education he was committed to becoming, and was recognised by others as, a renowned 
jurisprudent (faqih).  
 
The opposition to Sufism manifested itself in arguments with the students of Abu’l ‘Abbas al-
Mursi,50 the successor to Abu’l Hasan al-Shadhili.51 This was until 674 AH/1276 CE when Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah attended a public lecture given by Abu’l ‘Abbas al-Mursi, whereupon he changed 
from an opponent to Sufism to one of Abu’l ‘Abbas al-Mursi’s most serious and promising 
students.52 This change of heart came as a result of Abu’l Abbas’ knowledge of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) which forced Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah to reassess the judgement of his fellow 
students. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was committed to both Sufism and religious law, becoming a master of 
both, teaching at “both the Azhar Mosque and the Mansuriyyah Madrasah in Cairo”53 while 
simultaneously “devoted to his duties as a shaykh in the Shadhili order ... [being] considered 
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examines a branch of the Shadhiliyya derived from the Tunisian, not Egyptian, linage. While this may make his 
comments understandable, this does not make either Trimingham or Cornell correct. Furthermore, Cornell’s 
argument ignores the fact that Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi “upon his death bequeathed the order to two men,” Durkee, 
School of the Shadhdhuliyyah, 57. 
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the foremost spokesperson for Sufism in the Mamluk capital.”54 Thus, during his life, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah was recognised as both faqih and faqir, being renowned for his knowledge of both the 
exoteric (ilm az-zahir) and esoteric (ilm al-batin) aspects of Islamic doctrine. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
became one of the successors of his teacher upon the latter’s death.55 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah died in 
Cairo “at around sixty years of age in the middle of Jumanda II 709 AH/November 1309 AD.”56 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah lived during the Mamluk sultanate, which ended shortly after his death. While it 
is “impossible to know how many Egyptians actively joined Sufi orders,”57 it is recognised that 
during this time Sufism in Cairo flourished.58 Sufism was seen as “something quite distinct from 
the religious authorities of the Law”59 and because of this “a kind of court protocol arose ... 
[for] those masters of the [Sufi] Path recognized by the state as the official spokesmen for the 
Sufi adherents.”60 During this period in Egypt, Sufism became a reified class, distinguished by 
the bestowal of special titles, specific garb, and sectioning of the court seating, all of which 
demarcated the Sufi adherents from the other aspects of the community, each of whom had 
their title, garb, and seats. This reached the point where “in Mamluk society from the 
thirteenth century, the term Sufi could designate a legitimate professional occupation within 
the religious establishment.”61 This exteriorisation of piety differed greatly from classical 
conceptions of Sufism as an interior struggle towards virtue. In contrast Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili 
abolished the ostentatious show of piety by encouraging the Shadhiliyya adherents to wear “no 
distinctive garments setting them apart from the world around them nor did they abandon 
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their professions or trades.”62 This is one of the reasons that Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili’s methods 
were seen as a return to the way of the Prophet. 
 
Re-examining the Works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
 
This study of In ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview makes it possible to revisit the interconnections 
between his works. In doing so, it is useful revise Danner’s overview that was quoted in full in 
the introduction. The interconnections between the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah will become more 
apparent as this work progresses, though it is useful to foreground and highlight the salient 
features of each work and, more importantly, through this highlighting their interconnections 
begin to become visible.  
 
From the works that are available, there are: 
 
• Kitab al-Hikam (The Book of Wisdom): This is perhaps the most widely known of his 
works. It is generally considered his earliest known composition. Consisting primarily of 
aphorisms, this work has often been the source of much contemplation and has inspired 
numerous commentaries. The kitab al-hikam is seen as a masterful summary of the 
lessons necessary for travelling the Sufi path.   
 
• Kitab al-Lata’if fi manaqib Abi l-‘Abbas al-Mursi wa Shaykhihi Abi l Hasan (The Subtle 
Blessings in the Saintly Lives of Abu l-‘Abbas al-Mursi and His Master Abu l-Hassan): This 
biographical work records some of the sayings and litanies (ahzab) Shadhiliyya Shaykhs. 
All subsequent works on Abu l-Hassan al-Shadhili and Abu l-‘Abbas al-Mursi refer, to 
varying degrees, to the Lata’if and is an essential source for information on this period 
of development of the Shadhiliyya order. This work is also somewhat autobiographical, 
without which very little could be said about the life of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah himself. 
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• Miftah al-falah wa misbah al-anwah (The Key of Success and the Lamps of Spirits): 
While not the first to discuss the topic of Sufi invocation (dhikr), this work is the first to 
deal solely with this topic. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah draws on the Qur’an and Hadiths, as well as 
earlier Sufis, to illustrate the necessity of invocation in attaining spiritual felicity. This 
work deals with both the general and technical aspects of invocation, covering such 
topics as its salvific necessity, the aliments that can be cured through the use of specific 
Divine names, as well as some of the etiquette (adab) that one should uphold within 
Sufi circles. 
 
• Kitab al-Tanwir fi isqat al-Tadbir (Light on the Elimination of Self-Direction): As the title 
suggests, this work deals with the elimination of self-direction. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah details 
how the elimination of self-direction (isqat al-tadbir) is necessary for the affirmation of 
Allah’s Unicity (tawhid). In doing so, it is illustrated how this virtue elicits a plethora of 
virtues associated with the Sufi path, including, though not limited to, patience, 
sincerity, hope, fear, and love. This work abounds with the sayings of the first two 
Shadhiliyya Shaykhs and as such is another important source for understanding their 
teaching. As quoted above, it has been considered one of the most important works in 
traversing the Sufi path. 
 
• Al-Qasd al-mujarrad fi ma’rifat al-Ism al-Mufrad (The Pure Goal Concerning Knowledge 
of the Unique Name): This work discusses various aspects of the Supreme Name, Allah. 
While all of his works are steeped in a metaphysics of Unicity (tawhid), this work draws 
out the ontological implications of this doctrine. In doing so, the relation of the Supreme 
Name, Allah, to the other Divine Names is discussed. 
 
• Taj al-arus al-hawi li-tahdhib an-nufus (The Bride’s Crown Containing the Discipline of 
Souls): Previously thought to be a composite work, this work is now considered to 
contain the sermons (khutbah) delivered by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah to both students and non-
student alike. It is deemed to contain the essential principles of Sufi, though stripped of 
the technical language and controversial topics found in other Sufi works, presented in a 
manner palatable for a general audience.  
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• Unwan at-tawfiq fi adab at-tariq (The Sign of Success Concerning the Discipline of the 
Path): This short work is a commentary on a Qasida of Abu Madyan. Through his 
commentary, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah highlights the importance of the relationship between a 
Shaykh and their student (murid). In doing so there is a discussion of a) the importance 
of keeping company with individuals who are more spiritually advanced than oneself, b) 
the etiquette (adab) of keeping such company, and c) the importance of such etiquette. 
 
The Interconnections 
 
Despite being composed on different aspects of the Sufi path, there are some important 
interconnections between the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is aware of such 
interconnections and almost encourages his readers to seek them out, as can be seen in 
statements such as “we have explained this statement in Kitab al-Tanwir, hence, we will not 
repeat our discussion of it here”63 or that “we have stated the same truth in our book al-
hikam.”64 As a Sufi Shaykh of the Shadhiliyya and as a teacher of other Islamic fields, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah understands the pedagogical value of indicating out such lines of inquiry while allowing 
his readers to gain the benefit of seeking them out for themselves. Yet, despite this, the extent 
of these interconnections has not been drawn out within contemporary works.65   
 
It could be submitted that there are two ways of viewing Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre. The first, and 
perhaps most popular, is to view his works as merely a self-commentary on the Kitab al-
Hikam.66 Danner asserted this position, as can be seen in the statement that, in relation to the 
Kitab al-Hikam, “the other books of Ibn ‘Ata’illah, such as the Tanwir, the Qasd, the Lata’if, and 
the Miftah, open up still further angles of insight.”67 This view is supported by the fact that the 
Kitab al-Hikam is the earliest of his existent works and there are frequent allusions to it within 
his other works. However, despite the breadth of the Kitab al-Hikam, it is submitted that this 
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view is unsatisfactory for the following reason. Firstly, to some degree it discounts the value 
that each of his other works hold, making them, in a sense, a footnote to the Kitab al-Hikam 
rather than highlighting the salient features of each text. Furthermore, given Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
reluctance to repeat himself, it is unlikely that he would write these other works if they were 
intended primarily to be commentaries on the Kitab al-Hikam. Thus, while there are some 
points of correspondence between the Kitab al-Hikam and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other texts, it could 
not be asserted that there are any more interconnections between this work and the others 
than between any particular work and the rest of the oeuvre. 
 
A second approach is to view each of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works as being equally important and 
examining what, if any, interconnections exist. This is the approach that has been made 
throughout this work and, as can be seen from the preceding study, while the primary concern 
of each work differs, the oeuvre, when taken as a whole, presents a consistent worldview that 
is dependent on an Islamic paradigm for cohesion and comprehension. The method of 
approach used here has been to draw attention to the cohesiveness of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
worldview while using the footnotes to highlight that a) this cohesiveness is consistent across 
each work and b) the areas within which interconnections can be made are cover the broad 
range of topics covered here. As can be seen within the preceding chapters, and in the outline 
of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works above, within each text there is a dominant theme, or it may be said 
that there is a predominant discussion of a particular domain. Nevertheless, as has been shown 
within this work, each domain is intimately interconnected, underpinned as it is by tawhid, and 
as such each work is interconnected providing a) a consistent worldview and b) an oeuvre that 
requires both an understanding of an Islamic paradigm and a familiarity with each of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s works for a deeper comprehension and appreciation of each of this author’s works.    
 
Despite the popularity of the Kitab al-Hikam, it does not follow that Ibn 'Ata' Allah's other 
works subsume a subordinate role to his earliest known work. Even though the Kitab al-Hikam 
is the most widely available of his works, an example of which can be seen in Appendix 1, it is 
not necessarily to be considered his most important, as can be seen from Ibn Abbad of Ronda's 
statement, that “the book which you have by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the Kitab at-Tanwir, comprises all 
that the books on Sufism, whether detailed or condensed, contain including both detailed 
explanations and concise expressions.”68 While the Kitab al-Hikam's breadth is not in dispute, it 
cannot be singled out as being the only work of Ibn 'Ata' Allah that covers a range of domains, 
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as can be seen from both the preceding quote and the material discussed in the chapters 
above. This becomes increasingly apparent when Ibn 'Ata' Allah's discussion implicitly relies on 
matters discussed in other works, such as the nature of tawhid, implicit in Unwan at-Tawfiq fi 
adab at-Tariq, which connects the metaphysical and ethical domains. As a result, there are two 
reasons for favouring the second approach to Ibn 'Ata' Allah's oeuvre. Firstly, the footnotes 
throughout the discussion of Ibn 'Ata' Allah's works show, of the domains discussed, there is no 
domain that is the sole, exclusive subject of a particular text. Secondly, due to the centrality of 
tawhid to both an Islamic paradigm and Ibn 'Ata' Allah's worldview, there is bound to be 
interconnections that can only be drawn out if the texts are treated as being, to some degree, 
equally, rather than viewing certain texts as subordinate to one specific work. This supports the 
view taken here that each of Ibn 'Ata' Allah's works are equally important and deserve equal 
weighting. 
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Chapter 4 – Metaphysics 
 
It could be suggested that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not have a metaphysics as he neither explicitly 
discusses nor uses the term. Moreover, like other Sufi authors, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s work is 
underpinned by the principle of tawhid, the Oneness of Allah. It is from this principle that the 
multitude of things comes into existence, and to which they return. As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah admits, 
Allah’s Oneness is difficult to grasp because a) it has, in and of itself, no opposite to contrast it 
against; and b) it is the foundation upon which all of creation (khalq) depends. Throughout his 
works, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah devotes many passages explaining how tawhid is to be understood and 
how its affirmation is to be maintained. Occupying, as it does, such a central and foundational 
position within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview, it is suggested that, when pared of all other 
concerns, the Oneness of Allah constitutes what is meant here by the domain of metaphysics 
and is what is intended by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics of tawhid. 
 
Within the domain of metaphysics, provision (rizq) is simply not an issue because, on one hand, 
the self-existent principle is without need and thus does not require provision, and, on the 
other hand, the provision for all of existence is provided by the self-existent principle. However, 
in working out the details and consequences of these two positions rizq begins to become an 
issue. In this sense the domain of metaphysics is the source of the problem of rizq. 
Understanding the relationship between creation and Creator, especially in affirming and 
embodying this relationship, has been a prime concern for theologians, philosophers, and Sufis 
across the Islamic world, and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was no different in this regard. Through an 
examination of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics of tawhid, and teasing out the aspects that relate 
to the problem of rizq, it will be seen that, even in the texts that are not explicitly metaphysical, 
there is a complex interrelation between his works with Allah’s Oneness as a central tenet 
throughout.  
 
Definition of Metaphysics 
 
The word ‘metaphysics’ has no natural correlation in Arabic. As a result of this, “too often 
medieval Arabic metaphysics is regarded as either simply a paraphrase of or commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or a curious and rather unsuccessful blend of Aristotelian metaphysics 
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and Neoplatonism.”1 While this may be true for some figures, it is not true for all. While Arabic 
lacks a native word for metaphysics, the Islamic tradition is not devoid of metaphysical 
material. Too often discussions on metaphysics specifically, and philosophy in general, makes 
the Arabic writers to appear derivative and unoriginal, thus denying any intrinsic Islamic 
metaphysics.2 While the influence of preceding philosophies, especially Greek cannot be 
denied, “one should remember that the Muslim sages accepted only such Greek wisdom as was 
compatible with the Islamic notion of Tawhid.”3  
 
Metaphysics, as it is employed here, is understood as the sense of Being qua Being. ‘Being’ in 
this sense refers to the quiddity of Allah, a chief aspect of which is tawhid. There are two 
approaches that can be taken with regard to Allah’s quiddity, that of Allah’s transcendence 
(tanzih) and immanence (tashbih). In an attempt to understand tawhid it is useful to emphasise 
Allah’s transcendence (tanzih). In this aspect, Allah, in being beyond creation, is not part of the 
ontic scheme. The metaphysics of tawhid appears to be a cold and impersonal domain due to 
Allah’s transcendence (tanzih) and seeming detachment from creation (khalq), though, despite 
creation (khalq) being bracketed within the discussion here, it is seen to have a warmth and 
intimacy when integrated with Allah’s immanence (tashbih) for it emphasises the direct and 
personal connection between Allah and each individual. The metaphysics of tawhid is seen as 
being central to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview and is the foundation from which all other aspects 
of his thought develop, such that it can be said that “this is a far-reaching intellectual 
expression of intertwined experience and ideas which addresses ultimate and transcendent 
issues of cosmogony and cosmology, God and man, this world and the next.”4 
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Tawhid, the Oneness of Allah 
 
Like other Sufi writers, the Oneness of Allah (tawhid) is the central principle of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
metaphysics. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, who quotes Imam al-Ghazali, “affirming the unity of God 
(Tawhid) is that one see all things as coming from God Most High” thus “preventing one from 
giving undue consideration to intermediate causes.”5 Though discussions of tawhid are 
considered to encompass a variety of differing aspects and it has been stated that 
Tawhid as used in Sufi literature means four different things. It refers, first, 
to a man’s belief about God’s unity, and consists essentially of some 
propositions about the nature of God and His relation with man and the 
world. These propositions may differ according to the believer’s status, 
whether he is an ordinary man or a learned theologian. Tawhid refers, 
secondly, to disciplining one’s life, internal and external, in light of one’s 
beliefs. Here again there may be differences between individuals regarding 
the areas of life that they subject to discipline and the emphasis they may 
place on them. Tawhid refers, thirdly, to the mystical experience of unity or 
union. This tawhid is neither belief nor discipline, it is an affective experience 
differing in some ways from ordinary affective experiences. There are, as we 
have seen, different levels of this experience... Tawhid refers, fourthly, to a 
view of reality that arises from the mystical experience of unity. It is a 
combination of transcendental perception (mushahada) and belief, a 
philosophical construction of reality, of the relation of the Eternal, as the 
mystics put it, with the contingent in the light of the mystical experience.
6 
While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works encompass all four senses of tawhid, not all are equally 
prominent. This work can be seen as an attempt to explore the fourth sense of tawhid as it 
occurs throughout Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works in that tawhid acts as a foundation for his worldview. 
The current chapter is an attempt to explore Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s views of the first sense of tawhid, 
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especially in as far as it provides the framework of later discussions. The second sense of tawhid 
can be seen as the process through which an individual must pass in order to arrive at an 
affective experience of tawhid in the third sense. As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works were composed for 
pedagogical purposes he is less concerned with explicating the third sense than he is with 
aiding individuals through the second. Thus, while the affective experience of tawhid is touched 
on, it is not explicitly explored within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works nor will it be done so here. 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion of that which he considers 
essential to understanding Allah’s Unicity. For this he quotes freely from the Qur’an and Hadith, 
though his discussion is not limited to it. He also uses logical proofs to argue for the 
metaphysical necessity of only one God, to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
asserts that soteriological success depends, not only on knowing the relevant Qur’anic material, 
but also on knowing and understanding the rational proofs of Allah’s singularity.  
 
Tawhid in the Qur’an and Hadith 
 
From the opening chapter which states “Thee alone do we worship; and unto Thee alone do we 
turn for aid” (1: 5), the proclamation of tawhid in the Qur’an is repeated throughout. “There is 
no deity save Him” is repeated several times, including minor variations in the phrasing,7 
confirming tawhid as a central doctrine. According to the Qur’an it was also the central tenet of 
the teaching of the pre-Islamic prophets and messengers. Noah said “worship Allah alone: you 
have no deity other than Him” (7: 59), which is repeated by Hud (7: 65), Salah (7: 73), and 
Shu’ayb (7: 85). The declaration of tawhid is made even more forceful when stated in second 
person “your god is the One god” (16: 22) and “your only deity is Allah” (20: 98), culminating in 
the injunction to “say: He is the One God” (112: 1). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah affirms this view, writing that 
“God’s prophets and messengers teach others on His authority in order that others may 
likewise be gathered together on the basis of His divine oneness.”8 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah it is not 
enough to know that Allah’s Unicity (tawhid) is one of the central tenets of the Qur’an, for him 
it is necessary to understand the implications of this tenet.  
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Understanding “there is no god but Allah” (la ilaha illa’llah) 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, understanding what is meant by the kalimah tawhid (lit. words of Oneness) 
is a central aspect of understanding tawhid. This is partly because bearing witness to “there is 
no god but Allah” (la ilaha illa’llah) is integral in the daily life of every Muslim. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
highlights the centrality of this phrase in stating that “it is mentioned in thirty-seven passages in 
the Qur’an.”9 For this reason, amongst others, it is important to understand exactly what is 
meant when one asserts la ilaha illa’llah. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that the obligation 
to understand this phrase arises because “He [Allah] requires His servants to affirm His 
singularity.”10 By analysing its linguistic nuances, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah illustrates that la ilaha illa’llah is 
the expression and affirmation of Allah’s Unicity (tawhid) in the simplest form. As has been 
stated, “By saying la ilaha (‘there is no deity’), one says ‘no’ to every sort of pseudo-deity, and 
by saying illa’llah (‘but God’), one says ‘yes’ to God alone.”11 From this understanding of la ilaha 
illa’llah Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah develops his metaphysics of tawhid.  
 
The first element, and the one most contentious for grammarians, is that of negation, la, no. 
Ibn ‘Ata Allah writes that according to grammarians, “when la (no) is joined to an indefinite 
noun, it signifies a general negation,” negating both the few and the many.12 Yet, this would 
mean that it would not be correct to add “but one or more” to the negation. If this were the 
case, then the phrase can be conceived as having ellipsis, such that it could express ‘we have no 
divinity but Allah’ or ‘there is no divinity in existence but Allah’. With regard to the former 
statement, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah points out, it “would not have the meaning of True Unity.”13 It 
does not have the meaning of true unity because, while this statement asserts that we have no 
other God, it includes the possibility that others might.  
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As to the statement that ‘there is no divinity in existence but Allah’ this includes the negation of 
divinity in both essence and existence, depending on how the phrase is understood. Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah writes that “it is known that the negation of essence is more powerful in affirming Unity 
than the negation of existence,” and as such focuses the examination of this sentence in the 
sense that it negates essence.14 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah proposes two options, essence and existence are 
either the same or they are different. If they are the same then the negation of both results in 
absolute nonexistence, which is absurd. However, if they are different then it is possible to 
negate the essence of divinities other than Allah. If their existence is negated this merely 
negates their actuality, but not their potentiality. Whereas, if la illaha illa’llah is understood to 
negate the essence of deities other than Allah, then this is tawhid for not only does it deny the 
actuality of other deities, but also their potentiality. 
 
The next element given attention is illa, but or except. In highlighting the possible meanings of 
illa, in order to determine the correct one, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah cites the Qur’an, “if there were, in the 
heavens and the earth, other gods besides (illa) Allah then verily, there would have been 
confusion in both” (21 :22). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah argues that, given the possibilities, the meaning of 
illa in this sense is equal to ghayr, other than, rather than meaning ‘exception’.15 The reason for 
this is that in the latter case, la ilaha illa’llah becomes “there are no divinities from which God is 
to be excluded”, which is not an expression of Unity.16 Alternatively, if illa is equated with ghayr 
then the phrase is understood to express ‘there is no divinity other than Allah’. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
points out that as it is “agreed that it conveys the meaning of pure Unity; so it is necessary to 
ascribe to illa (except) the meaning of ghayr (other than).”17 
 
Finally there is the affirmation. After the negation of all deities, the sentence la ilaha illa’llah, as 
an expression of tawhid, affirms the existence of the one sole Deity. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in 
examining the grammar, states that it is in keeping with the logic of the sentence that “in 
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apposition one rejects the first part of the phrase and accepts the second,” as in this instance 
the apposition illa’llah, except Allah, is in the nominative case.18 Thus, it is in keeping with the 
grammatical form of the sentence that the existence of Allah is affirmed. However, as Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is quick to point out, there are some who hold that “the exception from negation is not an 
affirmation.”19 For when there is “both a judgement of non-existence as well as the negation of 
non-existence ... this exception might conceivably go back to the judgement of non-existence” 
such that “the exception remains undiscussed and unevaluated as either negative or 
affirmative” without certainty.20 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah concedes that the sentence la ilaha illa’llah is 
not recognition of the existence of Allah, but rather “a declaration negating the remaining 
deities.”21 He admits that while the meaning of the affirmation is conveyed through a 
conditional, such that the meaning becomes ‘if there is any god then it is One Allah’, it does not 
contradict the general meaning of the sentence. It does, however, change the wording of the 
sentence and this is unacceptable because “abandoning whatever the wording might be is a 
contradiction to the general meaning.”22 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s response is that, while the sentence la 
ilaha illah is an implicit affirmation of the Oneness of Divinity, the explicit affirmation of Divinity 
is a precondition of this sentence, without which it makes no sense as it comes “through the 
grasp of a principle of language.”23  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah goes further, showing the necessity of the negation preceding the affirmation, 
while maintaining the priority of the latter. Before showing the priority of the affirmation of 
Divinity, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the concept of non-existence and negation is impossible 
before the concept of affirmation, because non-existence is unintelligible except in relation to a 
specific thing.”24 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah gives three reasons for the priority of the affirmation of the sole 
Divinity in la ilaha illa’llah, one grammatical, two symbolic and metaphysical. He writes that 
negating divinity other than Allah Most High and then affirming it “in regard to Him” is more 
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emphatic “than affirming it of Him without negating it in other-than-Him.”25 Next, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah states that “every man has one heart and one heart cannot be occupied with two things 
at the same time,”26 which is evocative of the Qur’anic verse which states that “never has God 
endowed any man with two hearts in one body” (33: 4), an allusion that would not have been 
lost on his audience. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s point is that this exclusion means that whenever an 
individual is concerned with anything other-than-Allah, they are excluded from being 
concerned and aware of Allah, which should be one’s prime concern if they are to develop 
soteriologically. It is for this reason, writes Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, that for “the one who says la ilaha 
illa’llah that he intend by la ilaha the expulsion of what is other-than-Allah from his heart” so 
that the “authority of God is present therein.”27 Finally, following on from this, the negation of 
other-than-Allah is seen to be a precondition of the affirmation of Allah Most High, just as 
“ritual purity precedes prayer” or “cleaning a house of dirt precedes the arrival of a king 
therein” and for this reason it is necessary that “la ilaha precede illa’llah.”28 Thus, for Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, the phrase la ilaha illa’llah is the simplest expression of the affirmation of the Oneness of 
Allah. 
 
The Proofs of Tawhid 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the proof of tawhid is clearly stated in the Qur’an. The Qur’an, as the 
irrefutable word of Allah, states, regarding Allah’s Unicity “your God is the One God: there is no 
deity save Him” (2: 163). For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this is sufficient proof for accepting Allah’s 
Oneness, as can be seen from his writing, 
For me, the supposition of the existence of two deities is rationally 
impossible, because the Divinity is One Who has the attributes of Majesty 
and Beauty, both dynamically and passively. Then who is there other-than-
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He? In the ‘other-than-He’, those attributes are acquired from Him. Thus, the 
Divinity is naught but One, and He is Allah, as is evidenced through His 
Words (may He be exalted!). ‘If there were, in the heavens and the earth, 
gods besides God, then verily, there would have been confusion in both . . .’
29
 
Beyond this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah presents numerous proofs illustrating the logical necessity of the 
Oneness of Allah, to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Given the above quote, their 
inclusion cannot be considered as attempting to verify the truthfulness of the Qur’an; rather, in 
line with his overarching concern, they can be seen to be included because their knowledge is 
necessary for soteriological development. On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that on condition of 
having belief in Allah’s Oneness, it is necessary to “back up this belief with decisive proofs.”30 At 
the same time, these proofs of tawhid, in reaffirming the above mentioned material from the 
Qur’an, are an aid to understanding, affirming, and accepting the Qur’an as the irrefutable word 
of Allah.   
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s proofs take two formats, one intellectual and the other traditional.31 Of the 
intellectual proofs, most follow the method of reciprocal hindrance (tamau’). In utilising this 
method Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah follows a consistent format generally beginning with “if we assume two 
deities.” Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah introduces an attribute of Allah and shows that it is logically inconsistent 
to apply this attribute to two things simultaneously. While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not state this 
anywhere, it follows that he is aware that in refuting the assumption of two deities he also 
refutes the assumption of three or four or more as these would elicit the same absurdities as 
the existence of two. Furthermore, a refutation of tawhid only requires a proof of the existence 
of two deities and for this reason the inclusion of any more into the argument does not alter 
the result.  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah first considers the quality of being the “master over all possibilities.”32 In 
supposing two deities, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah wonders about the result of two deities desiring opposing 
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things, i.e. one “wanted Zaid to move while the other wanted him to be still.”33 Both of these 
hypothetical deities cannot be a “master over all possibilities” because both outcomes cannot 
occur “due to the impossibility of combining two opposites.”34 Zaid either moves or he does 
not, either way the will of one deity will overcome the other, which “would require the 
predominance of one of the two equals without any predominating element; and this is 
absurd.”35 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah then raises the possible objection that this opposition of wills is not 
necessary due to their knowing “all things knowable” and their possession of the wisdom of 
“what is good and not good” such that both deities agree to will the same thing, avoiding 
contradiction.36 Interestingly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah accepts the validity of this objection but replies 
that “it is merely conceivable, not real.”37 His reason for doing so involves a transition from 
strictly logical considerations to metaphysical ones, replying that it is absurd to assert that a 
deity wills something merely because it is good, for that would mean that “the deity would be 
the result of his deeds, not the creator of them.”38 This response is not as far removed from the 
logical proof as it first seems. For Allah to be “master over all possibilities” means that what is 
willed is not subject to anything, whether it be another deity or the concept of the good, for if it 
was then Allah would be limited to certain possibilities, not master over them. According to Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah, to hold otherwise the consequence is plain, namely that as “Allah is transcendent 
above having others share in the choice with Him ... whoever pretentiously claims to have any 
personal choice alongside Allah is one who associates (mushrik), who claims Lordship for 
himself.”39 Thus, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, there cannot be two or more masters over all 
possibilities.  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah repeats this argument, each time focusing on a different attribute of Allah 
including self existence, omnipresence, omnipotence, and the like. Each time Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
examines one of these qualities he argues that since it is logically impossible that these qualities 
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be ascribed to two or more existents then the Unicity of Allah (tawhid) is affirmed. For example, 
if two or more deities have the power over all possibilities, then either one has more power 
than the other, in which case it cannot be affirmed that both have power over all possibilities. 
Furthermore, it is absurd that if they agreed on a possible creation “then the power of one of 
them would not be worthier to create than the other” as both have the power over all 
possibilities.40 For any particular possibility, a deed would either be dependent on one deity and 
independent of the other or vice versa, which would mean that it is “in need of both and yet is 
in no need of both,”41 which is absurd, “hence, the existence of two deities is impossible.”42 
Alternatively, if they disagree then one would prevail, meaning that the other is weak, or if they 
do not disagree then they are both weak, as their decisions would be depend on each other, 
both of which are unacceptable because “the weak cannot be a deity.”43 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
these arguments all point to the Unicity of Allah (tawhid).  
 
One quality that covers a number of these proofs is self-existence. The first, and most obvious, 
argument against two, or more, self-existents is that “each would have to be a partner to the 
other in existence and at variance with him in himself.”44 While embracing and including 
elements from the previous arguments the necessity of variance adds some new elements and 
possibilities. In the case of assuming of two deities, existence would consist of a compound, yet 
“that through which the partnership comes about is other than that through which the variance 
occurs.”45 As existence depends on the partnership of two, or more, deities, these deities 
cannot be considered as self-existent as they depend on each other for this partnership, which 
is extraneous to both deities.  
 
If the above argument was not sufficient for rejecting the possibility of two or more self-
existent deities, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah examines the quality distinguishing the self-existent beings. In 
doing so, he aims at putting the impossibility of multiple self-existents beyond doubt. Either 
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that which distinguishes these deities is an attribute of perfection or it is not, or it is of 
considerable importance or it is not. In the former case, if distinction is a result of an attribute 
of perfection, then, by being devoid of the distinguishing attribute, the deities are imperfect. If 
the distinction is not the result of an attribute of perfection, then, being an attribute of 
imperfection, the deities are imperfect. Either way “the imperfect cannot be a god.”46 In the 
latter case, if the quality is of considerable importance in distinguishing divinity, then the one 
devoid of this quality is not a god. If the quality is not of considerable importance “then being 
distinguished by it is not necessary” and a distinction is still required. This lack of distinction is 
proof that this is not a deity for “he who is in need is one who lacks and is not a deity.”47 While 
this does not exhaust the intellectual proofs offered by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it is evident that 
throughout these arguments the sole aim is to show that positing more than one deity is 
metaphysically and logically incorrect. As a result, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to be clearing the 
ground so that a solid foundation is established. 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is aware that, while these are arguments to disprove the possibility of multiple 
deities, they do not explicitly assert the existence of one Sole Deity. For this traditional proofs 
are necessary, all of which are taken from the Qur’an. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, some of them are self 
explanatory, such as “Your God is One God; there is no deity save Him” (2: 163), “Say: ‘He is 
God, the One’” (112: 1), “God says: ‘Do not take two gods, for He is only One God...’” (16: 51). 
In passages such as these the assertion of one sole Principle to the exclusion of any others is 
self-evident. In other Qur’anic passages Allah’s attributes are mentioned. In these instances Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah provides commentary illustrating how each passage is an assertion of tawhid. Two 
examples of this kind of proof are the verses “He is the First and the Last...” (57: 3) and 
“everything will perish save His countenance” (28: 88). With regard to the passage “He is the 
First and the Last...” (57: 3), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that to be the First is to be “the One without 
antecedent”48 so that if one were to say “the first slave I buy will be freed” and then proceeds 
to purchase two slaves simultaneously it is not incumbent on them to free either “because the 
first must be a single person” and any subsequent slaves purchased will be kept too “because 
the first must be prior to the others.”49 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s point is that “when God Most High 
describe Himself as being the First, it is incumbent that He be unique and prior to all else; 
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hence, this requires that He not have a partner.”50 Hence, Allah’s being the First is taken to be 
indicative of Allah’s Unicity. 
 
As to the passage “everything will perish save His countenance” (28: 88), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah reminds 
his readers that “whatsoever is non-existent, and then comes into being, cannot be eternal,” as 
the eternal cannot possibly be non-existent and “what is not eternal is not a god.”51 Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s argument is elliptical and his readers are left to tease out the implication. This argument 
follows the line that since only His countenance does not perish, nothing else can be considered 
eternal, and thus there are no partners alongside of Allah. It may be objected that this proof 
merely mirrors the intellectual proofs, in that it rejects the possibility of multiple eternal 
existents. However, by affirming the existence of “His countenance,” this proof not only rejects 
all possible partners but also affirms the existence of the Oneness of Allah. While this does not 
exhaust Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s traditional proofs, it does convey the intent and form of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s hermeneutics in that it aims to place this conception of tawhid at the centre of the 
Qur’an.  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah accepts unequivocally that “the Divinity is One Who has the attributes of Majesty 
and Beauty.”52 This is important, for when these proofs are elucidated the reader knows that 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has no doubt about the validity of the Qur’anic passages. When Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
quotes the passage “if there were, in the heavens and the earth, gods beside God, then verily 
there would have been confusion in both” (21: 22),53 then the reader can see that the aim of 
the proofs is to remove any such confusion on the part of the reader. If Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s goal is 
not limited to elucidating a sound metaphysical foundation, it is also directed to developing the 
necessary basis for such a foundation. For without a solid foundation anything that is built is 
suspect. The relation of these proofs to the discussion of la ilaha illa’llah is integral. Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah states that, as a condition of affirming la ilaha illa’llah, one “back up his belief with 
decisive proofs, unless he is not from among the people of contemplation, unveiling, and 
revelation.”54 However, understanding the decisive proofs, like those examined above, is not 
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the goal.55 The final condition of affirming la ilaha ill’llah is “to be from amongst the people of 
contemplation, unveiling, and revelation.”56 Thus, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, understanding and 
affirming la ilaha illa’llah is pivotal for soteriological development.  
 
Being “from amongst the people of contemplation, unveiling, and revelation”57 is considered 
the pinnacle of human achievement. Throughout his works Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah encourages his 
readers to aspire to become from amongst this group and his books can be seen to be written 
to help others achieve this goal. To be from amongst this group means one’s “worship of God 
becomes sincere.”58 Sincerity in worship means “he does not turn to anyone but Him, nor does 
he have hope in or fear other than Him, nor does he see harm or benefit except as coming from 
Him” to the point that “he abandons whatsoever is not He.”59 This culminates in ridding oneself 
of “inward and outward associationism (shirk),”60 which can be seen as being the pinnacle of 
affirming and embodying tawhid. The degree of subtlety involved might not at first be 
apparent. Beyond the obvious attribution of partners to Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes Abu’l 
Abbas al-Mursi as having said “kindness is a veil which conceals the One who is Most Kind.”61 
Regarding this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah comments that “kindness is a veil when one finds repose in it and 
is tempted to be content with the kindness itself.”62 This is further emphasised in quoting al-
Wasiti’s statement that “the enjoyment of obedience is a deadly poison,” to which Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah explains that enjoyment of obedience often results in a missed “opportunity to 
demonstrate sincere devotion” as one’s devotion continues “because of the sweetness and 
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enjoyment that you find in them” and “not out of loyalty to your Lord.”63 Finding repose in 
kindness or the sweetness of devotion is contrary to tawhid for it treats contingent things as an 
end, whereas to affirm tawhid is to know that “with God is all journeys’ end” (3: 28). Without 
skipping ahead, it is important to see, as is discussed below, that, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, affirming 
tawhid entails, as far as possible, embodying it in such a way that one’s intentions correspond 
with one’s words which correspond with one’s actions and one’s actions are such that they do 
not place anything alongside Allah. Anything less would be considered associationism (shirk). 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is careful in asserting that being “from amongst the people of contemplation, 
unveiling, and revelation”64 is the final goal. He is quick to add that “the science of unveiling has 
no end to it,”65 and that the “truth is that the Gnostic sciences have no limit.”66 This is 
important, for to state otherwise would be inconsistent with the metaphysics of tawhid. In 
provoking a response to this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah asks “how can it be conceived that something veils 
Him, since He is the One (al-Wahid) alongside of whom there is nothing?”67 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
answers  
The Real (al-Haqq) is not veiled from you. Rather, it is you who are veiled 
from seeing It, for, were anything to veil It, then that which veils It would 
cover It. But if there were a covering to It, then that would be a limitation of 
Its Being: every limitation of anything has power over it. ‘And He is 
Omnipotent, above His servants’.
68
 
To claim to have reached the point beyond which there is no further unveiling would entail 
implicitly claiming that Allah is limited and would contradict the verse “every day He manifests 
Himself in yet another [wondrous] way” (55: 29). Yet, as the proofs have shown, this is 
inconceivable and logically impossible. Rather, while the “science of unveiling” has no end, the 
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individual has a limit and the infinite cannot be apprehended by the contingent. For each 
individual, as the above aphorism shows, is veiled beyond their limit. 
 
However, this metaphysics of tawhid, while affirming the limitless unveiling for the creation, 
affirms that the Creator is not at any time, or in any sense, veiled. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah inquires “how 
can it be conceived that something veils Him, since He is the one who manifests everything,”69 
to which he responds that, due to the nature of Allah’s Unicity, “He appears even in those 
entities through which He is veiled” such that “there is, in reality, no veil.”70 In denying creation 
through affirming la ilaha illa’llah “attention is turned away from the created universe only with 
respect to its creatureliness, not with respect with the Truth’s appearance therein.”71 The result 
is that it is “not to His failure to appear in everything but rather, to their [creation’s] inability to 
perceive Him in everything.”72 Tawhid is not an effacement of creation, rather the contingently 
existent creation must acknowledge their contingency for “[earthly] causes must needs exist, 
while at the same time, one must be absent to them in order to witness [the Divine causality 
behind them].”73 Thus, it is Allah’s Unicity that veil’s creation from perceiving His Oneness.  
 
The Goal of Tawhid 
 
While it is necessary, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, to “back up belief with decisive proofs,”74 this 
is not the goal. Beyond belief or faith (iman) there is certainty (yaqin) and one of the purposes 
of the proofs employed by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is to develop certainty. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “all 
certainty entails faith, though not all faith entails certainty” as “the difference between them is 
that while faith might be attended by heedlessness, such is not the case with certainty.”75 The 
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distinguishing mark of certainty’s (yaqin) superiority over faith (iman) is that the former entails 
knowledge attended by action, whereas the latter only entails the affirmation of such 
knowledge, hence the potential for heedlessness. The importance of knowledge coupled with 
action will become apparent through the discussions on ethics and soteriology. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, faith and belief, and, as will be seen below, 
even certainty, are not ends-in-themselves, but are a means to realise the relationship between 
the Absolute and the contingent, the One and the many.   
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that the fruit of the affirmation of tawhid is “trust in God.”76 For Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, this trust, while informed by various proofs, is not theoretical or abstract. This kind of 
trust in Allah is one that is embodied and enacted. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah asserts that “your striving for 
what has already been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are 
signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira),”77 emphasising that one’s motivation should be 
correctly orientated. Focusing on “what is demanded of you” ensures the affirmation of la ilaha 
illa’llah because it emphasises the performative aspect of embodying and enacting tawhid 
without alterities like “striving for what has already been guaranteed.” The kind of trust in Allah 
being advocated for involves abstaining from intermediaries, as is seen from “the abstinence of 
the elect ... [which] includes, for example, their wariness of relying on any being but God, 
inclining in love towards anything or anyone other than Him, or aspiring to anything but His 
grace and goodness”78 or finding repose in kindness rather than “the One who is Most Kind.”79 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah further writes that “detachment from the world arises solely from genuine trust 
in God, while genuine trust in God arises solely from faith in God based on a personal vision of 
and encounter with Him.”80 The encounter that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah mentions engenders trust in 
Allah through the realisation of His Unicity and creation’s inherent ontological poverty. 
 
Closely aligned to trust in Allah, is being pleased with Him. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that being 
“pleased with Allah” means that one “has submitted to Him, and yielded to His order, and left 
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his control to His leadership.”81 Commenting on the Qur’anic verse “God has bought of the 
believers their lives and their possessions, promising paradise in return” (9: 111), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
states “you have no management or authority over what you do not own.”82 At first glance this 
may appear self-evident, however, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah made the comment in connection with the 
Qur’anic verse to indicate that as our lives and possessions have been bought, we, in reality, 
have no authority over them. The importance of this is that if one has trust in Allah, then one 
should be pleased with His choice regarding “their lives and their possessions.” Allah’s 
closeness to each and every creation is evident through His having power and choice over every 
course of action, the result of which is that “the intimacy of His nearness makes him absent 
from the perception of the afflictions.”83 Awareness of this intimacy indicates a perception of 
the mercy that extends from the Absolute to the contingent, such that “for whoever is deprived 
and knows that the deprivation is a mercy to him, then that deprivation is in reality a gift.”84 Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah is indicating that Allah’s choice, irrespective of whether one conceives it as a trial or 
not, is directed to enabling the individual to recognise the source of all action. However, implicit 
within this is that the knowledge required to be content with Allah’s choice, thus being pleased 
with and trusting in Allah, is to know that all contingent creation has the selfsame source, that 
is, knowledge of tawhid. As the goal of tawhid is its affirmation, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to 
be establishing what is here called a soteriological semiotics with Allah revealing Himself to 
creation through creation. 
 
While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics may seem to be world denying it should be kept 
in mind that Allah “appears even in those entities through which He is veiled.”85 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
writes that “attention is turned away from the created universe only with respect to its 
creatureliness, not with respect with the Truth’s appearance therein”86 such that the world’s 
“only blameworthiness is what keeps you away from Allah and from dealing with Him.”87 
                                                          
81
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 13. 
82
 Ibid., 24. 
83
 Ibid., 9. 
84
 Ibid., 7. 
85
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Lata’if al-Minan, 49. 
86
 Ibid., 49. 
87
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Tanwir, 75. 
86 
 
Soteriologically, the denial of creation only occurs to the extent that one is unable to perceive 
the Divine causality behind it. On this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “not all who seek the world are 
blameworthy, but only the one who seeks it for himself and not for his Lord.”88 Thus, while two 
actions may appear outwardly similar, they can differ greatly in their intention, which is the 
criterion against which they are judged for “the reward of deeds depends upon the 
intentions.”89 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position regarding the world is that “it is not totally blameworthy 
without exception, and neither is it totally praiseworthy without exception.”90 To the extent 
that perception of the Divine pierces the veil of creation the world can be affirmed due to its 
Divine underpinnings. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah cannot be 
considered world denying for he recognises that it is within the world that one comes to know 
and affirm tawhid. Secondly, if either praise or blame is attributed to creation it should be 
examined to see how it either highlights or covers the Divine.  
 
Furthermore, the type of trust that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is advancing stems from the deepening 
awareness of creation’s, and thus one’s own, total contingency. The understanding of la ilaha 
illa’llah that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is promoting extends beyond what is commonly assented to when 
tawhid is affirmed. He writes that “ordinary people only sense their great need of God in the 
face of certain distressing life events” because “their vision is dominated by the realm of 
sensory experience” such that, due to this veil, their “need of God” is fleeting.91 However, this 
misses a vital point of the relationship between Allah and creation in that “the creature’s need 
for God is a function of the servant’s essential nature, since he is a contingent being, and every 
contingent being is in need of an external source of supply.”92 In elaborating in the servant’s 
essential nature, he writes that “among the requirements of servitude are the following: 
manifesting need of Allah, and standing before Him with the quality of poverty, and raising the 
aspiration (himma) from other than him.”93 It is for this reason that “the saint is constantly in 
distress,”94 for they know that their need of Allah is not fleeting and “the imperative need (al-
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idtirar) of the Gnostic never vanishes, nor is his repose (qarar) in anyone but God.”95 To awaken 
creation’s awareness of their contingency “the Truth afflicts them with [outward] conditions 
which alert them to their need of Him.”96 This culminates in the constant awareness of 
creation’s contingency and their need for Allah, while embodying qualities that ensure that 
associationism (shirk) is avoided. 
 
Implications of the Metaphysics of Tawhid 
 
It has been shown that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics is founded on the Oneness of Allah 
(tawhid). Central to the metaphysics of tawhid is to bear witness (shahid) to the testimony of 
faith (shahadah) “there is no god but Allah” (la ilaha illa’llah). For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this involves 
more than mere lip service, as a sincere affirmation involves embodying Allah’s Unicity. 
However, accepting this involves a seemingly irreconcilable rift between abandoning all that is 
other-than-He and continuing one’s everyday existence since this requires an ontology that is 
underpinned by a non-ontic entity. This discussion will be confined to the topic of provision 
(rizq) in order to draw out the implications of the metaphysics of tawhid. One outcome of this 
metaphysics of tawhid is that, irrespective of the domain, unicity underpins every discussion. 
While confining this discussion to provision (rizq), it will be seen that, on all levels, tawhid plays 
a crucial role in both developing the problem and defining the solution. In highlighting some of 
the implications of this metaphysics of tawhid it should be acknowledged that these issues are 
developed and examined in greater length in later chapters. 
 
In examining the metaphysics of tawhid its ontological implications become apparent. This may 
seem like a slight digression, but the importance of the concept of the descent of Being 
(tanazzul) cannot be understated. While a full understanding of this descent is not possible 
within this work, it is possible to cover the pertinent aspects. Tanazzul is the descent of the 
Essence (adh-dhat), which is unknowable, through the Divine Names (asma’ Allah), and 
Attributes (sifat) to the corporal world (al-dunya).97 The descent of Being (tanazzul) is often 
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portrayed as a hierarchy with each tier having its own internal hierarchy. An example of this is 
that the names of Allah (asma’ Allah) are covered by the Supreme Name ‘Allah’ for it “refers to 
the essence which unites all attributes of Divinity, so that none of them is left out, whereas 
each of the remaining names only refers to a single attribute.”98 The top-down approach shows 
the descent of Being (tanazzul) as a sort of map showing the hierarchy of existence. However, 
this map can be inverted such that the possibility of a return or reintegration becomes evident. 
With regard to the individual the Qur’an states “We create man in the best conformation and 
thereafter We reduce him to the lowest of the low” (95: 5-6), which sets up the entire 
soteriological endeavour. The “best conformation” entails being witness to the reality of la 
ilaha illa’llah. The human being, having experienced this descent (tanazzul), is compelled to 
regain their “best conformation.” While human beings cannot escape their contingency, they 
may shed their baseness by re-establishing an awareness of the relationship between the 
Absolute and the contingent. While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not express it in this manner, it is 
implied within his works and informs his discussions of provision (rizq).  
 
The importance of an understanding of the Divine descent (tanazzul) becomes apparent when 
it is acknowledged that the distinction between Creator and creature is the site of the problem 
of rizq. Allah, being the Creator and source of all existence, cannot be divorced from the 
creation for this would mean that creation is separate, which conflicts with tawhid. Allah is both 
transcendent, for “there is nothing like unto Him” (42: 11), and immanent, for “wherever you 
turn, there is God’s countenance” (2: 115). While creation is manifest by and through the grace 
of Allah, its nature is such that it is taken as an end in itself and its source is obscured. On this, 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the Cosmos (al-kawn) is all darkness” and “is illumined only by the 
manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.”99 He further states that it is not possible that “the 
heart be illumined while the forms of creatures are reflected in its mirror.”100 His point is that 
those who stop at the creation, without acknowledging the Creator “in it or by it or before it or 
after it,”101 do not affirm tawhid. Given Allah’s Self-sufficiency it is absurd that there could be a 
lack or want, even though from the perspective of creation the pursuit of rizq is necessary.  
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The heart of the problem of rizq is this: if Allah is Self-Sufficient and Allah is the only true 
existent, then why is rizq necessary? The short answer is that the problem of rizq involves a 
domain error. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah asserts that one must “know that things have a certain being in 
the foreknowledge of Allah” and that “the Real takes charge and regulates its affairs while it is 
in His foreknowledge.”102 Rizq is only a problem without an understanding of the ontic 
hierarchy. A sufficient understanding of the ontic hierarchy is implicit in the affirmation of 
tawhid as presented by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Though, it is evident from the extent that this arises 
throughout his works that this common problem arises as a result of a lack of knowledge. It is 
clear from this chapter that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics, rooted as it is in tawhid, is not only 
aware of the problem of rizq but also has an answer. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s answer to the problem of 
rizq involves fleshing out the implications of tawhid across domains, including ontology, 
epistemology, eschatology, and soteriology. 
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Chapter 5 – Ontology 
 
If the metaphysical domain is the source of the problem of rizq, then the ontological domain is 
the site of the problem. Within the metaphysical domain, tawhid means that there is no 
opposite or opposition to Allah as a result of His Self-sufficiency. However, the corresponding 
ontological extension of this metaphysics of tawhid involves an arena wherein provision is 
pursued, attained, and consumed, opposites appear to attract and repel, and opposition 
appears to be an overwhelming experience, though only for the contingently existent. If the 
metaphysics of tawhid can be typified as harmony, then, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, one of the key traits 
of the ontological domain is disjunction. Within this domain all things, due to their inherent 
contingency, are placed under strain as they arise within their boundaries. However, rather 
than renouncing the world, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah acknowledges its existence and advises that things 
should not be given more attention than they are due. It can be seen that this approach stems 
directly from his understanding of tawhid as “there is no god other than (ghayr) Allah,” for to 
reject creation is to reject Allah’s appearance therein. The result is that creation is 
acknowledged, though only as far as it gives rise to the perception of the Divine. Due to its 
ontological contingency, creation has an inherent ontological poverty. This means that the 
contingently existent has no control over its, or anything else’s, inherent contingency. For Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah, it will be seen that this inherent ontological poverty is a crucial factor in both a) 
highlighting the relationship between Creator and creation and b) opening the possibility of 
contact between creation and Creator. 
 
The distinction between the metaphysical and ontological domains is not necessarily obvious, 
though it is seen to play an important role within the writings of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Metaphysics, as 
it has been used here, refers to the principles of existence as they are within themselves, prior 
to ontic existence, the chief for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is, as discussed, tawhid. To distinguish the 
ontological domain from the metaphysical is important as the former deals primarily with 
manifestation, i.e. ontic entities, whereas as the later is, in a sense, independent of 
manifestation.1 To make this distinction clearer it could be stated that the metaphysical domain 
encompasses the potentially possible, i.e. that which is or will be manifest, as well as the 
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potentially impossible, i.e. that which is possible for Allah to manifest though has no possibility 
of being due to the limitations Allah has placed on Himself with regard to His creation. The 
potentially impossible is limited due to such things as His mercy superseding his wrath (7: 156) 
and His not burdening his creation with more than they can bare (2: 286) and other such Self-
imposed limitations which are stated in the Qur’an and the Hadith. As a result, the ontological 
domain is limited to the potentially possible.2 It is important to note that the choice of stressing 
the potentiality of any possibility or impossibility is deliberate, for the necessity of anything 
other than Allah would impose limitations on Allah and remove Allah’s quality of being, 
amongst others, the all powerful (al-qadir), which, as previously discussed, would mean that 
what is being referred to is not God. 
 
Within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works the ontological domain, comprising of that which is potentially 
known, is considered to be the source of all knowledge of Allah for His creation. However, as it 
comprises of, in a sense, the first veil on the ipseity of Allah, the ontological domain is the 
source of tension between the Absolute and the contingent’s apprehension thereof. While the 
metaphysical domain, typified by tawhid, is a domain of undifferentiated, uniform harmony, 
the ontological domain is punctuated by the tension involved in differentiating Creator and 
creation. It will be seen that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion of what is here called the ontological 
domain encompasses the twofold importance of this domain, that of containing the 
contingent’s knowledge of Allah whilst being the site of their distinction.  
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, a correct understanding of the ontological domain is crucial in as far as it 
prefigures all potential soteriological development. The centrality of the ontological domain 
with regard to his soteriology lies in this domain being an isthmus (barzakh) between the 
metaphysical reality and an individual’s epistemological apprehension of it, either aiding or 
hindering the harmonious interplay between the Absolute and the individual. To avoid any 
disjunction between the Absolute and the individual, so as to avoid contradicting tawhid, Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to deploy a soteriological semiotics. As stated, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
soteriological semiotics arises as an aid to affirming and embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. 
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As it is through creation that Allah communicates with creation, it is within the ontological 
domain, being the site of disjunction between Creator and creation, that his soteriological 
semiotics becomes an invaluable tool for aligning the individual’s epistemological outlook with 
the metaphysical reality.  
 
Intimately tied to, and implicit within, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion of the kalimah, that is no god 
but Allah (la ilaha illa’llah), is the second half of this kalimah is Muhammad is the Messenger of 
Allah (Muhammadur rasulu’llah). This can be seen to express two things. Firstly, it can be taken 
to describe how the Absolute relates to the contingent, that is, how the metaphysics of tawhid 
is expressed ontologically. The message of tawhid expressed in la ilaha illa’llah is conveyed to 
creation through the Messenger in Muhammadur rasulu’llah. Secondly, it illustrates how the 
contingently existent can affirm the metaphysics of tawhid. That is, by following the Messenger 
of Allah, it is possible to act in accordance with the preference of Allah. This chapter will focus 
on the first of these two implications. 
 
From Essence (dhat) to Existence (kawn) 
 
The description of descent from essence (dhat) to existence (kawn) is not explicitly discussed by 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in the available texts. However, in order to understand the content of this 
chapter it is necessary to briefly clarify the relationship between the essence (dhat) and 
creation (khalq), for the latter does not proceed directly from the former. In clarifying this, the 
discussion will briefly go beyond the bounds of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s writings, though, in order 
maintain the focus on his work, this discussion will remain brief. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the relationship between, and descent from, the essence and existence was 
not unknown to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as can be seen from the many allusions made to this subject 
throughout his work that this chapter draws on, nor would he have been unfamiliar with the 
authors that will be drawn on for this material, as can be seen from the fact that “the list of 
books used by both Shaykhs [Abu’l Hassan and Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi] is quite impressive and 
indicative of the high calibre of their religious instruction.”3 Furthermore, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
defence of Ibn ‘Arabi illustrates familiarity with and comprehension of the latter’s works, many 
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of which clearly discuss the descent from Being to being.4 For these reasons the following brief 
discussion of the relationship between the essence and existence is not beyond the scope of 
either Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works or his knowledge. 
 
Many Sufis agree on the difficulties of expressing the relationship between essence and 
existence. Part of this difficulty is due to the limits of language in expressing that which 
encompasses and surpasses language. This is one of the reasons the relation between essence 
and existence is said to have an inherent mystery.5 Creation (khalq) is not seen to proceed 
directly from the essence (dhat) for “nothing is brought into being directly from the One (ahad); 
rather existence comes about from oddness or singularity.”6 A distinction is made here 
between ahadiyyah on the one hand and wahdah and wahidiyyah on the other. While ahad 
and ahadiyyah are commonly understood as the One and Oneness respectively, it is better 
understood as the Supreme Unity or the ‘outward’ aspect of the Essence (dhat). With this, it is 
possible to understand that the reason that multiplicity does not proceed directly from the 
ahad is because this level is isotropic and further ‘descents’ are necessary before the 
metaphysical unity is expressed as an ontological totality. Wahdah is situated between the 
Supreme Unity (ahadiyyah) and the outward Oneness or Singleness (wahidiyyah) where the 
Essence is conscious of the Names and Qualities. It is outward, not in the sense of being 
separate from, but in as far as it has a contingent ontological extension. Thus, in the Qur’an it 
states “His being alone is such that when He wills a thing to be, He but says unto it, ‘Be’ – and it 
is” (36: 82). This is the site of the contingent ontological extension. 
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The Arabic word for “be” (kun) reflects the mysterious and ineffable relation between Allah’s 
essence (dhat’illah) and his creation (khalaq). This word is made up of three letters, kaf – waw 
– noon. The kaf corresponds to “the One in relation to Its Essence”, the noon corresponds to 
“the relationship of the One to the World”, while the waw is “the link which connects both 
aspects of the One.”7 This link, the waw, is hidden since it does not appear in the written form 
and thus encapsulates the mysterious distinction between Creator and creation. Furthermore, 
the letter waw “signifies ‘and’, which is the link between two aspects”8 and, within this context, 
includes both aspects of an isthmus (barzakh), both joining and separating, in the same sense 
as the ontological domain is an isthmus between the metaphysical and epistemological 
domains. Interestingly, this means that “the word k[u]n, therefore, represents all that is 
manifest and nonmanifest.”9 Regarding this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes a poem he heard Abu’l 
Abbas recite, which states: 
And when He appears to you, know that you are not He, 
Nor, indeed, are you anything but He. 
 
Two entities which have not been united, but herein lies 
A mystery which we are hard pressed to explain.
10 
This succinct and poetic summary aptly shows two key points. Firstly, it illustrates the difficulty, 
even for figures such as Abu’l Abbas and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, of expressing the finer points regarding 
the relationship between the Creator and creation. Secondly, it supports the view that the 
preceding comments, despite not being explicitly discussed by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, would not have 
been beyond the scope of his understanding. 
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The Isthmus (barzakh) 
 
To understand the mystery of unity in multiplicity it is useful to understand the isthmus 
(barzakh). The isthmus (barzakh) is a hidden barrier between any two things. In the three times 
it occurs within the Qur’an “it signifies a limit or a barrier that separates two things, preventing 
them from mixing with each other.”11 However, it is important to note that “at the same time, 
by preventing the two entities from mixing with each other, the isthmus (barzakh) also provides 
for their unity.”12 Just as a veil conceals and in doing so reveals something about what it is 
concealing, so too does the isthmus (barzakh), in separating two entities, creates the point of 
contact between the two entities. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah refers to the Prophet Mohammed as “the 
most splendorous barzakh”13 and the “supreme, all-encompassing barzakh.”14 This follows from 
“Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” (Muhammadur rasulu’llah) as indicating the point of 
contact between Creator (al-khaliq) and creation (khalq). This part of the kalimah is taken as 
indicating that the prophetic model is the means to Allah in that, by following the Messenger, it 
is possible to draw close to the source of the message. On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has stated that 
“he [Muhammad] is the intermediary between God and us, our guide to Him, and our means of 
knowing Him through gnosis.”15 Thus, “Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” (Muhammadur 
rasulu’llah) indicates the meeting point between Creator and creation and the limit to which 
creation may approach their Creator.  
 
The understanding of Muhammad as an isthmus (barzakh) also relates to the Science of 
Prophethood (ilm al-Nubuwah). In general terms the science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah) 
has two key aspects, a) the implementation of the practices of the prophet of a religion by the 
adherents of that religion, and b) the transmission of this knowledge. The knowledge and 
implementation of the prophetic practices is central because the prophets and messengers are 
seen as the models par excellence for knowing Allah in all states, while the accurate 
transmission of this knowledge is crucial for maintaining access to the salvific guarantee of 
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knowing Allah in all states. In being a point of contact between the Absolute and the 
contingent, the model set out by Muhammad, if followed, allows for a similar point of contact 
between the Absolute and the particular individual implementing the model. It is necessary to 
say that further points of contact are similar for several reasons, chief of which is the fact that 
Muhammad was appointed to act as a prophetic model, and thus it is divinely perfected within 
him, while for subsequent individuals the degree to which they come to embody this model will 
differ greatly. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is acutely aware of this fact, for he states that “the lights which are 
manifest in the friends of God derive from none other than the radiance of the lights of 
prophethood ... the Muhammadan reality is like the sun, while the hearts of the saints are like 
moons.”16 The likeness of Muhammad to the sun and those who follow him to moons are 
indicative of Muhammadan model being the source of contact between the Creator and 
creation, while the saints, in following this model, reflect this contact to the degree that they 
embody this prophetic model.  
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Muhammad is the supreme isthmus (barzakh) because of his elevation over 
the other prophets and messengers. One the one hand, Muhammad approached Allah “until he 
was but two bow-lengths away, or even nearer” (53: 9). On the other hand, Muhammad’s 
elevated status is due to the fact that “the Real attached His Name (of Lord) to Muhammad”, 
referring to verse 4: 65, “whereas He attached Zakariyya’s [Zechariah’s] name to Him”, referring 
to verse 19: 2, “so that the slaves may know the difference between the two stations, and the 
inequality of the two degrees.”17 In the figure of Muhammad there is both aspects of the 
isthmus (barzakh), for his approach demarcates the separation between the Absolute and the 
contingent, while Allah’s attaching of His Name to Muhammad illustrates the meeting point of 
the Absolute with the contingent. Whereas, Zakariyya’s name being attached to the Real marks 
a point of contact and not the limit of the possible contact.  
 
The Role of Creation  
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, creation is not meant to be an end-in-itself. Underpinned as it is by tawhid, 
creation has ontological existence so that it can act as a means to affirm its metaphysical basis. 
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For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this partly indicates that knowledge arises through opposites, as can be seen 
in statements such as “sometimes darknesses come over you in order that He make you aware 
of the value of His blessings upon you” and “he who does not know the values of graces when 
they are present knows their value when they are absent.”18 Within the metaphysical domain, 
tawhid has no opposite and as a result it requires multiplicity for its affirmation. The point of 
creation, and the ontological domain, is to signify that which underpins it.  However, this is not 
an intrinsic quality of creation for “if created entities do lead [us] to God, they do so not out of 
some capacity which they possess in and of themselves ... for nothing can lead to Him but His 
own divinity.”19 This refers back to the inherent tension within the ontological domain. For, in 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view, creation is an indication of its Creator, though only in as far as the Creator 
has bestowed this capacity on them. Furthermore, this quote also hints at the paradoxical 
position given to creation within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s ontology, namely of being both the source of 
knowledge of Allah whilst being the source of distraction from Allah.  
 
As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah sets up the relation between creation and the Creator, he does not renounce 
creation in the sense of denying it value. He is aware that each individual’s interaction with 
Allah is mediated by creation. He writes that “the Truth afflicts them with [outward] conditions 
which alert them to their need of Him,”20 which culminates in the awareness of the constancy 
of this need. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah further adds that “if God, glory be to Him, wishes to give a servant 
something, He gives him a sense of his need to seek it from Him.”21 However, implicit in this is 
the awareness that existence is too often taken to be an end-in-itself and creation is to be 
shunned in so far as it hinders the awareness of tawhid. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah charts a fine course 
between immersion in creation and its rejection. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states “do not stretch out your 
hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-Mu’ti) amongst them is your 
Lord”, however “if such is your case, then take what knowledge says is suitable for you.”22 This 
is a clear indication of the twofold nature of creation of being both a veil on Allah as, in this 
example, the Giver (al-Mu’ti), while being the site at which Allah’s giving takes place. This can 
                                                          
18
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 51. 
19
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Lata’if al-Minan, 54. 
20
 Ibid., 195. 
21
 Ibid., 195. 
22
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 50. 
98 
 
be seen to culminate “when you see the Doer in all you see all being as agreeable.”23 Thus, 
creation is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad and is only so in as far as it blinds or 
aids the perception and awareness of its Divine underpinnings. 
 
A consequence of this intense focus on tawhid is that it gives rise to utterances that are liable 
to be misconstrued. An example of this is the saying attributed to Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi:  
Lead people to God, and nothing else. He who leads you to this world has 
deceived you, and he who leads you to [good] deeds will wear you down; but 
he who leads you to God has counselled you aright.
24 
The potential for confusion within this statement arises due to the focus within Islam being on 
the accumulation of good to be placed within the scales on the Day of Judgement. The point is 
the “goodness” of deeds, as it is not a value intrinsic to them, can hinder the perception of 
Allah’s actions and attributes moving the created realm. Similarly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah shares this 
sentiment in stating: 
Let not obedience make you joyous because it comes from you, but rather, 
be joyous because it comes from God to you. “Say: In the grace of God and in 
His mercy, in that they should rejoice. It is better than that which they 
hoard.”
25 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to be implying that even good deeds, “which they hoard,” are 
insignificant unless it is understood that they are a grace that “comes from God to you.” 
Despite the potential for reading these statements as being unorthodox, both Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
and his teacher are ensuring that Allah is given primacy without a second, thus affirming the 
ontological manifestation of tawhid.  
 
Creation in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre seems to have a semi-paradoxical ontological status. It is 
apparent that creation does not have a necessary existence, for if it did it would exist eternally 
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alongside Allah, thus contradicting tawhid. Yet, at the same time, it is not ontologically non-
existent for this goes against common experience. Thus, in order to affirm tawhid and its 
implications, it becomes necessary to deploy a sort of ambivalence towards the manifest realm. 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah sums up the paradoxical ontological status and the subsequent ambivalence in 
stating that “when we renounce this earthly realm, we are thereby affirming its existence, since 
we testify to its existence by renouncing it.”26 In the act of renouncing creation there is an 
admission, or more correctly attribution, of inherent existence in creation. This act, however 
subtle it may be, contradicts tawhid in that it posits the existence of something other than 
Allah. On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “if you have true understanding, you will know that 
there can be no abandonment of that which has no existence.”27 That is, it is impossible to 
abandon anything that has existence independent of Allah, as the metaphysics of tawhid allows 
for no such thing.28 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen here as continuing the view of Abu’l Hassan al-
Shadhili who forbid his adherents from wearing any particularly “Sufi” garb, as had become a 
custom in the courts of Egypt, for any appearance of renunciation was an indication that 
creation had, for that individual, an intrinsic value in as far as it needed renouncing.29 Thus the 
asceticism of the Shadhiliyya could be seen to play on two conceptions of zuhd, that of 
renunciation and nonattachment.30 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, through his soteriological method, can be 
seen to be advocating nonattachment, for to renounce something, even though it is negated, is 
to, albeit subtly, place that thing alongside of Allah, which contradicts tawhid. 
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Despite their privileged epistemological status among ontologically contingent beings, humans 
have no ontologically privileged status. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah records Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi as stating 
that  
Human beings came to exist after having not existed, and they will cease to 
exist after having existed. From both ends, therefore, they are nothingness. It 
follows, then, that they are, in essence, nothingness.
31 
And that  
Indeed, we see no creature. After all, is there, in all of existence, anything but 
the True Sovereign? And even if we must acknowledge other entities, they 
differ little from the fine dust particles in the air which, when you examine 
them carefully, you will find to be nothing at all.
32 
The second statement is more understandable in light of Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili’s statement 
that 
The Sufi is someone who, in his inward being, sees human beings as so much 
fine dust in the air – neither existent nor non-existent – just as they are in the 
knowledge of the Lord of the worlds.
33 
Thus, the ontological status of humans does not differ from the status of any other contingently 
existent object. Yet, this seems to contradict the Islamic view that extol the virtues of the 
human over the other creations, such as the Qur’anic verses which state that “verily, We create 
man in the best conformation” (95: 4) and that “He imparted unto Adam the names of All 
things” (2:31). These comments are understandable when it is seen that the human, as a 
contingently existent being, is one creature amongst creation and, as such, does not deserve 
any special consideration. However, in terms of soteriological potential, which can be seen to 
be central to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s work, the human is unique amongst creation. It is for this reason 
that “since all beings participated in receiving existence and sustenance, Allah wanted to 
differentiate some from others, to show how vast and far-reaching His will is.”34 Thus, while, 
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ontologically, all of creation is the same, one aspect of Allah’s communication with creation can 
be seen through the differentiation between creations. 
 
However, it should be noted that, as Abu’l Hassan is quoted as stating, the focus of the 
individual’s perception should be on the “inward being” of a Sufi rather than their outward 
actions. One reason for this is that one’s inward being includes the relationship between the 
ontological and metaphysical domains, whereas one’s outward being includes their relationship 
with other similarly ontologically contingent beings. The interaction of creatures within the 
ontological domain is dependent on sets of proscriptions and prohibitions, which result from 
the metaphysics of tawhid. While these are discussed below, it is important here to understand 
why Abu’l Hassan makes the distinction between the individual’s inner and outer being. As all 
of creation is inherently ontologically contingent, creation cannot but interact outwardly with 
creation. Yet, individuals have an inherent potentiality to internally perceive that this outward 
interaction is an aspect of Allah’s communication with creation. To decipher this 
communication between Creator and creation Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah deploys a method referred to 
here as soteriological semiotics. To deny creation through outward actions, supposedly for the 
sake of Allah, is to deny Allah’s communication with creation. There is a Hadith Qudsi within 
which Allah states 
O son of Adam, I asked you for food and you fed Me not. He will say: O Lord, 
and how should I feed You when You are the Lord of the worlds? He will say: 
Did you not know that My servant So-and-so asked you for food and you fed 
him not? Did you not know that had you fed him you would surely have 
found that with Me?
35
  
It can be seen that the proscriptions and prohibitions are set up to outwardly express what is 
perceived inwardly. 
 
Cause and Effect 
 
The domain of creation is the domain of cause and effect. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah it can be seen that 
the process of cause and effect has a pedagogical role as Allah deploys it to test the perspicacity 
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of creation in perceiving the motion of the Divine through the contingently existent. Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah writes that “causes must needs exist, which at the same time, one must be absent to 
them in order to witness”36 and that “he who stops at these [causes and effects] is bound to 
meet with disillusionment.”37 In order to witness the creative expression of the Divine “one 
must be absent” from causes that seem to indicate effects resulting from creation for this, for 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, is disillusionment. Furthermore, “He has made the familiar chains of cause and 
effect, mediating forces and earthly causes to be like veils which conceal His power, and like the 
clouds which obscure the suns of His oneness.”38 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah mentions that cause and effect 
are “like veils” for, like the sun veiled by clouds, the Divine Unicity prevails even though its 
perception is obscured. It will be seen that it is in the removal of these “veils” that constitutes 
an increasing awareness of tawhid. 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, a difficulty arises regarding sustenance for the individual who, ignorant of 
tawhid, attributes to himself the ability to affect an outcome. The reason for this is that such an 
individual will readily assert that it is through their efforts that they gain sustenance. However, 
the Qur’an repetitively states, in varying formulations, “eat and drink of the sustenance 
provided by God” (2: 60).39 For this reason, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah encourages his readers to “seek your 
sustenance from God, whose goodness embraces all creation in grace and compassion.”40 With 
those who assert that “food satisfies my appetite,” Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah queries “Does the food itself 
satisfy” or is it “that it is Allah who satisfies your appetite through the food.”41 It is important to 
reiterate that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not deny the ontological existence of creation. However, in 
doing so, he recognises that Allah engages the ontologically contingent entities by means of 
other creations in a manner that does not impinge on their potential for understanding the 
primacy of Allah. On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “when the forgetful man (al-ghafil) gets up 
in the morning, he reflects on what he is going to do, whereas the intelligent man (al-‘aqil) sees 
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what God is doing with him.”42 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is pushing for “contentment with God alone,”43 
while reassuring the reader that Allah’s mercy is unrestricted and inclusive. This contentment is 
expressed as trust in Allah (tawakkul) and nonattachment to the world. 
 
Allah’s inclusive mercy evokes another problem, similar to the problem of rizq. Like rizq, it may 
be objected that impediments and their solution spring from the selfsame source. It is possible 
to see that this is both true and untrue at the same time. From the perspective of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s metaphysics of tawhid it is true, for if either were independent of each other then this 
would equate to two existents, which is incongruent with tawhid. From the perspective of Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s ontology, this problem arises as a result of fixating on creation, which veils Allah’s 
actions (sifat) and names (asma). Relief comes, not from the veils, but through that which is 
veiled. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s solution is to “appeal to no one but Him to relieve you of a pressing 
need that He Himself has brought upon you.”44 In apprehending this, an aspect of this which is 
veiled is revealed,45 as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah recognises, “deprivation (al-man’) hurts you only because 
of the lack of your understanding God in it.”46 The Qur’an states that for “everyone who is 
conscious of God” (65: 2) Allah “provides for him in a manner beyond all expectation” (65: 3). 
Thus, for those who understand the reasons Allah brings a pressing need upon them, i.e. those 
who understand “what God is doing with him,”47 trust in Allah (tawakkul) is increased. Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s soteriological semiotics can be seen to be shifting the focus away from the ontological 
domain and the creation (khalq) as an end-in-itself so that the reality (al-Haqq) can be affirmed.  
 
While it appears that deprivation and trial arises through the ontological domain, such events 
arise through Allah’s providing for the needs of creation (khalq) irrespective of a) the latter’s 
awareness of this process or b) whether or not the latter believes that any particular event is 
necessary. Implicit within this view is that the ultimate need is the unwavering awareness of 
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Allah, this being Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s overarching soteriological concern. While, in a sense, 
impediments and their solution have their roots in the selfsame source, it appears that the 
problem arises as a result of the conflation of the metaphysical and ontological domains as they 
are here defined. Thus, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics repeatedly attempts to 
demarcate the signs that Allah deploys through the ontological domain to assert His 
metaphysical Unicity. 
 
Obedience (ta’a) 
 
Obedience (ta’a) to Divine decree is another means for testing the commitment to the 
metaphysics of tawhid. Obedience includes “’commissions’ and ‘omissions’, in other words, 
things which the Truth requires you to do, and things which He requires you to refrain from 
doing.”48 However, whilst adhering to or abstaining from certain actions is set out by Divine 
decree, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in maintaining the metaphysics of tawhid, illustrates that such actions 
are not good-in-themselves. These actions are beneficial solely because they are the most 
effective means for removing the veils that efface the awareness and affirmation of tawhid. 
These commissions and omissions are effective in as far as an individual, through them, is 
effaced before Allah. Disposing of one’s egocentric behaviour is necessary for soteriological 
development as “every action requires the concentration of one’s whole being on God.”49 
Again, to maintain a disposition that is metaphysically consistent with tawhid, it is not enough 
to perform such acts out of a preference against the alternative. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the 
servant is moved by a desire to perform such acts [religious obligations] because God, may He 
be praised, has appointed their number, their times, and their causes.”50 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s point 
is that such actions may be performed without an individual concentrating their “whole being 
on God” and as a result their performance has no corresponding soteriological value. For an 
individual’s ontological prolongation to be consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid requires a 
shift from a self-centred consciousness to a God-centred consciousness, which involves a total 
deference to Allah. 
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The pursuit of obedience to the Divine results in another, seemingly paradoxical relationship, 
though this time with regard to creation’s contingency. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “the servant’s 
fulfilment of these obligations has nothing to do with his choice for himself, and everything to 
do with God’s choice for him.”51 It is for this reason that it should be sufficient recompense “for 
obedience that He has judged you worthy of obedience,”52 indicating that obedience to the 
proscribed commissions and omissions come as a result of Allah’s favour of the individual and 
not as a result of the latter’s choice. However, that the fulfilment of obligations depends on 
Allah’s choice for this individual highlights the fact that the worth any action is in the awareness 
of Allah that it engenders. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah recognises this in stating that “a disobedience that 
bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an obedience that bequeaths self-
infatuation and pride.”53 For this reason “sometimes He opens the door of obedience for you 
but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a 
cause of arriving at Him.”54 Thus, while it is necessary to adhere to the proscriptions and 
prohibitions, the worth of an action is in the degree that it engenders deference to Allah for this 
in turn develops trust in Allah (tawakkul) and nonattachment to the world. 
 
Obedience to Allah, as conceived by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, is the point from which freedom can be 
obtained. Whilst in a narrow sense, obedience to the Divine decree is the condition for entering 
paradise, freedom from damnation is not the kind of freedom alluded to, here. Furthermore, it 
must be recognised that, due to the nature of existence, contingently existent beings cannot be 
ontologically free, for this contradicts tawhid. However, this does not preclude freedom 
altogether. The kind of freedom that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is implicitly advocating is epistemological 
freedom. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, through his works, is aiming to show the point where the individual 
“will perceive the wisdom in his Lord’s choice.”55 This follows the Qur’anic injunction that 
“when thou hast decided upon a course of action, place thy trust in God” (3: 159), such that 
“for everyone who places his trust in God He [alone] is enough” (65: 3). This culminates in 
trusting Allah and deferring to Allah in all actions. While the perception of choice posits 
multiple possibilities, tawhid accepts only one reality, for “not a breath (nafas) do you expire 
                                                          
51
 Ibid., 35. 
52
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 37. 
53
 Ibid., 37. 
54
 Ibid., 37. 
55
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Lata’if al-Minan, 169. 
106 
 
but a decree of Destiny has made it go forth.”56 In knowing this, and, more importantly, 
embodying it, the individual is free to pursue the necessary course of action without being 
dogged by doubt, regret, or self-reliance. The implications and importance of this is highlighted 
in the following chapters.   
 
Poverty (faqr) and the Poor (faqir) 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, like other Sufis, maintains that a consequence of tawhid is the total dependency 
of creation on their Creator. Creation has nothing that Allah needs,57 while Allah has everything 
that creation needs, as the Qur’an states “it is you, who stand in need of God, whereas He 
alone is self-sufficient” (35: 15). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah notes that “the friend of God has gone from 
disposing of his own affairs to relying upon God’s disposal thereof ... by his sincere reliance on 
God.”58 The element of trust (tawakkul) implicit within this act, while not intrinsic to Allah’s 
disposing of the affairs of creation, is essential for soteriological development. While this is 
further discussed in the following chapter, it should be acknowledged that this seemingly 
simple act incorporates a number of soteriologically important elements. Firstly, acknowledging 
one’s complete dependence on Allah and one’s own ontological poverty entails an act of 
humility. Secondly, it removes feelings of or for self-subsistence and thus all claims to godhood. 
Thirdly, the trust it engenders allows the individual to focus on what is required of them, as Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah stated “striving for what has already been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in 
what is demanded of you, are signs of the blurring of your intellect.”59  
 
Soteriological development depends on understanding the ontologically contingent position of 
creatures in relation to Allah. This culminates in embodying this position and affirming it 
through action. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah advises that one must “cling to the attributes of His Lordship and 
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realize the attributes of your servanthood.”60 He further reminds his readers that “if you want 
gifts to come your way, then perfect the spiritual poverty (al-faqr) you have,” quoting the 
Qur’anic passage that “alms are only for the poor” (9: 60).61 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is here making an 
esoteric allusion to the Islamic alms (zakat) that corresponds to their exoteric interpretation. 
Just as material alms are a gift from those without need to those in need, Allah, who is 
ultimately without need, bestows gifts to those who recognise their ontological poverty and 
complete dependency on Allah. This sort of poverty is here qualified as ontological for, in 
relation to Allah, creation is likewise epistemologically poor. Epistemic poverty, within the 
domain of cause and effect, would include being veiled to creation’s intrinsic ontological 
poverty. Insight into and recognition of one’s inherent ontological poverty would be an 
example of the kind of alms mentioned by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. 
 
The ability to embrace, and thus embody, ontological poverty, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
requires contentment with this ontological position. In the Qur’an it is stated that animals 
sacrificed to Allah are to be utilised to “feed the poor who is contented with his lot” (22: 36). In 
enumerating the qualities of those who embrace poverty (faqir), Ibn ‘Ata Allah writes that “the 
faqir is the one who casts off secondary causes and turns away from hindrances” and has “no 
qibla [direction] nor goal except Allah.”62 In doing this “the one who embraces poverty refuses 
everything that is other than God” so that they may realise “the reality of la ilaha ill’Allah 
Muhammadun Rasulu’llah.”63 This shows that for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah there is an intimate connection 
between embracing ontological poverty and affirming the metaphysic of tawhid.  
 
Acknowledging one’s ontological poverty requires embodying certain characteristics. However, 
before discussing these character traits, it is important to note that embodying and affirming 
the inherent ontological poverty of contingent beings does not equate with being destitute. 
Whilst periods of destitution, or appearing destitute, may be utilised in affirming one’s 
ontological poverty, it is not the goal. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah highlights this point with the story of a 
student of a poor fisherman going to visit his teacher’s teacher, only to find the latter living a 
luxurious life which bewilders the student. The events that transpire do not surprise the 
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fisherman for he knows that, regarding his teacher, “God has purified his heart of the world, yet 
has placed it in his hand and given him the appearance of a worldly man” while “as for me, He 
has taken it out of my hand, yet I still long for it.”64 The point of this story highlights the 
differing conceptions of zuhd as asceticism and nonattachment, for while the poor fisherman 
was utilising ascetic practices to inculcate nonattachment, his teacher embodied 
nonattachment and as a result could be surrounded with worldly luxuries without longing for 
their presence. On this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “it is not one of their conditions that they not 
have wealth; rather, among them are those who have wealth and those who have nothing.”65 
The confusion of the student resulted from his seeing asceticism as an end rather than as a 
means to nonattachment.66 
 
In embodying one’s ontological poverty, the virtues that are affirmed are not affirmed for their 
human qualities, nor are they ends-in-themselves. The qualities necessary for the poor (faqir) 
are not virtues in the sense that they relate to the peak of human potentiality, for these 
qualities do not begin with humanity, allowing individuals to reach towards Allah. Rather, in 
accordance with tawhid, virtues are the result of the expression of Allah’s names (asma) and 
attributes (sifat). The goal of which, for the faqir, is to “take on the character of their master.”67 
In acknowledging their ontological poverty and dependency, the faqir is able to partake in the 
Divine characteristics in as far as they are able to embody and enact tawhid. 
 
Rizq within the Ontological Domain 
 
The ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq for it is within this arena that provision 
is pursued, attained, and consumed. Due to the inherent ontological poverty of contingent 
beings, such beings are always in need of something beyond themselves. One reason for this is 
creation’s contingency, which, whether acknowledged or not, creates a compulsion to seek 
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fulfilment. Another reason for this is creation’s ontological poverty, which ensures that they 
cannot attain fulfilment through themselves. This compulsion is liable to yield purely self-
interested pursuits and, to curtail this, the Qur’an emphasises compassionate consideration of 
others, encouraging people to “spend on others out of what God has provided for you as 
sustenance” (36: 47). However, armed with an incomplete understanding of tawhid, the 
common response, goaded by self-interest, is likely to be “shall we feed anyone whom, if God 
had so willed, He could have fed” (36: 47). This verse illustrates how the problem of rizq arises 
from a misunderstanding of how tawhid is manifested ontologically. Further verses highlight 
the fact that the implications of tawhid are not always fully thought out. In a verse where 
polytheists are questioned the Qur’an states “if thou ask them, ‘who is it that has created the 
heavens and the earth?’ – they will surely answer, ‘God’” (39: 38), however, in response to a 
follow up question, “have you, then, ever considered what it is that you invoke instead of God” 
(39: 38), they have no response.68 Thus, the problem of rizq can be seen to arise as a result of 
misunderstanding the relation between the ontological and metaphysical domains.  
 
In attempting to understand the ontological domain, if this understanding is to be consistent 
with tawhid, then an intermediary cannot be placed before Allah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that 
one’s experience “is nothing except the compassion that He sent to you and to the servants 
through the outward manifestations of father and mother, as a means of making you come to 
know of His love” for “in reality, nothing cared for you except His Lordship, and nothing 
nurtured you and satisfied you except His Divinity.”69 Tawhid is maintained for Allah 
communicates to creation through creation. As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah further explains, “you have never 
left, nor will you ever come out of the circle of His beneficence.”70 Metaphysically, this is a 
given, for Allah encompasses all that exists, without being limited to it. The corollary of this is 
that it is possible to understand all experience as being augmented so that, irrespective of the 
individual, all creation has the greatest possibility of acknowledging their Lord. However, due to 
the contingency inherent within creation, as it is played out ontologically, this point is often 
veiled. This shows one of the benefits of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics, for, in 
understanding that Allah communicates to creation through creation, he is able to highlight the 
signs of this communication such that each individual may realise their potential for 
acknowledging Allah in all circumstances.  
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It might seem obvious to state that the problem of rizq is only a problem when provision (rizq) 
seems in short supply. This is because the perception of constrained quantities often invokes 
anxiety and hardship in the resulting pursuit for further provisions. It is necessary to state that 
rizq ‘seems in short supply’ because there is no abundance or lack other than what will allow an 
individual the greatest possibility of acknowledging Allah. The Divine command, to give or 
withhold provision, “is not the command of other than Him, that it should become a source of 
hardship for you,” for “it is the command and the decree of your Master, the very same One 
who supports you with His beneficence and comes to you with His benevolence.”71 In this it can 
be seen that difficulty arises as a result of not comprehending the “source of hardship,” for in 
understanding that it is “the decree of your Master” transforms the situation from one of 
hardship into a communication between the Absolute and the contingent. Thus, both the 
source of the hardship and the solution to it are the same and both, when understood in this 
manner, are an indication of the Unicity of Allah (tawhid). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah succinctly summarises 
this sentiment as “there is nothing for him [from Him] that he could choose for himself [other 
than His choice].”72 Anxiety over the perception of constrained quantities is an indication of a 
lack of trust (tawakkul). The solution to this is in developing trust in Allah’s choice for His 
creation and contentment in the knowledge that it has occurred through the choice of Allah. 
 
In order to further clarify the reception of perceived hardships, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah likens them to 
bitter medicine. Those who are content with the choice of Allah “take the heat for the sake of 
seeking contentment, as the sick man bears the bitter medicine for the sake of recovery and 
health.”73 The recovery that patient endurance elicits, by way of understanding and 
contentment with Allah’s choice, results in the realisation of the necessity of such actions in as 
far as they accord with tawhid. Thus, the metaphysics of tawhid enjoins contentment with the 
necessity of events, for “thy Sustainer creates whatever He wills; and he chooses whatever is 
best for them” (28: 68). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah acknowledges that unpleasant events exist, though he 
recognises that they do not exist solely for their unpleasantness.74 He writes that “afflictions 
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extinguish and humiliate the ego and prevent it from seeking after its desires, and that with this 
humility is victory.”75 With regard to the problem of rizq, it is now possible to see that any 
perceived lack of provision is merely a perception, and not a real lack, for it is an aspect of the 
bitter medicine. However, rather than accepting the medicine for what it is, more often than 
not it is avoided, and the treatment prolonged. 
 
The Perception of Hardships 
 
According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah the perception of hardships is at the centre of human earthly 
existence.76 For this reason it is crucial to gain a correct understanding of this issue, without 
which no solution can be pursued. He writes that “error and fault are a fundamental part of 
your existence, nay, even the source (‘ain) of your existence.”77 The fault being referred to is 
the self’s perceived independence. Independence is only perceived, for any real independence 
would contradict tawhid. For this reason it is the selves “which are the places of agitation and 
which contend with Allah,”78 meaning that they are agitated due to their inherent ontological 
poverty and contend with Allah over causative effectiveness. On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that 
“he who wishes that at a given moment there appear other than what God has manifested in it, 
has not left ignorance behind at all.”79 This agitation is an indication of distrust towards Allah, 
for “one of the signs of relying on one’s own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall 
occurs.”80 Thus, it becomes apparent that the solution to the problem of rizq, according to Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah, is in the acquisition and application of a soteriological semiotics that affirms tawhid.  
 
Yet, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is quick to point out that a perceived downfall is a means to realising the 
nature of the relationship between the Absolute and the contingent. He reminds his readers 
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that “when He gives, He shows you His kindness (birr); when He deprives, He shows you His 
power (qahr),” however, and above all, “in all that, He is making Himself known to you and 
coming to you with His gentleness.”81 An example of this is the fall of Adam, of which Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah writes that “it was a fall in form, but an ascent in meaning.”82 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah considers it 
an ascent for a) “He could make Himself known to them through forbearance, covering-up of 
deeds, forgiveness, relenting, and choosing” as well as b) making possible two stances towards 
Allah, namely “returning to Him repentant, and guidance from Him.”83 While, from a contingent 
perspective, the fall is seen as the source of all hardship and suffering, it is, from this 
perspective, the event that gave all the children of Adam the potential to realise their intrinsic 
relationship with Allah. Regarding this, he stated that “He only made affliction come at the 
hands of people so that you not repose in them” so that by using creation to drive creatures 
from depending on creation Allah ensured that “nothing would drive you from Him.”84 This 
highlights one aspect of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s assertion that “sometimes He opens the door of 
obedience for you but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and 
it turns out to be a cause of arriving at Him.”85 The so called sin, and subsequent fall, was the 
means through which each human gained the potential of “arriving at Him.” 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah holds that the reality of rizq is that it proceeds indefinitely from Allah. He writes 
that “for Allah created all beings, and bestowed His grace upon them, first, through giving them 
existence, and second, through uninterrupted sustenance.”86 The importance of this passage, 
with regard to the problem of rizq, is twofold. Firstly, it shows that, irrespective of one’s 
awareness of Allah, provision for creation is uninterrupted, thus the problem of rizq is not how 
to get more but how to a) realise the necessity of the provision bestowed and b) find 
satisfaction in that provision. Secondly, it shows that, even though existence implies an 
inherent error/friction, it is also a grace for it contains the solution to that apparent 
error/friction. It is necessary to differentiate an implied or apparent error from a real error, for 
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the latter would mean that there is a contradiction in tawhid, which is not possible according to 
an Islamic paradigm, while the former does not penetrate beyond mere appearances. This 
relates to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view that “the intellect is the greatest bounty Allah has granted His 
slaves,”87 for the intellect has the potential to pierce the outward forms in order to apprehend 
their metaphysical foundation, which is perceived through the application of a soteriological 
semiotics.   
 
It is possible to see why the ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq. The problem 
of rizq is the problem of contingency and, thus, occupies the domain within which contingency 
abounds. While rizq is not a problem relating to reality as such, it is intimately bound up with 
the contingently existent’s relationship with, and apprehension of, reality as such. For Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, apprehending the true relationship between the Absolute and the contingent cuts to the 
core of our being and for this reason imposes the obligation of finding and applying the solution 
to this issue. The solution to the problem of rizq is not extraneous to the ontological domain for 
a) it is located within this domain and b) the ontological domain, being underpinned by tawhid, 
does not contain anything that acts independently from this inherent unity. For these reasons, 
the solution to problem of rizq, while located within the epistemic domain, is to be found in the 
correct understanding of, and approach to, the ontological domain, which, in turn, is dependent 
on the metaphysic of tawhid. 
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Chapter 6 – Epistemology 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as has been seen, due to the inherent contingency of creation, the 
ontological domain is the site of the problem of rizq. Within the domain of epistemology there 
is a shift of focus from creation, as it is within the ontological domain, to a focus on the 
individual’s comprehension of creation. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah the goal for the individual is to 
comprehend the nature of their contingency and, as a result, the relationship between the 
metaphysical and ontological domains. Statements such as “My God, how near You are to me, 
and how far I am to You”1 indicate the gap between the metaphysical reality and the epistemic 
state of the individual. Within the epistemological domain an understanding of the relationship 
between the two aspects of the kalimah, namely there is no god but Allah (la ilaha illa’llah) and 
Muhammad is the messenger of Allah (Muhammad rasul Allah), is developed. It will be shown 
that in understanding this, the conflation of domains that gives rise to the problem of rizq is 
corrected and a solution can be found. 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not explicitly develop an epistemology, although his works indicate that he 
advances a specific epistemic model. This epistemic model, like the rest of his work, is founded 
on tawhid such that it could be said that the goal of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology is to 
comprehend, and thus affirm, tawhid as it is manifest in creation. He states that “every knower 
– whatever his kind might be, and whether he knows it or not – understands Him and affirms 
Oneness of Him, as God Most High has said, ‘And unto God falleth prostrate whosoever is in the 
heavens and the earth, willingly or unwillingly ...’”2 The unwilling prostration is understood to 
result from creations inherent contingency and its unavoidable reliance on Allah, though it is 
committed in ignorance. Conversely, to prostrate willingly requires knowledge of Allah and 
creation’s relation to Allah. This he calls beneficial knowledge, which “is that through which aid 
is sought in obedience to Allah,” it “overpowers and subdues caprice,”3 and “uncovers the veil 
over the heart.”4 Beneficial knowledge also includes the “knowledge of Allah and the 
knowledge of His commandments”5 and is seen to impact on the understanding of, and 
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approach to, the ontological domain in that “by virtue of that experiential knowledge ... the 
witnessing of creatures as active independent agents falls from their hearts.”6 The chief tool 
used to aid in the acquisition of beneficial knowledge and affirm tawhid is his soteriological 
semiotics which, as seen, decodes the signs within creation that Allah uses to communicate 
with creation. As a result, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology cannot be considered strictly noetic.  
 
The Importance of Self-Knowledge 
 
It is evident within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works that self-knowledge is important in understanding the 
relationship between the Absolute and the individual. He cites the well known saying “whoever 
knows himself knows his Lord” for this “indicates that self-knowledge leads to the knowledge of 
God.”7 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes Abu’l Abbas as stating that this can be interpreted in two ways, 
either a) “if someone knows himself in his lowliness, helplessness and poverty, he will come to 
know God in His glorious might, power and self-sufficiency” or b) this saying means that “if 
someone knows himself, this is evidence that he had already known God before this.”8 Both 
interpretations indicate that the epistemic state of an individual is intimately connected with 
their knowledge of their ontological reality and that self-knowledge is a crucial aspect of that. 
Regarding the importance of self-knowledge, it has been suggested within Sufism that “self-
knowledge is not only the condition but also the goal of the mystical quest.”9 Thus, it is 
necessary to explore the centrality of self-knowledge in correctly apprehending the contingency 
of creation and its accord with tawhid.  
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Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah repeatedly indicates that gaining self-knowledge is connected to realising one’s 
potentiality. He states that “whenever you admit your ignorance and fall back on your root, the 
recognition of your self will appear to you”10 for in the knowledge of their inherent ontological 
poverty, the individual ceases to rely upon what they attribute to be their own capacities and, 
in turning away from these, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah would have the individual turn to the source of all 
potentiality, namely Allah. This is further emphasised in stating that “when you are convinced 
about your attributes and you have seen the faults of your nafs [ego] – although they are 
concealed – then you will obtain the manifestation of the attributes of your Master.”11 It is 
important to note that the reception, and embodiment, of the Master’s qualities is a passive act 
by the recipient. The receptivity of the individual is dependent on their realisation of their total 
ontological poverty and the reception of virtues is evidence of, or witness to, their acceptance 
and embodiment of this ontological poverty. 
 
There is a simple manner of approaching self-knowledge. According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, there are 
four possible epistemic states that an individual can find their self in. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes 
Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi as stating, 
There are four times in which the servant will find himself, of which there is 
no fifth: blessing, affliction, obedience, and disobedience. In each of these 
times, there is an aspect of servanthood which the Truth requires of you by 
virtue of His lordship. If it is a time of obedience, your path is to bear witness 
to God’s grace, since it is He who has guided you into this obedience and has 
made it possible for you. If it is a time of disobedience, your path is to seek 
God’s forgiveness and repent. If it is a time of blessing, your path is to give 
thanks, which means for your heart to rejoice in God. If it is a time of 
affliction, you path is to be content with God’s decree and to endure 
patiently.
12 
These four epistemic states delimit the possible states of the contingently existent with regard 
to Allah. It is important to note that these four states are not necessarily connected to the 
individual’s soteriological development, in as far as the transition through them does not 
necessitate progress nor does their occurrence indicate any particular development within the 
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individual. Rather these can be considered as four doors at the centre of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
soteriological semiotics which demarcate the possible conditions confronting the individual and 
their four keys, for once a condition has been correctly diagnosed the appropriate key can be 
utilised, thus opening the way to pass onto another epistemic state. The importance of self-
knowledge for the individual’s soteriological development is here evident in that it allows for a) 
a correct diagnosis and b) the knowledge of which key to utilise. 
 
Repentance (tawba) and Disobedience 
 
Repentance is connected to the seeming contradiction between servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) and 
self-direction (tadbir). Repentance occupies an important place within Islamic, and specifically 
Sufi, soteriology. As the previous quote from Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi indicates, repentance 
(tawba) is a condition for moving from a state of disobedience. However, if, ontologically, 
servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) is an inherent aspect of creation, due to the metaphysics of tawhid, 
how can creation be accused of disobedience? While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not tackle this 
question directly, there is sufficient evidence in his works to propose an answer.  
 
From Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works it becomes apparent that disobedience does not occur 
ontologically, but epistemologically. He writes that “sometimes He opens the door of 
obedience for you but not the door of acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and 
it turns out to be a cause of arriving at Him”13 indicating that, if understood and responded to 
correctly, acts of disobedience have the potential to alter the apprehension of Allah. This makes 
disobedience an epistemologically useful pedagogical tool through which greater obedience is 
possible. This is further confirmed by a Hadith which states that “had you not committed sins, 
Allah would have brought into existence a creation that would have committed sin (and Allah) 
would have forgiven them.”14 Thus, there can be seen to be an intrinsic relationship between 
disobedience and repentance. It is through disobedience that repentance becomes both 
possible and necessary. Disobedience is often the result of absentmindedness, an act which is 
corrected through consciously remembering Allah in order to repent, for it is only those who 
have the ability to forget that remembrance (dhikr) is possible. This is one reason Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
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states that disobedience or sin can be “a cause of arriving at Him” for sincerity in repentance 
can be greater than it is in an act of obedience, hence obedience does not always lead to the 
“door of acceptance.”  
 
Patient Endurance (sabr) and Contentment (rida) 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s call for patient endurance (sabr) arises due to what he sees as a) a lack of self-
knowledge and b) a lack of understanding Allah’s methods. He writes that he was informed by 
Abu’l Abbas that “’patient endurance’ (sabr) is derived from the word asbar, which refers to the 
target used by archers” such that “the person with patient endurance is one who sets himself 
up as a target for the arrows of divine decree”15 and that “if, then, one is unmoved by them 
[the arrows of divine decree], he or she is said to have patient endurance.”16 The patient 
endurance of and contentment with divine decree is connected with creation’s ignorance in as 
far as “He knows best that in which your true well-being lies.”17 It is the ontological poverty 
inherent in creation that is emphasised through hardship and a failure to acknowledge that this 
is a veil which conceals tawhid. In acknowledging that “it is God who delivers us from those 
impediments which threaten to keep us from Him,”18 contingent creation endures the “arrows 
of divine decree” as a means to witness Allah as the sole Creator and affirm tawhid. It is for this 
reason that “the Real desired to manifest the essential and desperate need of the animal 
towards nourishment and food,”19 for instilling this fundamental requirement makes it possible 
for creation to become aware of their lack of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, in being content 
with the “arrows of divine decree” the individual elicits their trust in Allah (tawakkul) for, rather 
than attempting to avoid hardship, they adhere to Allah’s choice for them. 
 
According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah sabr can be divided into three basic categories. These are: “(1) 
perseverance in the performance of duties, (2) self-control in the face of what is forbidden, and 
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(3) steadfastness and equanimity in affliction.”20 These three categories all relate to instilling 
and maintaining an awareness of creation’s lack of self-sufficiency. In spelling out these 
categories, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah draws in the etymology of sabr, indicating that an individual may feel 
targeted when called upon to maintain composure and control when facing affliction. 
Regarding the third category of patient endurance, through the experience of hardships it is 
necessary to remember the verse “Allah does not burden any human being with more than he 
is well able to bear” (2: 286). Through his understanding of this verse, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is telling 
his reader that as Allah has promised humanity the strength to bear all trials that are presented 
to them, they should trust in Allah to uphold this promise by having patience with their 
circumstances.    
 
The three categories of sabr, while encompassing the boundaries of what it is to have patience, 
do not reach the limits of patient endurance. Without diminishing their status regarding either 
the difficulty of attaining them or the exaltedness of those who have achieved all three of these 
categories of sabr, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that they are to be considered ‘basic’ only in 
comparison with “the patient endurance exhibited by the greatest of God’s saints.”21 The basic 
categories of sabr involve patiently enduring the effects of the actions that each individual 
commits, whereas the sabr of “the greatest of God’s saints” involves enduring the afflictions 
placed upon them through others, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah recognises “God has afflicted those who 
belong to this community through other people in order that, by virtue of their patient 
endurance of people’s persecution, He might elevate their status.”22 Thus, hardships are not 
meant to be viewed as merely punishment for they are the catalyst through which 
soteriological development occurs. This is indicated in the Hadith that states that “no calamity 
befalls a Muslim but that Allah expiates some of his sins because of it, even though it were [sic] 
the prick he receives from a thorn.”23 It is for this reason that this bitter medicine is necessary. 
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Furthermore, such afflictions are far from negative in that “it should be also borne in mind that 
if everyone believed in God’s friends, they would miss the opportunity to endure patiently the 
disbelief of those who do not believe in them.”24 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah provides a list of examples of 
the things indicating the sabr “exhibited by the greatest of God’s saints,” though without 
dwelling on them, with regard to the levels of sabr, it should be noted that their difference is in 
degree not in kind. While the number of arrows shot by Divine decree differs, the qualities that 
both levels of patient endurance (sabr) engender are the same, though differing in intensity. 
  
Similar to, and closely connected with, patient endurance (sabr) is contentment (rida). Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah shows this connection in stating that “if it is a time of affliction, your path is to be content 
with God’s decree and to endure patiently.”25 Both sabr and rida are necessary responses to 
affliction. Regarding the etymology of rida, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “contentment (rida) is to 
break (radd) oneself of one’s passions.”26 “One’s passions” often include the desire to be free of 
hardships, which, as seen, would preclude the soteriological development that potentially 
results from such hardships, thus prolonging the bitter medicine. “One’s passions” also include 
the desires one has for oneself even though the Qur’an states “it may well be that you hate a 
thing the while it is good for you, and it may well be that you love a thing the while it is bad for 
you: and God knows, whereas you do not know” (2: 216). For these reasons it is necessary to 
show contentment (rida), patience (sabr), and trust (tawakkul) so that soteriological 
development can occur. 
 
The Goal of Knowledge 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah the acquisition of knowledge is not an end in itself. The value of knowledge is 
predominantly soteriological in that its acquisition enhances the contingently existence’s 
potentiality to act in accordance with the Absolute. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the evidence of 
that knowledge which God seeks is reverent fear, while the evidence of the presence of 
reverent fear is obedience to God’s commands.”27 This is a clear example illustrating that “the 
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purpose of knowledge is action.”28 However, as the preceding quote shows, not just any action 
is acceptable, rather it is action for the sake of Allah. It is apparent that patient endurance 
(sabr) and contentment (rida) implies a certain set of directives. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “it is 
impossible that one would be content with Allah as Lord but not with Islam as a religion, or be 
pleased with Islam as a religion but not with Muhammad as a prophet.”29 As a result it is clear 
that acknowledging the oneness of Allah results in a set of directives that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah views 
as immutable. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is uncompromising on this point, writing that “someone who 
acquires knowledge in order to gain this world and to achieve status therein may be likened to 
someone who picks up excrement with a sapphire spoon.”30 While this may seem stern, given 
his project, it is understandable. The kind of knowledge that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is encouraging his 
readers to pursue is that which gives insight into the principle of manifestation. Thus, 
knowledge, and its resulting action, cannot be accepted as an end in itself for, being done for 
the sake of that which is other than Allah would contradict tawhid.31  
 
The kind of knowledge that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is pursuing, and encouraging others to pursue, is that 
which allows the individual to acknowledge the connection between Allah and His creation. The 
Unicity of Allah, being the source of existence, is the ultimate end of any pursuit for “true 
understanding returns you to Allah.”32 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah believes that the reason for this is that 
“understanding from Allah unveils to you the secret of servanthood in you.”33 For Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, servanthood (‘ubudiyyah)34 is affirmed through true understanding because it enacts the 
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ontological poverty inherent within the individual and reconnects them with the Absolute in as 
far as they confirm the Unicity of Allah. For this reason, it is understandable that “amongst the 
signs of success at the end is turning to God at the beginning”35 because turning to Allah means 
embodying one’s servanthood and, being a sound beginning, ensures success at the end. 
Servanthood “takes place through obedience to God’s commands and surrender to His 
decrees,”36 and, most simply stated, the meaning of this is that “He [Allah] requires His servants 
to affirm His singularity.”37 In acknowledging the contingent’s connection with the Creator, the 
individual is directed towards understanding, what is for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, an intrinsic aspect of 
their being, namely their inherent contingency. Considered an inherent aspect of creation, the 
awareness of contingency is increased through self-knowledge because as each individual 
increases their understanding of what they are, they also increase their understanding of how 
they are. When the metaphysics of tawhid underpins an individual’s epistemological outlook, 
that individual realises that they are for Allah by Allah and that, being a creation, their 
contingency is integral to their being. In understanding the simplest expression of “His 
singularity,” as the awareness of it deepens, it may be enacted more thoroughly through 
thought, speech, and deed for “the purpose of knowledge is action.” This process culminates in 
the unification of the individual in their inward and outward movements, allowing them to 
draw closer to embodying the metaphysical Unity of tawhid.  
 
Within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, knowledge of servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) can be seen to involve 
an understanding of its ontological foundations. He states that “you have not loved anything 
without being its slave, but He does not want you to be someone else’s slave.”38 Loving 
something, in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view, involves turning to face that which is loved to the exclusion 
of others such that there is a degree of enslavement to it. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in stating that “He 
does not want you to be someone else’s slave” recognises that becoming a slave to contingent 
things involves a perpetuating cycle moving from one contingent thing to another, like the 
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“donkey at the mill.”39 Furthermore, facing that which is loved is important for, if seen in 
conjunction with the Qur’anic verse “wherever you turn, there is God’s countenance” (2: 115), 
means that being a slave to Allah is ontologically unavoidable, though the degree to which this 
is understood depends on the epistemological awareness of the individual.  
 
While an active pursuit of servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) deepens the awareness of tawhid, it in no 
way denies the realness of contingent change. Rather, it is the orientation towards creations 
inherent contingency that appears to change. From Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion of tawhid it can 
be seen that there is no instance where any creation does not embody it, though their 
awareness of such embodiment may be lacking. It is through a deeper awareness of their 
ontological state, through self-knowledge, that the individual comes to realise their total 
embodiment of tawhid. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics utilises a selection of symbolic 
markers whose key function is to help induce self-awareness within the individual. As a result, it 
cannot be said that the world changes through soteriological development, rather it can be 
seen that there are concrete changes in the paradigm of selfhood that change the individual’s 
orientation with regard to their inherent contingency. A prime aspect of this change in 
orientation towards contingency is the move away from (apparent) self-direction (tadbir) 
towards the realisation of servanthood (‘ubudiyyah). 
 
Servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) and Self-direction (tadbir) 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah attributes an exulted position to servanthood (‘ubudiyyah).40 He states that “the 
most sublime abiding station in which the servant could be established [in] is the station of 
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servitude.”41 Support for this view in verses such as “Limitless in His glory is He who transported 
His servant by night...” (17: 1), “and in what We bestowed from on high upon Our servant” (8: 
41), and “whenever a servant of God stands up in prayer to Him” (72: 19). It is the intimacy and 
connection between Allah and His servant that is the focus for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, whether the 
servant stands to commune with, receives bestowal from, or is moved by his Master. For an 
individual to develop this intimate connection with Allah, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it is 
imperative to “understand that the spirit of servitude and its secret is to abandon self-choice 
(ikhtiyar), and not contest the Divine Decrees.”42 The reason for this is that “self-choice,” 
discussed below, treats the individual as an independent, rather than contingent, entity, thus 
contradicting tawhid. In order to “abandon self-choice” Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah divides this task into two 
distinct aspects, writing “its outer is compliance with Allah, and its inner is the lack of 
contention with Him.”43 Outer compliance, which includes proscriptions and prohibitions, 
involves the abandoning of self-choice in preference for deferring to the Prophetic example, 
whereas inner compliance, involving “the lack of contention with Him,” is abandoning self-
choice in preference for Allah’s choice and contentment (rida) with this choice. In both cases 
servanthood can be seen to detach the individual from preoccupation with worldly concerns so 
that they are free to devote their attention to Allah. 
 
Self-direction and self-reliance are intimately connected, and for this reason are equally 
contrary to tawhid. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes Abu’l Hassan as having said “make no choice upon 
your own authority in anything,”44 which, in light of tawhid, is understandable considering that 
taking oneself as an authority effaces the authority of Allah. Abu’l Hassan is advocating for 
tawhid in two ways. Firstly, by abrogating self-choice the individual is effaced through a denial 
of self-reliance and, in turn, the alternative is trust in, reliance on, and contentment with Allah. 
On this point Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “if you wish to enter into the presence of God ... then 
that will not be possible for you so long as other than God lords it over your heart, for verily, 
you belong to whosoever has authority over you.”45 Secondly, the possibility of choice 
presupposes multiplicity which is reaffirmed through self-choice. The Qur’an states “thy 
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Sustainer creates whatever He wills; and He chooses [for mankind] whatever is best for them” 
(28:68). Regarding this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “if He creates and chooses what He wills, then 
He plans and manages as He wills,”46 indicating that knowledge of creation’s ontological 
inefficiency, as he takes this Qur’anic passage to specify, should be sufficient to abrogate self-
direction and self-reliance. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah47 the verse “is, then, He who creates comparable 
to any [being] that cannot create” (16: 17) closes the possibility of further disputing this point.  
 
Obedience and Disobedience 
 
In light of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s presentation of tawhid, it would appear that the distinction between 
obedience and disobedience could fail. For, to accept Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position appears to entail 
shirking from attributing actions to oneself and, thus, the associated reward or punishment, as 
contingent entities are not the authors of their actions. Accusations of antinomianism have 
been repeatedly levelled against many Sufis. Ibn Taymiyya was fond of utilising this accusation, 
while it has been considered to be a key aspect of the anti-Ibn Arabi polemic.48 A simplified 
version of the argument follows the line that if everything is Allah then everything is 
permissible and the law (shari’a) is abrogated, with the accused being censured for allegedly 
advocating antinomian views. It is possible that this accusation rests on a conflation of the 
metaphysical and ontological domains.49 However, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, that everything is from 
Allah does not free creations from their obligations. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s rejection of antinomianism 
is twofold.  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s first reason relates to the verse “when He wills a thing to be, He but says unto 
it, ‘be’ – and it is” (2: 117). As Creator, Allah has command over cause and effect, as Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah acknowledges “just as He creates obedience by His grace, He creates disobedience by His 
justice.”50 Whilst all action and creation originates with Allah, acts of disobedience, being a part 
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of cause and effect, are contingent, as he writes “not a breath (nafas) do you expire but a 
decree of Destiny has made it go forth”.51 The contingency of disobedience is dependent on the 
contingency of creation and are therefore attributable to particular individuals. However, these 
actions cannot be considered inherently bad because both good and bad issue form the 
selfsame source, though this leads to the second point. This position relates to the 
abandonment of self-direction, discussed above. While it could be advanced that the individual 
is not responsible for their actions as all action originates with Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen 
to place responsibility on the individual in their response to the circumstances in which they are 
to be found. He states “do not look forward to being free of alterities (al-aghyar), for that is 
what cuts you off from vigilant attention (al-muraqaba) to Him in that very state He has 
assigned to you.”52 Desiring to be “free of alterities” indicates a lack of trust in Allah (tawakkul) 
in that the individual does not trust Allah’s reasons for placing them “in that very state He has 
assigned to you.” According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it is possible to diagnose this for “one of the signs 
of relying on one’s own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall occurs.”53 
 
Following on from the first point, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s second reason for rejecting antinomianism 
involves the existence of evil. In this he holds a position akin to al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali states that 
Allah “intended good for the good itself, yet intended evil not for itself but because there is 
some good within it” such that “good is accomplished essentially but evil is accomplished 
accidentally.”54 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to follow this view for he writes that the attribution 
of evil to an action or object is a “secondary, or accidental, attribution,” indicating that he too 
believes that there is no inherent evil. This connects to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view of patient 
endurance (sabr) in that afflictions cannot be considered inherently bad because such 
afflictions are the means through which “He might elevate their status.”55 The same position is 
applied to disobedience in that, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, any action “is not in itself essentially bad, 
but only because of its connection to a prohibition.”56 Implicit in this position is its relation with 
tawhid, which, once it is made explicit, makes it untenable to accuse Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah of 
                                                          
51
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab al-Hikam, 27. 
52
 Ibid., 27. 
53
 Ibid., 23. 
54
 al-Ghazali, Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names, 56. 
55
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Lata’if al-Minan, 296. 
56
 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Kitab at-Tanwir, 56. 
127 
 
antinomianism. Any and all prohibitions are connected with the prime prohibition of submitting 
to anything other than Allah, a corner stone of an Islamic paradigm and key to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
metaphysics of tawhid for “the Real made it clear that He did not create the slaves for 
themselves, but rather created them so that they might worship Him and declare His 
Oneness.”57   
 
Interestingly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s statement “that they might worship Him” includes the possibility 
of not worshipping Allah. This possibility is further reinforced by the statement that 
“disobedience is an ugly action from the servant only because it is in opposition to the Divine 
Command.”58 However, this seems impossible for metaphysically tawhid makes it impossible 
that anything should oppose Allah, for if it did then that would imply a god besides Allah. Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah affirms this in stating that “whosoever reflects deeply will find that all creatures 
affirm the Oneness of God Most High in accordance with the subtleness of their ‘breaths’.”59 
Furthermore, given that “He did not create him except to obey Him and serve Him,”60 it 
becomes apparent that ontologically the possibility of opposing Allah is again impossible. 
However, a problem remains as to why Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah would imply what has so far been shown 
to be apparently incongruent with his metaphysics and ontology. It could be that the use of this 
expression has a pedagogical function. It is conceivable that this phrase is directed towards 
novices who may be overwhelmed by the implications of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discourse. Support for 
the view that this phrase has a pedagogic function can be drawn from many of his works, most 
of which explicitly state that they were composed for pedagogic reasons. The Miftah al-Falah, 
amongst other reasons, resulted from a prompt by “a pious brother ... to compose a book 
wherein I have assembled those things that would facilitate understanding the remembrance of 
God,”61 while the Unwan al-Tawfiq repeatedly enjoins “O brother! Know...,” “O full brother,”62 
“O wayfarer,”63 and concludes with “this inscription is for whoever longs for the meaning of 
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these verses,”64 indicating that both texts were composed for pedagogic purposes. Even each 
chapter in the Kitab al-Hikam begins with “he said”65 indicating that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was 
conveying his knowledge to others. In this case, the inclusion of the possibility of disobedience 
acts as a pressure valve for those students who perhaps cannot grasp the implications of Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s works.  
 
While reading the inclusion of the possibility of disobedience as a pedagogical tool may go 
some way to explain this issue, it is insufficient. Furthermore, if it was strictly the case then Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah would not need to add that “the one of understanding is the one who has 
understood the secret of existence and acts accordingly,”66 as this puts beyond doubt the 
existence of individuals who do not have such knowledge and thus do not act accordingly. It 
seems that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah roots disobedience to the epistemological domain. Tawhid ensures 
that creation cannot but “obey Him and serve Him” and thus everything affirms tawhid through 
every action. Though, due to creation’s contingency, this is done unwillingly, meaning in 
ignorance. Whereas, Allah can be seen to have created the distinction between obedience and 
disobedience to distinguish between those who have the knowledge to affirm tawhid willingly 
and those who do not. 
 
Certainty (yakin) 
 
While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah utilises proofs (burhan), for him they are only a stepping stone towards 
certainty (yakin). Proofs are no guarantee of certainty for, whereas the former are completely 
noetic, certainty (yakin) arises as a result of enacting a deep seated conviction. This was 
touched upon in relation to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s metaphysics of tawhid and it is worth repeating 
that for him “all certainty entails faith, though not all faith entails certainty” as “the difference 
between them is that while faith might be attended by heedlessness, such is not the case with 
certainty.”67 Certainty is epistemologically greater than proofs because it carries an unshakable 
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and unrefusable resolve unlike evidence or proofs. He writes that “Shaykh Abu al-Hasan (may 
God be pleased with him) said, ‘we view God with the perceptive powers of faith and certainty, 
which has freed us from the need for evidence and proof.’”68 While this in no way discards 
evidence or proofs, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has been seen to utilise them,69 this quote contains three 
important points regarding Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology. Firstly, evidence and proofs are seen 
to be only a preliminary stage, which the individual is later free to hold or discard upon the 
advent of certainty (yakin). Secondly, the superiority of certainty (yakin) over proof is in the 
soundness of the former compared to the mere validity of the latter. Thirdly, and of particular 
reference to modern discussions, the denigration of faith as unfounded belief is not applicable 
here in that it is built on proof and develops into certainty (yakin). 
 
The development of certainty (yakin) is it intimately connected with action, and thus is an 
aspect of the goal of knowledge. This can be seen from Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion on the 
function of, and response to, miracles, where he states that “a miracle serves to unsettle 
doubts concerning divine grace, [and] to [bring about] experiential knowledge of God’s bounty 
towards the one at whose hands it was performed.”70 This can be seen to illustrate a clear 
connection between the development of certainty and action for he sees one function of a 
miracle to be the unsettling of “doubts concerning divine grace.” Regarding the response to 
miracles he writes that “for those to whom they are manifested, they may be taken note of by 
spiritual seekers who are still at the start of their journey, while they may be overlooked by 
those who have reached the end of their spiritual treks.”71 It can be seen that the point of 
soteriological development plagued by doubts, generally “at the start of their journey,” 
requires events that with strengthen the individual’s resolve, an example of which, according to 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, is miracles. Thus “the purpose behind it [the miracle] is to enable the servant 
who witnessed it to see the validity of the path being followed by the saint at whose hands the 
miracle was performed.”72 Whereas, upon attaining certainty (yakin), as a result of their 
soteriological endeavours, such individuals “are not in need of such confirmation” and thus 
need not take heed of miracles.73 From this it is evident that the superiority of certainty (yakin) 
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over mere proofs is that the former, as it occurs in conjunction with action, engenders 
“experiential knowledge” whereas the latter does not. 
 
While there is an intimate interconnection between certainty and action, it can be seen to 
change with soteriological development. As in the case of miracles, during the early stages of 
soteriological development certainty (yakin) develops as a result of particular actions. Whereas, 
for those who “are not in need of such confirmation” the relationship between certainty (yakin) 
and action can be seen to alternate in that certainty increases action. Thus, irrespective of an 
individual’s soteriological development, there is an intimate and inseparable connection 
between certainty and action within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology. 
 
Knowledge and Rizq 
 
From the above material it appears that within the epistemological domain the solution to the 
problem of rizq is dependent upon the degree of knowledge attained regarding the relationship 
between the metaphysical and ontological domains. In commenting on the verse “it is God who 
has created you, and then has provided you with sustenance” (30: 40), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states 
that this indicates “that creation and provision are coupled together.”74 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
armed with this knowledge it follows that “as you have agreed that Allah is the sole Creator 
without claiming for yourselves any part in creating, then in the same way agree to the reality 
that He is the sole Provider, without any share in that.”75 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this follows 
because in the above cited verse “He linked the two together as an argument against the slaves 
and to prohibit them from witnessing any provision coming from other than Him, or seeing 
beneficence coming from His creation.”76 Furthermore, implicit within this verse is the view 
that “rizq is already taken care of, and its affair concluded,”77 placing beyond doubt the degree 
to which creation can affect their provision.  
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Allah as the sole Provider involves, primarily, two points. Firstly, provision is guaranteed, as, for 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it is clearly stated in the Qur’an that “We do not ask thee to provide sustenance: 
it is We who provide sustenance for thee” (20: 132). According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this guarantee 
of provision comes because “it is as if He knew that the slaves might become perturbed in their 
worship by seeking provision, and that that disturbance would veil them from being wholly 
engaged in obedience.”78 By shifting the focus away from how provision arrives and onto 
developing the knowledge that it will arrive, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is implicitly drawing a connection 
between the knowledge of provision’s certain arrival and the development of trust in Allah 
(tawakkul). On this he writes that “whoever is preoccupied with what is already guaranteed for 
him instead of what is demanded of him, his ignorance is great, and his heedlessness is vast”79 
and that “your striving for what has already been guaranteed for you, and your remissness in 
what is demanded of you, are signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira).”80 While the 
discussion of rizq has come to centre on the fruitlessness of its pursuit, it has done so without 
contradicting tawhid. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s reason for discouraging the pursuit of rizq is that it 
becomes a distraction from obedience towards Allah, which is a way of reiterating that the 
pursuit of rizq is the pursuit of secondary causes. 
 
The second point that the guarantee of rizq raises is the lack of specification with regard to its 
bestowal. According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, this too is deliberate. The fulfilment of needs is not 
specified “so that the servant may become restless and agitated out of desperation.”81 He 
explains that the reason for this is threefold, a) the need for Allah is intensified, b) the individual 
ceases to rely on their own efforts, and c) it tests the sincerity and commitment of each 
individual’s trust in Allah (tawakkul) so that it may be strengthened. For had “the time, the 
cause, and the intermediate means been specified, then the slaves would not experience the 
desperation that exists when these are unknown”82 and thus the above three impacts would 
remain unknown. This concealing develops self-knowledge, for “whoever knows his self with its 
need, poverty, abasement, and humiliation, will know his Lord in His Might, His Authority, His 
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Being, and His Beneficence and other similar attributes of perfection.”83 Thus, like the 
guarantee of provision, the concealing of its distribution is designed to increase within the 
individual the conscious awareness of their dependence on Allah. 
 
The problem of rizq can now be seen to be at the centre of the Creator/creation paradigm. 
While tawhid ensures that there is no problem with rizq, the appearance of the problem of rizq 
is due to its pedagogic function, for, as presented by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it can be utilised to teach 
and encourage creation to consciously embody their contingency. Rizq exists so that creation 
can become aware of their need of Allah, as the Qur’an states “it is you who stand in need of 
God, whereas He alone is self-sufficient” (35: 15). In considering this verse, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes 
that “need is a doorway to Allah” and a “means of arrival to Him”84 because through need the 
individual becomes aware their insufficiency and turns to Allah. Nourishment and food, being, 
in a sense, the most basic, common, and gross forms of rizq, exists for each individual because 
it gives each and every individual an equal opportunity to recognise their inherent contingency 
and in turn voids all claims of being ignorant of such contingency. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah recognises the 
necessity of this, for “if He were to leave them without need, they would have become 
presumptuous and made pretentious claims.”85 Thus, the existence of need is inherent to 
creation in order for creation to become aware of its inherent contingency and, ultimately, to 
limit all contention with Allah. 
 
It has been seen that for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah there are three domains to be known in order to solve 
the problem of rizq. These three domains, being Allah, creation, and the self, involve knowledge 
of Allah’s Unicity, the contingency of creation, and the mediation of these two domains within 
the self. It has been seen that affirming tawhid means deferring to Allah. However, the specifics 
of this have not been explored. The self, being the site of knowing, requires a particular mode 
of being in order to mediate between a) affirming Allah’s Unicity, b) interacting with creation 
and c) being aware of the requirements of the self in its changing states. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
soteriological semiotics can be seen as advancing an etiquette that attends to the threefold 
requirements of solving the problem of rizq without abrogating the requisite commitments to 
any of the three domains.  
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Chapter 7 – Eschatology  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s eschatology is mentioned less frequently than other topics and, as a result, 
appears to occupy a less important role within his works. This may seem like a digression from 
the main theme, and to some degree it is. However, the inclusion of a chapter on Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s eschatology is important for three reasons. Firstly, given the importance of 
eschatological discourse within an Islamic paradigm, it is necessary to see how closely Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s worldview is aligned to this paradigm. Secondly, given that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre 
contains eschatological material, no study of his work would be complete without it. Thirdly, 
the relationship of this material to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s overarching soteriological concerns is 
important for deepening the understanding of the problem of rizq.  In order to gain a clearer 
understanding of his eschatology, the implications of his discussion of other domains needs to 
be drawn out, especially the intimate relation between eschatological and epistemological 
domains. It can be seen that by holding eschatological views there are transformative 
ramifications on the epistemic state of the individual, specifically regarding the performance of 
ethical duties. 
 
Works on Islamic eschatology  
deal with such questions as the nature of the human being and his 
relationship with God, the reason for man’s creation, his ultimate good and 
the manner in which he can achieve it, the various types of individuals that 
make up the human race and their respective lodging places in the next 
world, the ontological distinctions between this world and the next, and the 
interpretation of the data found in the Quran and the Hadith concerning 
death, resurrection, and heaven and hell.
1
 
Furthermore, “eschatology embraces not only teachings about death, resurrection, immortality 
and judgment, but also the tradition’s understanding of beginnings, the meaning of history and 
the direction and purpose towards which everything in creation tends” such that “theologically 
it orients our ultimate purpose and this should be central in its interpretation.”2 While this 
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domain encompasses a wide range of topics, this future has the potential to focus in on the 
present in so far as current events contribute to each individual’s ultimate state. Within Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s works, eschatology can be seen to provide much of the impetus for the individual’s 
daily actions, which govern the individual’s relationship with Allah. It is suggested here that Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s discussion of eschatological issues primarily focuses on its formative ramifications, 
which is bound to direct the individual to achieve their ultimate good. This “ultimate good” is, 
for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the affirmation of tawhid. It may be that a more detailed account has been 
excluded because, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the state of the individual in the hereafter depends on the 
will of Allah, with which the individual cannot contend, rendering further description, beyond 
striving for the individual’s ultimate good, unnecessary.  
 
One of the primary aspects of Islamic eschatology is the idea of return (ma’ad). “The concept of 
a return to God – both personal and collective – is Qur’anic,”3 which states “as it was He who 
brought you into being in the first instance, so also [unto Him] you will return” (7: 29). While 
“all human life in this lower world (dunya) is viewed as a path of return,”4 discussions of the 
return (ma’ad) are generally divided into discussions of the “voluntary return” (al-ruju al-
ikhtiyari) and the “compulsory return” (al-ruju al-idtiyari) where “the first deals with the path of 
attaining spiritual perfection in this life, [and] the second with the nature of physical death and 
bodily resurrection.”5 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is explicitly aware of the compulsory return, and it could be 
said to be prefigured into his discussion of the relation between the metaphysics of tawhid and 
the ontological domain. As a result, rather than detailing the compulsory return, it can be seen 
to fill a formative function for bringing about an impetus for the voluntary return. In this sense, 
the voluntary return encompasses the compulsory and, in some ways, exceeds it.   
 
The ontological domain, wherein is the “path of return,” is in a state of constant, unrepeatable 
flux, for “every day He manifests Himself in yet another [wondrous] way” (55: 29). One 
interpretation of “day” in this verse is that “His ‘day’ (yawm) is the indivisible moment (an).”6 
Abu’l Abbas’ circumscribing of the four epistemic states of the individual, “of which there is no 
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fifth,”7 can here be considered as four kinds of moments. Given that “wherever you turn, there 
is God’s countenance” (2: 115), an implication is that every moment is an unrepeatable instant 
of return (ma’ad) within which the individual voluntarily returns through affirming tawhid or 
compulsorily returns as a result of their inherent ontological contingency. As a result, 
eschatology concerns not only the ends things, but also every instant that leads to them. 
 
Eschatology as an Impetus 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is aware of the implications of the verse “I have not created the invisible beings 
and men to any end other than that they may [know and] worship Me” (51: 56). Yet he is also 
aware that this verse does not appear to give impetus to such worship. Eschatology provides 
such an impetus for “eschatological doctrines test the limits of our rational and customary 
experience, thereby reminding us of the fragility of our attachment to conditions that strike us 
now as unquestionably real.”8 While provision (rizq) in the herenow is given to creation so that 
they have the time and strength to know and worship Allah, provision for the hereafter does 
not have the same instant gratification. Yet, the Qur’an still states “and make provision for 
yourselves - but, verily, the best of all provisions is God-consciousness” (2: 197). For Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, “that this world, namely, that part of it which is necessary for your maintenance, is 
guaranteed for you” because “your afterlife is required of you, i.e. working for it.”9 Thus, by 
maintaining an awareness of eschatological issues, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah provides an imminent 
impetus for soteriological development.10 While provision for the herenow highlights the 
ontological poverty of creation, the individual is liable to fall into a state of forgetfulness once 
they reach satiation. However, the necessity of provision for the hereafter precludes such 
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forgetfulness because it places an unwavering focus on creation’s ontological poverty due to 
the lack of a) instant gratification and b) the guarantee of such provision.  
 
Yet, while holding an eschatological doctrine can provide impetus, the need for such an impetus 
can be seen to result from a weak understating of tawhid. At the risk of appearing repetitive, it 
is informative to requote Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view that “ordinary people only sense their great 
need of God in the face of certain distressing life events,” so much so that their “need of God” is 
fleeting.11 That eschatological issues provide such as a source of distress, misses a vital point of 
the relationship between Allah and creation, namely that creation’s function is worship. If this 
essential relationship were recognised then the individual would stand “before Him with the 
quality of poverty” and raise their “aspiration (himma) from other than him.”12 It is for this 
reason that “the saint is constantly in distress,”13 for “they would know that their need for God 
is never-ending.”14 In developing a constant awareness of creation’s contingency, their 
ontological poverty, and the need for Allah, the impetus that an eschatology doctrine gives is, 
to some degree, redundant for it is superseded by an impetus that results from the affirmation 
of tawhid. From this two things become apparent. Firstly, advancing an eschatological doctrine 
has a pedagogical function for it instils a sense of creation’s inherent ontological poverty in 
those who cannot sense their constant “need of God.” Secondly, even for those who sense 
their “Need of God,” dealing as it does with the ultimate end of an individual, it ensures that 
the sense of that need is constant throughout the individual’s engagement within the herenow.   
 
Beyond the obvious impetus that an eschatological doctrine gives, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah draws on the 
Qur’an to show the potential exaltedness an individual may attain and the eschatological 
repercussions of such soteriological development. He quotes the verse where Allah addresses 
the individual “O thou human being that hast attained to inner peace! Return thou unto thy 
Sustainer, well-pleased [and] pleasing [Him]: enter, then, together with My [other true] 
servants – yea, enter thou My paradise!” (89: 27 – 30). For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, to be “well-pleased 
[and] pleasing” are stages of soteriological development which come about due to “complete 
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submission and total reliance upon Him.”15 Being “well-pleased” is indicated by being “pleased 
with the Decrees of Allah” and can be seen to involve a high degree of trust in Allah (tawkkul). 
The injunction “return thou unto thy Sustainer” (89: 28), for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, is as if Allah had 
said “We have permitted you entrance into Our Presence, and eternity in Our paradise,” 
indicating that in attaining this degree of soteriological development in the herenow Allah has 
made it incumbent that the recompense is Divine presence and paradise, “which becomes a 
source of intimacy for it, and mutual tenderness, honor, and love.”16 Thus, more than just 
following the commands (amr) and prohibitions (nahy), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s eschatology sees 
soteriological development as imperative to the individual’s engagement with the herenow, 
without abrogating the individual’s pursuit of the hereafter. 
 
An aspect of the individual’s engagement with the herenow that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s eschatology 
promotes is the pursuit of divine knowledge. On this he states that “souls, after leaving their 
bodies, are not distinguished from one another save as regards the type of gnosis and 
knowledge imprinted upon.”17 The ramifications, with regard to the herenow, are that “nor will 
you be able, after that separation, to find any kind of gnosis or knowledge except what was 
there originally,”18 and such divine knowledge must be acquired before the soul leaves the 
body. That it is strictly divine knowledge that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is referring to is clear from 
statements such as “contemplation and vision [in the hereafter] will be commensurate with 
one’s knowledge of God Most High, His Names and His Attributes.” The vision referred to here 
may be a reference to the verse wherein the disbeliever, on the Day of Judgment, will ask "O 
my Sustainer! Why hast Thou raised me up blind, whereas [on earth] I was endowed with 
sight?" (20: 125) and, as such, vision can be considered as being commensurate with each 
individual’s knowledge of tawhid. In light of this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s comment that “no one will be 
more severely chastised on the Day of Judgement than the person who has memorised a verse 
and then forgotten it” is understandable for the verses of the Qur’an are considered the source 
of tawhidic knowledge par excellence. Thus, the necessity for an epistemology that affirms the 
metaphysics of tawhid is as important for the hereafter as it is for the herenow. 
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The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter 
 
Given the relationship between the hereafter and the herenow, by developing an awareness of 
the inevitability of the events of the hereafter each individual is able to heighten their 
awareness of each action they perform. Regarding this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah cites the Hadith which 
states “whoever sits down in a place and does not remember God therein is subject to God’s 
retribution.”19 He adds that “the etymology of the word tirah (retribution) has to do with 
‘shortcoming’; but here it means ‘consequence’.”20 To be forgetful of Allah is to be forgetful of 
creation’s inherent contingency, which is a shortcoming in both knowledge and servitude 
(‘ubudiyyah). The Qur’an states “I have not created the invisible beings and man to any end 
other than that they may worship Me” (51: 56) and one aspect of retribution for not doing so at 
each moment, or when an individual “sits down in a place,” is deprivation. On this, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah states that “deprivation (al-man’) hurts you only because of the lack of your 
understanding of God in it.”21 While this has been previously quoted with regard to immediate 
deprivation, it can be read as containing eschatological undertones. Deprivation could be 
understood to include the denial of paradise (jannah), though, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah highlights, even 
the inhabitants of hell (jahannan) have the potential for understanding Allah therein.22  
 
The Individual and Their Relationship to the Hereafter in Allah’s 
Foreknowledge 
 
The individual and their relationship to the hereafter in Allah’s foreknowledge can be seen to 
be intimately connected to the relationship between creation’s inherent contingency and 
destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes, regarding destiny and decree, “know 
that Allah has for you a destiny that He must enact, and a Decree that He must manifest.”23 At 
first sight, this passage would imply that Allah is limited, in that “He must enact” and “must 
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manifest,” though, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s proofs of tawhid have shown, this would contradict the 
attribute of being “master over all possibilities.”24 Yet, such a reading overlooks the limitations 
Allah has placed on Himself with regard to the manifestation of the ontological domain.  
 
To draw out the necessity of certain events, and their relation to Allah’s freedom from 
restriction, some aspects of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view of the Divine attributes (sifat) need to be 
discussed. He writes, “know that praising the attribute is more effective, intense and far-
reaching than praising the action” and “that is because the attribute refers to something fixed 
and established, whereas actions are subject to renewal and cessation.”25 Taken in conjunction 
with the passage regarding what “He must enact” and “must manifest,” these quotes provide 
further insight into Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s view of cause and effect. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, Allah cannot be 
considered limited in anyway, apart from being other than Allah, for “the imperfect cannot be a 
god.”26 However, in Allah’s revealing of Himself to creation in the manner that He has chosen 
to, indicates that Allah has willingly placed certain restrictions on His Self-manifestation. As 
mentioned, these restrictions can be seen to result from Allah’s compassionate kindness 
towards creation. Thus, (qadar) and decree (qada’), as enacted through Allah’s attributes 
(sifat), follow a pattern of cause and effect. This is not because this is the only way that things 
can be, but because of Allah’s choice for creation. Creation is enjoined to praise Allah’s 
attributes (sifat) for two reasons, a) their fixity ensures Allah’s compassionate kindness towards 
creation and b) that the attributes are fixed and established means that they are closer Allah’s 
unchanging ipseity than creation, with their renewal and cessation, drawing the individual away 
from creation towards Allah. Thus, even though destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’) ensures 
that there are certain things “He must enact” and “must manifest” within the ontological 
domain, Allah remains “master over all possibilities” for that which is enacted and manifest is 
done for creation’s soteriological benefit.  
 
Yet, to base everything on destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’) potentially leads to 
antinomianism. Rather than abrogating the necessity of a revealed law (Shari’a), destiny 
(qadar) and decree (qada’) can be seen to fulfil a formative role in the soteriological 
development of the individual. Destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’) can provide meaning in even 
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the most seemingly accidental of incidents for it reminds the individual that such events are the 
result of the Divine Will and, as such, contain subtle aspects of the soteriological semiotics that 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is attempting heighten the awareness of. Thus, it is through Allah’s 
foreknowledge of creation that each individual is situated in a position within which, as they 
proceed towards the hereafter, that they have the greatest potentiality of affirming the 
metaphysics of tawhid at each and every moment in the herenow. 
 
The Hereafter and Allah’s Mercy (rahma) 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s focus on the attributes of beauty (jamal) is highlighted in his reporting of Abu’l 
Abbas al-Mursi’s commentary on the verse “Satan is a foe unto you: so treat him as a foe” (35: 
6). He stated that 
One group understood from this that Allah ordered them to fight the 
Shaytan, so they directed their entire aspiration to fighting him, and thus 
became distracted from the love of the Beloved. Another group understood, 
“Shaytan is your enemy and I am your Lover,” so they became preoccupied 
with the love of Allah, and by their becoming so preoccupied with Allah, 
Shaytan was prevented from having his way with over them.
27 
As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah points out, amongst the reasons “Satan was prevented from having his way 
over them” was because, as the Qur’an states, “he [Satan] has no power over those who have 
attained to faith and in their Sustainer placed their trust” (16: 99). Even though “Satan is a for 
unto you,” by focusing on the attributes of beauty (jamal) the individual is in a greater position 
to realise the mercy (rahma) that Allah is disposed to enact towards creation and thus reach 
the point where they may place their trust (tawakkul) in their Sustainer. 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is able to capture the differing approaches to Allah’s attributes, while illustrating 
their respective pedagogical roles. He states that “there is no minor sin (saghira) when His 
justice confronts you; and there is no major sin (kabira) when His grace confronts you.”28 In 
being confronted by Allah’s attributes of majesty (jalal), like “His justice,” and taken to account, 
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the individual is differentiated from other creations and thus isolated such that “there is no 
minor sin” because all sins, according to this attribute, reaffirms such isolation. However, 
Allah’s attributes of beauty (jamal), like “His grace,” being inclusive, embraces the individual, 
and all of creation, such that “there is no major sin.” This distinction between the jalal and 
jamal attributes is emphasised in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s statement:  
When He gives, He shows you His kindness (birr); when He deprives, He 
shows you His power (qahr). And in all that, He is making Himself known to 
you and coming to you with His gentleness.
29 
In this statement Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah deploys his soteriological semiotics to highlight that Allah’s 
communication with creation happens through all instances confronting the individual with the 
sole goal of “making Himself known.” Eschatologically, this would imply that even punishment 
in the hereafter, being a show of “His power,” is a means of “making Himself known.” On this 
point he quotes Abu’l Hassan who states that “he who wishes that there be no rebellion against 
Allah in His kingdom has desired that His forgiveness not be manifest.”30 Given Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
overarching soteriological concern of affirming tawhid, it appears that the punishment of the 
hereafter is a means to such soteriological realisation. This view is not unique to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
as can be seen in the following quote from Rumi, which states 
The inhabitants of hell are happier in hell than they were in this world 
because in hell they are aware of God, while in this world they were not. 
There is nothing sweeter than the awareness of God.
31 
By focusing on the attributes of beauty (jamal), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah affirms that “you have never left, 
nor will you ever come out of the circle of His beneficence”32 and that even the most severe 
punishment in the hereafter is an aspect of Allah “coming to you with His gentleness.” In one 
way, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah clarifies the confusion and apparent contradiction between Allah’s mercy 
and the existence of punishment in writing that “deprivation (al-man’) hurts you only because 
of the lack of your understanding of God in it.”33 Thus, suffering would cease if the individual 
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were capable of perceiving Allah in such punishment.34 If tawhid is affirmed then gentleness 
(birr) and power (qahr) are seen to be just two means of communication between Creator and 
creation.  
 
Obedience (ta’a) and Disobedience (ma’siya) 
 
By engaging Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics, obedience (ta’a) and disobedience 
(ma’siya) can be seen as mutually exclusive modes through which Allah communicates each 
creation’s status with Him to them. He states that 
To soften for you the suffering of affliction, He has taught you that He is the 
One who causes trials to come upon you (al-Mubli laka). For the one who 
confronts you with His decrees of Fate (al-aqdar) is the same who has 
accustomed you to His good choice (husn al-ikhtiyar).
35 
As with affliction and trials, obedience and disobedience result from “His good choice” in that 
“just as He creates obedience by His grace, He creates disobedience by His justice.”36 Allah’s 
creation of disobedience can be considered a mercy in as far as it contains the potential for 
soteriological development for “sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a 
cause of arriving at Him.”37 One reason that a sin can be “a cause of arriving at Him” is because 
of the epistemological shift that can result through realizing that such an action contradicts the 
metaphysics of tawhid. Conversely, as an individual’s actions within the herenow are the 
determining factor for their position in the hereafter, all of humanity will be brought before 
Allah, whether it be though their obedience (ta’a) or disobedience (ma’siya). 
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For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the creation of obedience can be taken as an injunction for creation to be 
obedient, though there is also an indication that it is more than a mere injunction. While the 
verse “I have not created the invisible beings and men to any end other than that they may 
[know and] worship Me” (51: 56) can be read as such an injunction, it can also be read as a 
statement of fact. This would be consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid for it precludes any 
possible co-existent alongside of Allah and thus any opposition to the Divine will. This alternate 
reading gives weight to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah statement that “He knew of the irresolution of servants 
in dealing with Him, so He made obedience (ta’a) to Him obligatory for them.”38 A consequence 
of this is that “He made the service (khidma) of Him obligatory upon you, which is as much as to 
say that He made entry into Paradise obligatory for you.”39 Paradise can here be read in two 
ways. Firstly, there is the ontological realm of paradise. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s overarching soteriological concern, there is the epistemological 
paradise of knowing Allah through affirming the metaphysics of tawhid. The ontological 
paradise of the hereafter is for those individuals who attain the epistemological paradise in the 
herenow. The receipt of punishment in the hereafter, coming as it does after the resurrection 
and subsequent judgement, is received with an undeniable awareness of Allah’s ipseity. This 
would mean that such punishment is meant to bring about the epistemological paradise in the 
hereafter that those individuals failed to gain in the herenow, reaffirming the view that such 
punishment is meant as a means to soteriological realisation.   
 
Furthermore, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “what God seeks from His servants is the concentration 
of their entire beings upon Him”40 and for this there is a distinction between acts of obedience 
and acts of disobedience as 
acts of obedience are the causes behind such concentration and the means 
by which it is achieved, which is why God has commanded them, while acts 
of disobedience are the causes for separation and the means by which it 
comes about, which is why God has forbidden them.
41 
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The distance referred to here is not an ontological distance, for this is precluded by the 
metaphysics of tawhid, but rather an epistemological distance, the locus of which is the 
individual who is ignorant of their inherent contingency and, as a result, perceive 
independence. This perceived independence, metaphysically false as it may be, is the 
separation referred to above quote, which creates a distance, so to say, between the individual 
and Allah. Ontologically, such acts are forbidden because this would contradict the metaphysics 
of tawhid. Epistemologically, such acts have been forbidden for they are against the reason for 
creation, namely that humanity was not created “to any end other than they may [know and] 
worship Me” (51: 56). 
 
Regarding the judgment, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the pretenders are held to account, and 
the heedless are questioned, those who perceive themselves as owning dominion, or as being 
independent active agents alongside Allah.”42 From this it appears that it is the degree to which 
the individual embodies tawhid that determines the eschatological status of the individual. Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah reminds the individual of their ontological poverty (faqr), for either through the 
judgment or through the knowledge of tawhid “they come to know that they do not own 
anything with Allah … it is only a secondary attribution attached to you.”43 Those who embody 
tawhid in the herenow are aware that their inherent contingency precludes the possibility of 
ownership in the sense of outright possession. 
 
The Paradox of the Life to Come 
 
It might appear that for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, while rizq is guaranteed for creation in the present life, 
that obedience to Allah’s proscriptions and prohibitions are the means to rizq in the afterlife. 
This view is sustained by statements like “He is the One by Whom subsist the world and the 
hereafter, Who establishes the world with His freely given sustenance, and the hereafter with 
His rewarding.”44 From this it appears that there here now and the hereafter subsist in differing 
modes, as the former requires sustenance for it is perishing while the latter is given as 
recompense. Given Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s epistemology, it could be said that Allah freely gives 
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sustenance to the herenow so that creation can subsist with the knowledge of Lordship, 
whereas creation subsists in the hereafter as reward to the degree that Allah’s Lordship is 
recognised. Yet, this touches on two, seemingly, paradoxical issues. The first issue is connected 
to Allah’s knowledge and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s comments that it is imperative to “know that things 
have a certain being in the foreknowledge of Allah” and that “the Real takes charge and 
regulates its affairs while it is in His foreknowledge,”45 potentially affecting the individual’s 
impetus to act and making them liable of antinomianism. The second issue is connected to the 
seeming incongruence of Allah’s mercy and the punishment of the hereafter, given that Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah states that “you have never left, nor will you ever come out of the circle of His 
beneficence.”46 This seeming incongruence highlights a differing conceptualisation of the 
punishment of the hereafter than is generally given, which can be seen to result from a greater 
focus being placed on Allah’s attributes of beauty (jamal). These two issues will be dealt with in 
turn. 
 
Regarding the first issue of Allah’s foreknowledge, there is an important relation between rizq 
and trust (tawakkul). With regard to the herenow, it has been seen that the individual’s pursuit 
of rizq without contending with its bestowal is indicative of that individual’s trust in Allah 
(tawakkul). With regard to the hereafter, the exhibiting of trust is taken further. Commenting 
on the verse “and there is no living creature on earth but depends for its sustenance on God; 
and He knows its time-limit [on earth] and its resting-place [after death]” (11: 6), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
writes that rizq is “a guarantee He has undertaken for the sake of His servants, as a way of 
making His love known to them.”47 As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has previously indicated, those who 
exhibit servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) know that rizq is only from Allah and that its bestowal is 
indicative of Allah’s preference for His creation. Yet, as there are two ‘places’ of provision, the 
herenow and the hereafter, the former impermanent and the later permanent, the foregoing, 
or even denial, of the impermanent provision in preference to the permanent provision is 
indicative of a greater degree of trust in, and dependence on, Allah because the satisfaction of 
this worldly provision is instantaneous, whereas there is only access to the hope for provision in 
the hereafter during the herenow. However, as all rizq is from Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah would be 
aware that the Qur’an verse cited equally ensures the provision necessary for all transactions 
during the hereafter, especially given that the herenow is the means to such provision. 
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Regarding the second issue, there is a seeming incongruence between the punishment of the 
hereafter and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s views of Allah’s mercy (rahma). This is even more so given some 
of the account of said punishment found in the Hadith literature. Nevertheless, the punishment 
of the hereafter, while acting as a deterrent and giving an impetus for action in the herenow, 
can be seen as a means of bringing about soteriological development in the hereafter that was 
meant to be gained in the herenow. In achieving this, the punishment in the hereafter can be 
seen to bring each individual to a point where they can realize Allah’s Unicity and embody the 
metaphysics of tawhid, for failing to do so would be seen as a punishment from which there is 
no redemption. If Allah were to exclude anyone from realizing His Unicity, then this would be 
seen as an abrogation of His mercy (rahma) irrespective of the means through which it was 
realized.  
 
The Soteriological Elements of Eschatology 
 
Rather than being strictly teleological, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s eschatology places a sense of immediacy 
on the individual. This sense of immediacy is intended to place within the individual an impetus 
for soteriological development. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the connection between the return to Allah 
(ma’ad) and soteriological development is clearly stated in the Qur’anic verses: 
O thou human being that hast attained to inner peace! Return thou unto thy 
Sustainer, well-pleased [and] pleasing [Him]: enter, then, together with My 
[other true] servants – yea, enter thou My paradise! (89: 27 – 30) 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah distinguishes three degrees of soteriological development, namely “commanding 
toward the evil (ammara), self-reproaching (lawwama), and at rest (mutma’inna),”48 and 
notices that, in these verses, “He directed His speech towards the third”49 such “that no 
permission is granted for returning to Allah (in the manner of the noble) for the soul that incites 
to evil or the self-blaming soul.”50 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah “this is an arousal for the believers to 
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acquire this station of peace for themselves” for its recompense is entrance into paradise.51 
Moreover, the acquisition of this soteriological station is not achieved in the hereafter, after the 
individual has already returned, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah acknowledges “it indicates that he cannot 
attain to the good pleasure of Allah with him in the hereafter until he is pleased with Allah here 
in this world.”52 The recompense of paradise is given to those who have attained to inner peace 
(mutma’inna) for the “attributes and characteristics of the soul at peace are what prepared it 
and allowed it to be summoned to enter in the company of His slaves, and to enter His 
Garden.”53 Thus, the site of return (ma’ad), namely the herenow, is also the site of 
soteriological development, which, in turn, means that eschatology focuses the individual on 
the transformative potential within each and every action as they are performed.54  
 
The state of being well-pleased with Allah can be seen to involve many virtues. Being well-
pleased involves, amongst other things, contentment with, and trust in, Allah’s choice. Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah states that “he who wishes that at a given moment there appear other than what God has 
manifested in it, has not left ignorance behind at all.”55 The desire for circumstances to be other 
than they are involves a lack of both contentment with and trust in Allah’s choice and is 
indicative of not being well-pleased with Allah. With this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah provides the individual 
with a semiotic key to preclude any claim to a soteriological state that they do not possess. 
Another such semiotic key can be found in the following quote 
Were the light of certitude (nur al-yakin) to shine, you would see the 
Hereafter so near that you could not move towards it, and you would see 
that the eclipse of extinction had come over the beauties of the world 
(mahasin ad-dunya).
56
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Here is it possible to see the epistemic shift that occurs with the attainment of certainty (yakin). 
For those who “see the Hereafter so near” there is an indication that they have developed a 
degree of certainty (yakin) and for those who do not see this are precluded from any claim of 
certainty (yakin). Thus, the individual’s relationship to the hereafter is taken up within the 
soteriological semiotics to help the individual understand their soteriological development. 
 
Another aspect that eschatology places an immediate focus on the individual is the correlation 
between the end of time and the death of the individual. It has been noted that “the 
experience of death for the microcosm corresponds to the coming of the Hour for the 
macrocosm” such that “the Qur’anic accounts of the end of the world can also be understood 
as referring to the death of the individual.”57 This can be further divided into the inevitable 
death of the individual at the end of their life and the voluntary death involving the cessation of 
an ego-centered epistemological framework. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s focus on this voluntary death can 
be seen to be connected with his focus on the attributes of mercy. The pursuit of the voluntary 
death, or more specifically the death of the ego-centered epistemological framework, can be 
seen to come about through the individual’s choice of action. The choice of a God-centered 
epistemological framework, while resulting in soteriological development, manifests itself in 
ethical decisions.  
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Chapter 8 – Ethics 
 
Within the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah ethics and ethical behaviour (adab) has a central role. Ethics 
is significant within his work for it plays a connective role between the abstractness of tawhid 
and its affirmation through soteriological development. This chapter will examine this role in 
order to highlight the ethical domain as the arena within which the solution to the problem of 
rizq is enacted. This is important for it is not until the solution is enacted that the problem of 
rizq can be resolved. One important aspect of ethical behaviour (adab) is the role played by the 
figure of Muhammad. In acting as a touchstone for embodying the metaphysics of tawhid, the 
prophet Muhammad is seen as the example par excellence from which ethical behaviour (adab) 
should be gained and intimately connected with the science of Prophethood (ilm al-nabuwah). 
This is part of what it means to acknowledge that “Muhammad is the messenger of Allah” 
(muhammadur rasulu’llah).  
 
Adab is an umbrella term. Depending on its use it can mean ethics, ethical behaviour, cultured, 
polite, courteous, good manners, decency, and rules of conduct, amongst others. The rules of 
good manners (adab) are many and the literature discussing these within Islam generally, and 
Sufism specifically, is extensive, though it could be surmised that their common goal is to aid in 
developing an adib, an individual who constantly displays adab.1 Throughout Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
works multiple examples of and requirements for adab are listed. Rather than examining the 
actions that constitute good manners, this chapter will focus on the role adab plays within the 
work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. By examining the importance of adab, its function, the process of 
acquisition, and its degrees, it will emerge that, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, adab is not limited to a 
human to human exchange. Rather, its wider significance encompasses the comportment of 
the individual in each and every moment irrespective of who, what, or where they may be. 
Ultimately adab can be seen to be integral to developing an awareness of the relationship 
between Creator and creature.   
 
The Importance of adab 
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Much of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s approach to, and importance placed on, adab can be seen to be a 
direct result of the approach of Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili. Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili’s approach 
was to “emphasise the importance of man’s internal development over against his external 
behaviour and ostentation” and to highlight this he “took a negative attitude toward begging 
and wearing distinctive clothing,” which had become a part of Mamluk court protocol of his 
time, and “is said to have dressed with elegance,” also he “did not take part in the gatherings 
that induced trances or involved spectacular phenomena.”2 This shows Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili 
to be an advocate of ‘sober’ Sufism. Furthermore, as it occurs within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, it 
illustrates an emphasis on internal development whilst realising that such development arises 
through adhering to a specific set to behaviours, for it is acknowledged that the exponents of 
the Shadhiliyya “tended to play down the importance of saintly miracles, preaching instead self-
restraint and sobriety in word and deed.”3 While this approach makes a contradistinction 
between an internal development of virtues and an external adherence to moral actions, they 
are in no way seen as contradicting nor does one abrogate the other, otherwise Abu’l Hassan 
al-Shadhili would not have said: “If your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Qur’an and 
Sunna, hold fast to these two and take no notice of your unveiling; tell yourself that the Qur’an 
and Sunna is guaranteed by God Most High, which is not the case with the unveiling inspiration 
and mystical perceptions.”4 This emphasis on the Qur’an and the Sunnah is deliberate in that 
these are the sources from which adab is derived.5   
 
With regard to the Shadhiliyya in general, and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah specifically, it is important to 
notice that the emphasis on adab is not at the expense of metaphysical speculation. While it is 
acknowledged that “al-Shadhili’s spiritual method emphasised the practical aspects of 
mysticism,” this is not, as the preceding chapters show, as some have held “over against the 
more metaphysically oriented mysticism of Ibn ‘Arabi and his followers.”6 While it might be true 
that Abu’l Hassan al-Shadhili “saw little value in the speculative exercise of reason,”7 it is 
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possible to see within both his litanies (ahzab) and the accounts of him8 a highly developed 
metaphysics, which follows from the metaphysics of his teacher Ibn Bashish, and is later 
developed by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Furthermore, the rejection of the “speculative exercise of reason” 
is equally apparent in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, who keeps reason orientated towards an applicable end, 
without a diminished metaphysics.9 
 
In order to highlight the centrality of adab within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre it is useful to repeat a 
quote he uses by Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi, which states, 
There are four times in which the servant will find himself, of which there is 
no fifth: blessing, affliction, obedience, and disobedience. In each of these 
times, there is an aspect of servanthood which the Truth requires of you by 
virtue of His lordship. If it is a time of obedience, your path is to bear witness 
to God’s grace, since it is He who has guided you into this obedience and has 
made it possible for you. If it is a time of disobedience, you path is to seek 
God’s forgiveness and repent. If it is a time of blessing, your path is to give 
thanks, which means for your heart to rejoice in God. If it is a time of 
affliction, you path is to be content with God’s decree and to endure 
patiently.
10 
That this advice delimited the four possible epistemic states which could be considered as the 
four doors at the centre of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics. Abu’l Abbas also 
demarcates the four keys, which can now be seen as the necessary moral action for passing 
through each door. As he is adamant that there are only four times “of which there is no fifth” 
that an individual will find themselves in, this can be seen as delimiting the moral responses 
necessary for traversing these four states. Furthermore, there being “no fifth” indicates that all 
events can be categorised as one of these four kinds, blessing, affliction, obedience, or 
disobedience. Identifying the ‘kind’ of event also identifies the morally acceptable response 
required for traversing it, for the responses are also limited to four.  
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While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah utilises what appears to be a simple demarcation of potential adab 
responses, because it encompasses all possible events, it illustrates that each moment has a 
corresponding adab requirement. Regarding this he writes that  
it is possible to fulfil some obligations at times, but it is impossible to fulfil 
the obligations of every moment, for there is no moment wherein God does 
not hold against you a new obligation or a definite matter
11 
That there is “no fifth” means that the servant will constantly alternate between the four kinds 
of events, though as one leads into another there is perpetuity to this cycle. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is 
clear that not all obligations towards Allah can be fulfilled and this can be seen result from 
creations inherent contingency, for the limitations that contingency imposes ensures that “it is 
impossible to fulfil the obligations of every moment.” That not all obligations of adab can be 
fulfilled may be an extension of creation’s ontological makeup, as it was acknowledged that 
“error and fault are a fundamental part of your existence, nay, even the source (‘ayn) of your 
existence”12 and, for this reason, “the slave is never free of shortcoming.”13 This emphasises the 
constancy of maintaining adab. Furthermore, it is antecedent to the discussion of mistakes 
below.   
 
Due to its centrality, adab can be seen to be a key element of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological 
semiotics. It can be seen that, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, due to creation’s inherent 
contingency, it is not possible to extricate oneself from cause and effect.14 Being an aspect of 
creation’s ontological makeup, cause and effect ensures that the requirement of adab is, in a 
sense, isotropic. This highlights one aspect of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s saying that “you striving for what 
has already been guaranteed for you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are 
signs of the blurring of your intellect (basira).”15 In this context, “what is demanded of you” 
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refers to the requirements of adab, which, due to creation’s inherent contingency and the 
existence of cause and effect, is constant regardless of individual circumstances. This is one 
reason for the importance of the above demarcation and correctly identifying each successive 
event. Furthermore, due to this constancy, to be remiss of the adab that “is demanded of you,” 
even if only momentarily, is indicative of a “blurring of your intellect (basira),” namely a lack of 
self-knowledge, which is crucial for soteriological development. Thus, the importance of adab is 
not over and above other domains such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, or any other 
domain, rather adab acts as a connector between the other domains in as far as they are 
embodied within and enacted by the individual. 
 
The Function of adab 
 
One of the primary functions of adab is in its ability to aid the individual in embodying tawhid 
within a domain of multiplicity. For “what cannot be articulated conceptually can nonetheless 
be worked out in the way one lives, so the faith in Divine Unity (tawhid) which reminds us 
forcibly that the prime analogate for ‘agent’ is the Creator, can be lived out in a life of trust in 
Divine providence (tawakkul).”16 This shows that the focus of the ethical individual (adib) is, 
rather than choosing how to respond to an event, to find what response is applicable. In doing 
so, the individual puts aside their self-centeredness and, in choosing the action proscribed by 
Allah through the Qur’an and the Sunnah, maintains and embodies tawhid through a God-
centred consciousness. 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the existence of clearly defined adab aids in effacing personal choice and 
embodying tawhid. He writes that “the way of arriving to Allah is through the effacement of 
personal choice, and the rejection of personal choice.”17 This effacement cannot be an 
ontological effacement for creation cannot transcend its inherent contingency. Rather, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is advocating an epistemological effacement. That is where personal choice is abrogated 
by obligations to Allah, which are, in turn, enacted through creation. A connection between his 
view of adab and his metaphysics of tawhid can be seen in statements such as “whosoever 
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negates his nature by ‘There is no divinity’ (la ilaha) affirms His being by ‘but God’ (illa’llah).18 It 
is through adab that one “negates his nature” by negating one’s choices and affirming the 
proscribed actions which, in turn, “affirms His being.” In this sense, servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) is 
developing and maintaining correct adab.  
 
If effacement is taken to be an aspect of the process of adab, then servanthood or the station 
of servitude (‘ubudiyyah) is the goal. Regarding this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes “know that the most 
sublime abiding station in which the servant could be established is the station of servitude; 
and know also that all other stations of the Path are a way to it, ‘serving’ it.”19 In explaining the 
ramifications of this, he quotes the Qur’anic verse that states “I have not created the invisible 
beings and man to any end other than that they may worship Me” (51: 56). In quoting this verse 
it is evident that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s intention is to draw out the relation between worship and 
servitude, which he states as “worship (‘ibada) is the outer form of servitude, and servitude is 
its spirit.”20 Worship is the means through which servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) is established and, 
once it has become an “abiding station,” servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) enlivens worship in a 
continuing process. It is a continuing process as “the spirit of servitude and its secret is to 
abandon self-choice (ikhtiyar), and not contest with the Divine Decrees,”21 one of which is 
worship as established in the previous Qur’anic verse. Adab, in as far as it is Divinely prescribed, 
effaces self-choice and, through such effacement, opens to servanthood (‘ubudiyyah).  
 
The Process of adab 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it can be seen that there is a process in developing and increasing one’s 
adab. As adab is a means to soteriological development there are certain practices that he 
recommends for heightening such development. However, the implementation of adab, 
especially when judging the success of such implementation, is not a self-regulatory process. 
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While “whoever knows himself knows his Lord,”22 this refers to real self-knowledge and not 
some deceptive smokescreen presented by the ego. This lack of self-knowledge is one of the 
reasons that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “when two matters seem confusing to you, see which is 
heavier on the ego and follow it through” because even though self-knowledge is lacking for 
soteriological development “nothing weighs on the ego but that which is true.”23  
 
While there is a correct response for each situation, the process of adab does involve an 
element of trial and error. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that “the business is not that you do not do 
wrong actions, the business is that you do not persist in wrong action.”24 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be 
seen to be again reiterating the sentiment of the Hadith which states that “had you not 
committed sins, Allah would have brought into existence a creation that would have committed 
sin (and Allah) would have forgiven them.”25 The point of this is that in committing a mistake, 
repenting, and turning from it to draw closer to Allah, a drawing that proceeds indefinitely 
according to the capacity of the individual, the individual draws closer to Allah than they would 
have had they not committed this mistake. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah shows an acute awareness of this in 
stating that “sometimes He opens the door of obedience for you but not the door of 
acceptance; or sometimes He condemns you to sin, and it turns out to be a cause of arriving at 
Him” and that “a disobedience that bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an 
obedience that bequeaths self-infatuation and pride.”26 To emphasise this point Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
states that “a disobedience that bequeaths humiliation and extreme need is better than an 
obedience that bequeaths self-infatuation and pride.”27 Mistakes have a pedagogic function 
and an important aspect of this is their ability to highlight the “extreme need” or ontological 
poverty of creation towards Allah. The necessity of this aspect of the process of adab can be 
seen to arise due to creation’s inherent contingency which ensures a degree of fallibility. The 
degree of fallibility highlights an aspect of agency within creation. While fallibility is an intrinsic 
aspect of creation, it can be seen that creation’s fallibility is not the aspect which is condemned 
by Allah, rather it is the persistence in an action that has been shown to be fallible that is 
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condemned. This point is confirmed in the following Hadiths which state that if an individual 
“has intended a bad deed and has not done it, Allah writes it down with Himself as a full good 
deed,”28 indicating that while individuals are liable to have bad intentions it is only those that 
are acted upon that are condemned, and “follow up a bad deed with a good one and it will 
wipe it out,”29 indicating that while an individual’s actions are likely to manifest a degree of 
fallibility, that fallibility is only counted against them if they persist in engaging in it and fail to 
repent and make amends.  
 
Forgetfulness (ghaflah) and Remembrance (dhikr) 
 
One type action which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah highlights as being at the foremost cause of all 
subsequent errors is forgetfulness (ghaflah). The perniciousness of forgetfulness lies in its 
presupposition of possessing knowledge that is subsequently overlooked. In his discussion of 
forgetfulness (ghaflah) it is likely that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah had in mind the Qur’anic verse:  
And whenever thy Sustainer brings forth their offspring from the loins of 
Adam, He [thus] calls upon them to bear witness about themselves: “Am I 
not your Sustainer?” – to which they answer: “Yea, indeed, we do bear 
witness thereto!” [Of this We remind you,] lest you say on the Day of 
Resurrection, “Verily we were unaware of this” (7: 172) 
This covenant, taken in pre-eternity, is taken as evidence of humanity’s knowledge of its 
inherent ontological contingency and poverty and of humanity’s inability to claim “we were 
unaware of this.” Forgetfulness alters the outlook of the individual, affecting their 
epistemology, for “when the forgetful man (al-ghafil) gets up in the morning he reflects on 
what he is going to do, whereas the intelligent man (al-‘aqil) sees what God is doing with 
him.”30 Forgetfulness (ghaflah) results in a self-centred consciousness, while Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is 
advocating for a God-centred consciousness.  
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To combat forgetfulness (ghaflah) Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah proscribes remembrance (dhikr). He states 
that the “remembrance of God is liberation from ignorance and forgetfulness through the 
permanent presence of the heart with Truth.”31 While it is evident that by ‘remembrance’ Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah specifically means the ‘remembrance of Allah’, his definition of what constitutes 
remembrance is so broad that “whosoever observes what God has commanded and abstains 
from what God has forbidden is one who remembers God.”32 There is a symbiotic relationship 
between forgetfulness (ghaflah) and remembrance (dhikr) in that “only he to whom 
forgetfulness is possible is to be reminded; and only he to whom inattention is possible is to be 
warned.”33 Thus, for the one who forgets,  
remembrance is used to strengthen one’s presence with God Most High, to 
maintain the proper conduct towards Him, to guard against heedlessness, as 
a refuge from the accursed devil, and to help foster the attentiveness of the 
heart during acts of worship
34 
While it could be suggested that each of these benefits of remembrance are reiterations of a 
the key point from differing angles, it is interesting, given Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s broad definition, to 
see that “maintaining the proper conduct towards Him” is another aspect of observing “what 
God has commanded” and worshipping Him. This is a clear indication that adab is a) a 
component of worship and b) a key component in combating forgetfulness.  
 
The Degrees of adab 
 
Within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works there are two ways to distinguish varying degrees of adab. These 
can be distinguished as degrees of acquisition and degrees of implementation. Whilst it should 
be acknowledged that such a distinction is artificial it is useful for highlighting varying aspects of 
the degrees of adab. Regarding the acquisition of adab, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah recommends seeking the 
company of others who have good adab. The reason for this, he writes, is that “the self is 
naturally inclined to imitation and resemblance, and to adorning itself with the characteristics 
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of those it associates with, thereby becoming like them” such that “your companionship with 
the heedless causes heedlessness.”35 However, he is quick to point out that merely attaining 
the company of others is not enough for “company is a form, and adab is its ruh [spirit],” 
indicating that adab is the internal compliment of company, such that “if you join the form and 
the ruh [spirit], you will benefit of their company” yet without its internal compliment “your 
company is a corpse.”36 This indicates that the company of an individual with good manners 
(adib) is only soteriologically beneficial if their example is used to help establish and maintain 
adab within oneself. 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is insistent on being scrupulous in choosing the right company. He states “do not 
keep company with anyone whose state does not inspire you and whose speech does not lead 
you to God.”37 He further demarcates the minimum criteria for those whose company is to be 
kept, stating, 
Shaykh Abu’l Hassan said: “If the faqir who is occupied with his means of 
livelihood does not observe the following four properties (adab), attach no 
importance to him, even if he be the most knowledgeable of men. They are: 
avoiding oppressors – preferring the people of the other world – relieving the 
poor – and constancy in the five prayers with the congregation.”
38 
While each of these, to varying degrees, are obvious signs of piety, their combination marks the 
minimum adab for inspiring others and leading them to realise their inherent contingency and 
ontological poverty. While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah draws on the Qur’an and the Hadith in justifying each 
of the four properties as virtues, consistent across each justification is the idea that these 
properties maintain and strengthen, for the individual who observes them, the means of 
realising and embodying creation’s inherent ontological poverty. By avoiding oppressors the 
practice of religion is secure, the people of the other world, here meaning “the friends of Allah 
(awliya),”39 aid in the implementation of adab, the poor are a symbolic reminder of each 
creation’s ontological poverty and their aid helps in detaching from contingent things, while 
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maintaining the congregational prayers both strengthens the resolve of the attendees and 
removes each individual from their worldly pursuits to refocus and reorient themselves towards 
Allah.40 These four properties ensure for those who observe them the minimum for constancy 
in adab such that, without even one of these, their soteriological development would stagnate 
and could not be considered as fitting company for those who desire further soteriological 
development.  
 
In implementing adab the company of others is informative. For soteriological development Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah recommends that an individual keep company with a faqir for “the faqir is the one 
who casts off secondary causes and turns away from hindrances” and has “realised the reality 
of la ilaha ill’Allah Muhammadan Rasulu’llah.”41 Their “casting off secondary causes” is a direct 
indication of their company with Allah and their realisation of the kalimah is indicative of their 
embodiment of tawhid. The reasoning behind keeping a faqir’s company is that they are able to 
“make you recognise the Path and he [the faqir] will surmount the steep roads for you and 
remove impediments from your heart.”42 In having undergone soteriological development, the 
faqir, in a sense, knows the road and is able to steer the aspirant around various stumbling 
blocks which can cause impediment, such that “when the seeker finds a guide, then let him 
obey what he orders him to do, and let him abstain from what he prohibits or restrains him 
from doing.”43 In doing so, the aspirant is able shorten the ‘journey’ of embodying the 
metaphysics of tawhid due to their avoiding impediments. Furthermore, the faqir acts as a 
tangible example of an ethical individual (adib) and as such can be used to highlight ways of 
embodying the virtues necessary for soteriological development. For these reasons, amongst 
others, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah advises “get his company and have adab in his assembly.”44 
 
Yet the company of a faqir is not the goal. The faqir’s company is meant to be a means to 
having company with Allah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes “prepare for this behaviour with your 
brothers, the fuqara’, so that it will become a stairway for you by which you obtain access to 
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behaving with the Lord of heaven.”45 The reason why the company with the fuqara’ is a 
preliminary measure is because “they take on the character of their Master, as it is related, 
‘take on the good character of Allah’.”46 The importance of this passage is threefold in that a) it 
shows that the ultimate example for adab is Allah, b) by taking on “the character of their 
Master” the fuqara’ strive for harmony between the contingent and the absolute, and c) 
following on from the previous point, it is through adab that tawhid is affirmed and, in a sense, 
experienced within multiplicity. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be read as commenting on this last point 
when he states that “when you see Allah as the Doer in all you see all beings as agreeable,”47 
for in knowing that creation acts in accordance with tawhid, as Allah is the Doer, nothing can be 
considered disagreeable for this would be contending with Allah. This relates directly to having 
trust in Allah (tawakkul) as previously discussed.    
 
Adab with Allah 
 
Adab culminates in developing a good etiquette towards Allah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes a Hadith 
that states “God Most High says, ‘I am of the same thinking as my servant is towards Me,’”48 
which can be seen as a key to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s ethics. This Hadith gives impetus to develop and 
implement adab, for the way the servant thinks of Allah will be returned to them. To think good 
of Allah involves knowledge of Allah and, as “whoever knows himself knows his Lord,” this 
involves both knowledge of tawhid and knowledge of creations inherent ontological poverty. To 
ensure that such knowledge improves each individual’s thinking of Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes 
“if you have not improved your thinking of Him because of His nature, improve it because of His 
treatment of you.”49 As “the reward of deeds depends upon the intentions,”50 by improving 
ones thinking of Allah, as a result of knowledge, the intentions are correspondingly raised. In 
turn, better etiquette is developed because the individual’s thinking of Allah has improved, as 
have their intention.  
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Whilst adab with Allah can be seen as a particular tier of etiquette, above other such tiers, it is 
also to be understood as the zenith in the hierarchy of tiers for it encompasses all subsequent 
tiers. There is a Hadith Qudsi within which Allah states 
O son of Adam, I asked you for food and you fed Me not. He will say: O Lord, 
and how should I feed You when You are the Lord of the worlds? He will say: 
Did you not know that My servant So-and-so asked you for food and you fed 
him not? Did you not know that had you fed him you would surely have 
found that with Me?
51
  
This can be read as a clear indication that maintaining good manners with creation is, in 
accordance with tawhid, maintaining them with Allah. However, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah shows an 
awareness of the difficulty of a) maintaining an awareness of this implication and b) 
maintaining a corresponding degree of etiquette. He writes that “outwardly, creatures (al-
akwan) are an illusion (ghirra), but, inwardly, they are an admonition (‘ibra)”52 indicating that a) 
abiding with creatures, rather than Allah, is an admonition from Allah for it indicates a 
weakness of the awareness of tawhid and b) when abiding with Allah, it is through creatures 
that Allah’s admonition comes. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “if you want to know 
your standing with Him, look at where He has made you abide now,”53 indicating that one’s 
position within creation is indicative of one’s relation with Allah. The development of adab with 
Allah does not result in an ontological effacement of creatures. Rather, the realisation that 
“creatures (al-akwan) are an illusion (ghirra)” is an epistemological reorientation which leaves 
creation’s contingent ‘reality’ intact while realising that they are a pedagogical trope that 
enacts a soteriological semiotics. Thus, the primacy and Unity of Allah is affirmed through 
engagement with the multiplicity of ontologically contingent creatures. 
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Adab and rizq 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah there is a direct connection between adab and rizq. Citing the Qur’anic 
passage “enter houses through their doors” (2: 189), he comments that “the door of rizq is the 
obedience to the All-Provider” and that “His provision is not sought after except through 
obedience to Him.”54 Adab, within these passages, involves obedience to Allah, which is an 
aspect of ‘ubudiyyah. Central to obedience to Allah is God-wariness (taqwa) for he writes that 
“God-wariness (taqwa) is the key to the two provisions: the rizq of this world, and the rizq of 
the Next World.”55 An increase in provision can be seem to arise through correct adab with 
regard to Allah, so much so that it is arguable that this is the sole source of “the rizq of the Next 
World,” which comes about through a heightened awareness of and focus on the primacy of 
Allah. Correct adab implies the knowledge and perception of the principles of creation’s 
ontological foundations, the primary of which is tawhid. It is important to make a distinction 
between the knowledge of and the perception of these principles for this knowledge ensures 
that the correct responses are known independently of particulars while the perception of 
these principles ensures the correct employment of these responses within particular 
circumstances. Thus, the existence of rizq, in a sense, necessitates adab, which in turn, due to 
its centrality within contingent existence, ensures that each creation have a minimum 
understanding of the metaphysics of tawhid. 
 
It is now possible to examine the connection between adab and rizq in the Qur’anic injunction 
“I have not created the invisible beings and men to any other end other than that they man 
[know and] worship Me” (51: 56). For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in this verse it is as if Allah said “I do not 
want from them that they should sustain themselves” and that “I do not want them to provide 
for themselves, because I am the Provider for them,” such that “this verse includes the 
following: guaranteeing the slaves their provisions.”56 Thus, beyond the guarantee of rizq there 
is the injunction to worship Allah and, in doing so, places a focus on the development of adab 
through following that which required of creation. These points can be seen to be covered in 
the aphorisms a) “rest yourself from self-direction (tadbir), for what Someone Else (ghayruka) 
has carried out on your behalf, do not yourself undertake to do it” and b) “your striving for 
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what has been guaranteed to you, and your remissness in what is demanded of you, are signs 
of the blurring of your intellect (basira).”57 In both instances, “what Someone Else (ghayruka) 
has carried out on your behalf” and “what has been guaranteed to you” refers to provision, 
rizq. He enjoins his reader “do not yourself undertake to do it,” namely seeking rizq, and to do 
so is a “blurring of your intellect (basira)” because Allah did not create “the invisible beings and 
men to any other end” than worship (51: 56), including seeking provision, and as such can be 
considered “guaranteed to you.” Thus, to pursue “any other end” than worship is to show poor 
adab towards Allah in His position as Creator and Sustainer. 
 
Whilst rizq is generally conceived as being relevant only within the realm of creation, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is insistent on not seeing creation as an end-in-itself. As in his likening movement from 
creation to creation to a donkey going in circles within a mill, he cites the Qur’anic verse “in 
heaven is your sustenance” (51: 22) to reiterate this point, stating that this “implies the lifting 
of the aspirations (himma) of the creation from the creatures, and that they not ask except 
from the True King.”58 There is a twofold motion that such a turning to the “True King” implies, 
for firstly it directs the individual away from secondary and contingent means and secondly it 
directs the individual’s aspirations towards Allah. In turning towards Allah the individual comes 
to affirm tawhid in their pursuit of rizq. Yet, this is not a pursuit of rizq in the sense of trying to 
gather it oneself or in attempting to increase it. Rather, it involves displaying the correct adab 
towards Allah and creation with the knowledge and trust (tawakkul) that rizq will come as and 
when it is required.59  
 
Anxiety over Rizq 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah discusses at length the relationship between pursuing rizq and the subsequent 
anxiety felt by the individual. Due to the existence of such anxiety, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah sees the 
existence of a “means of livelihood” as “a consolation for their selves” from Allah due to “their 
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incapacity of attaining to the reality of sincere trust in Allah.”60 The existence of a means of 
livelihood is taken to be indicative of Allah’s mercy (rahma) towards creation in that it grants 
the individual the feeling of security with regard to their provision. Yet, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, the 
existence of a means of livelihood is indicative of more than just Allah’s mercy (rahma) and he 
illustrates its pedagogical function. To begin with, “when the slaves work for their means they 
are distracted from disobedience to Him, and from engaging their time in rebellion against 
Allah,” and, while such “preoccupation in means is a mercy of Allah,” this lack of contention 
with Allah can be a means to developing a greater trust in Allah (tawakkul) and exhibiting 
better adab.61 Thus, anxiety over rizq can be a means, if correctly understood, towards 
affirming the primacy of Allah. 
 
Yet, the existence of anxiety over rizq is evidence that knowledge of tawhid is lacking. Despite 
the existence of a means of livelihood, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is definite, writing that 
the final word is: means exist (wujud) for you, and you must be absent from 
them in your witnessing (shuhud). So confirm it in the same way His wisdom 
confirmed it, but do not lean on it for supports, because of your knowledge 
of His Oneness
62 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to be encouraging the acknowledgment of a means of livelihood for 
it is acknowledging Allah’s mercy (rahma) to creation, which helps remove anxiety over rizq. 
Yet, he is indicating that such acknowledgement is not an end-in-itself and is not to be used as a 
crutch. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be considered as stating that anxiety over rizq can be a means 
towards affirming “His Oneness,” but utilising the existence of a means of livelihood to reduce 
anxiety over rizq indicates a lack of knowledge of the metaphysics of tawhid.   
 
Seeking from Allah 
 
While discussing the etiquette of asking from Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah returns to the topic of 
maintaining servitude (‘ubudiyyah). His view is that making a request from Allah is not a sign of 
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distrust in His providing for creation, though this view can be seen laden with conditions. He 
writes that “asking and requesting from Allah does not oppose the station of pure servitude.”63 
The reasons behind this view are that a) asking is enjoined upon the slave, for he states “when 
He loosens your tongue with a request, then know that He wants to give you something”64 for 
“God is most kind unto His creatures” (42: 19), and thus it is acting in accordance with 
‘ubudiyyah and b) asking is a sign of need, meaning ontological poverty, which turns the 
individual towards Allah. However, this presupposes the satisfaction and acceptance of the 
manner in which Allah fulfils such requirements, for if not accompanied by acceptance of, and 
trust in, Allah the existence of need can be misunderstood. Furthermore, implicit in this view is 
that the individual has a sufficient understanding of the metaphysics of tawhid such that they 
are unable to “stretch out your hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-
Mu’ti) amongst them is your Lord.”65  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is careful in delimiting the process and etiquette of seeking from Allah. He writes 
that  
being polite in seeking is that one seek from Allah and not specify an 
amount, or cause, or moment, so that the Real provides for him whatever He 
will, in the manner He wills, and at the moment He wills.
66 
Among the reasons for omitting these specifics is to avoid the potential pitfalls. For if these 
specifics are omitted from a request then the likelihood of dissatisfaction and distrust is 
diminished. He writes that “any doubt in Divine provision constitutes doubt in the Provider.”67 
These doubts are liable to result in a perceived independence from Allah, of being ‘outside’ of 
Allah’s care.  While indicating a lack of both knowledge and embodiment of tawhid, such views 
ignore the Qur’anic passage that states “there is no living creature on earth but depends for its 
sustenance on God” (11: 6), which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah takes to mean “trust in Me as a Guarantor, 
and take me as a trustworthy disposer of affairs.”68 It is possible to see here Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
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soteriological semiotics in that the method of asking form Allah and the response to that which 
is received demarcates the relationship between each particular creation and their Creator. 
 
Adab and Soteriology 
 
Adab can now be seen to be a central soteriological process. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological 
semiotics is deployed so that each individual can ‘read’ the signs (ayat) given to them so that 
they can enact the correct response to each situation. Key to this understanding of adab is the 
ability to comprehend the signs (ayat) so that correct comportment can be displayed. This 
‘reading’ is preliminary to soteriological development. Regarding this he states that “that which 
hearts find in the way of worries and sadnesses is due to that which prevents their having inner 
vision (al-‘iyan).”69 “Worries and sadnesses” arise due to a lack of “inner vision (al-‘iyan),” for if 
inner vision was present then it would be seen that “the existence of the veil is the cause of 
suffering” and that “while varied in its manifestations, suffering (al’adhab) is due only to the 
existence of His veil.”70 Knowing this opens up the possibility of examining the way in which 
creation is veiled from Allah, for a veil, by its nature, reveals aspects of what is veiled. By 
contemplating the manner in which Allah reveals Himself to creation through His veils, rather 
than being preoccupied with these veils as ends-in-themselves, opens the possibility of inner 
vision and, by seeing the veils for what they are, decreases worries and sadnesses. 
 
Regarding the discussion of veils, there is an important point regarding the use of language, one 
that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is explicit about. He asks rhetorically “how can it be conceived that 
something veils Him, since He is the one who manifests everything (azhara kulla shay’)?” and 
again “how can it be conceived that something veils Him, since He is the One (al-Wahid) 
alongside of whom there is nothing?”71 On this he has stated 
The Real (al-Haqq) is not veiled from you. Rather, it is you who are veiled 
from seeing It, for, were anything to veil It, then that which veils It would 
cover It. But if there were a covering to It, then that would be a limitation of 
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Its Being: every limitation of anything has power over it. “And He is the 
Omnipotent, above His servants.”
72 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is careful to point out that Allah is not veiled from creation, as the Qur’an states 
“We are closer to him that his neck-vein” (50: 16), rather creation is veiled from Allah. This 
point touches on many domains. It is a metaphysical issue with regard to tawhid, while being an 
ontological issue with regard to any real distance between Creator and creation, and an 
epistemological issue with regard to the perception of such distance. Furthermore, it is also an 
issue of adab in that it involves the manner in which creation relates to Allah. It is in this light 
that his saying “do not deem His giving to be slow; but rather, deem your approaching to be 
slow”73 can be understood. It is not that Allah is absent, for this would be contrary to the 
metaphysics of tawhid. Rather the extent to which the contingent is ignorant of Allah’s 
presence is the perceived distance between the creation and Creator. Thus, the correct adab is 
for creation to censure themselves and “deem your approaching to be slow” for Allah is ever 
present. 
 
Thus, the problem of rizq can be seen to exist, not because the acquisition of rizq is an issue. 
Rather, the problem of rizq exists because of the pedagogical ramifications of the existence of 
such a problem. The development of correct adab, both towards Allah and creation, ensures, 
through the performative process it engenders, that the correct comportment of the 
metaphysics of tawhid is embodied. Correct adab ensures that the virtues necessary for 
resolving the problem of rizq are enacted, allowing the individual to realise that the problem of 
rizq exists for its soteriological implications. 
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Chapter 9 – Soteriology 
 
If the preceding chapters can be considered as describing the stages of descent from essence 
(dhat) to creation (kawn), then this chapter should be considered as demarcating the ascent of 
the individual towards embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. If the epistemic domain is the 
site of the solution to the problem of rizq, then the soteriological domain is the domain wherein 
the problem of rizq is resolved through enacting the metaphysics of tawhid. As the 
soteriological domain is the site wherein the individual’s epistemic framework is actively 
brought into harmony with the metaphysics of tawhid, it is here that tawhid is affirmed, as this 
is the goal of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works. Drawing as it does on the prophetic example and the 
science of Prophethood (ilm al-Nabuwah), it has been seen that Islamic ethics generally, and 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s specifically, has been seen to be an embodiment of Muhammad rasul Allah. 
Yet, as this mode of ethics is underpinned by the metaphysics of tawhid, it is in the 
soteriological domain that the purpose of ethical behaviour (adab) bears fruit. Thus, it is in this 
domain that the two halves of the kalimah, la ilaha illa’llah and Muhammad rasul Allah, can be 
seen to be united. As bearing witness to the kalimah is central to an Islamic paradigm,1 
achieving this unity between the two parts can be seen as the peak and purpose of Islamic 
soteriology.  
 
The Problem and Goal of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Soteriology 
 
One of the main problems that Islamic soteriology seeks to address is the abolition of idols. 
Central to this is the affirmation of tawhid in as far as it precludes all forms of associationism 
(shirk). Whilst it is a central and unifying theme within his work, it is not unique to Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah. The Qur’an shows the abolition of associationism as being trans-historical problem, one 
that occurs throughout the history of humanity and one that focuses on the individual’s 
struggle against all forms of idols. In its most externalised form it involves abolishing the 
worship of physical object, as in the case of Prophet Abraham’s statement “By God, I shall most 
certainly bring about the downfall of your idols” (21: 57). However, while this form of 
associationism (shirk) may persist, the form of idol worship that requires the most 
confrontation is its internalised form. It is these internalised idols that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be 
seen as attempting to topple, as he states “Abraham, upon him be peace, came upon physical 
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idols and shattered them” though “you have spiritual idols,” which he demarcates as being 
“specifically, you have five idols: the ego, craving, Satan, carnal appetite, and this earthly 
existence.”2 Each of these distorts the epistemic outlook of the individual by positing an 
irreconcilable disjunction between Allah’s inherent Unicity and the perception of multiplicity. 
 
In entering upon Islam the goal of affirming tawhid is set as a prerequisite, though the problem 
of reconciling Allah’s Unicity with the apparent multiplicity remains. While there is debate as to 
what Allah requires of humanity, within Islam there is an agreement that this involves affirming 
tawhid. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as was seen in the discussion on the metaphysics of tawhid, it is of 
the utmost importance to correctly understand tawhid and its implications so that a worldview 
that is consistent with it may be developed. What such a worldview would consist of has been 
explored in the previous chapters. While the goal is agreed upon, there is some disagreement 
upon what this entails for the individual. Much of the anti-Ibn ‘Arabi polemic can be seen as a 
reaction to this point.3 So too can the alleged debate between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya 
be seen as an argument over the implications of tawhid upon the individual.4 Debates such as 
these have often escalated to include accusations of antinomianism and apostasy. Though, for 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, these can be seen to result from conflating the ontological and epistemological 
domains.   
 
While destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’) play a role in the soteriological development of the 
individual, the individual should be cautioned against emphasising their role. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
would agree with those who are seen to be his detractors that an overreliance on destiny 
(qadar) and decree (qada’) can result in antinominalistic tendencies. Though rather than 
disempowering the individual, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works can be seen to empower the individual by 
embracing destiny (qadar) and decree (qada’) in such a way that the inevitability of events is a 
means of detaching the individual from reliance on creation, which results in a turning to Allah. 
The result of this is, rather than an abolition of the law (Shari’a), an embodiment of it due to 
the awareness that, being within the domain of cause and effect, knowledge of future events, 
especially the ultimate outcome of the individual, remains for each contingent creation 
unknown. The law (Shari’a), and especially the Sunna, are actively maintained in as far as they 
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allow the individual to navigate within the domain of multiplicity whilst affirming tawhid. In 
participating in the world, and without actively seeking difficulties, the individual who is 
attempting to establish a God-centred consciousness can, with an understanding of destiny 
(qadar) and decree (qada’), reflect on their circumstances so as to see what Allah requires of 
them and the reasons for their current situation without relinquishing hope. This encourages 
the individual to develop contentment (rida), see below. As a result, there does not appear to 
be a world denying attitude that is apparent in other mystical or ascetic traditions, though this 
affirmation of the world is not done for its own sake. 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, soteriological development seems particularly incumbent upon each 
individual due to the nobility given solely to the human amongst creation. While it has been 
previously seen that humans were created for worship, he cites the verse of Qur’an which 
states that “He has made subservient to you, [as a gift] from Himself, all that is in the heavens 
and the earth” (45: 13). He also mentions that he heard Abu’l ‘Abbas say “Allah said: ‘O son of 
Adam, I created all things for your sake, and I created you for Me, so do not become distracted 
with what is created for you from Him Whom you are created for.”5 On this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
comments that “the nobility of the human over other than him among the creatures is the fact 
that the creatures are created for his sake, and he is created for the Presence of Allah,”6 from 
which it can be seen that the purpose of creation is to aid in embodying the metaphysics of 
tawhid.  
 
However, for the majority it is unclear how creation aids in embodying the metaphysics of 
tawhid. For this it becomes necessary to develop a hermeneutic tool which allows the 
individual to be able to read the signs (ayat) as the Qur’an states: “We shall make them fully 
understand Our messages (ayat) [through what they perceive] in the utmost horizons [of the 
universe] and within themselves, so that it will become clear unto them that this [revelation] is 
indeed the truth” (41: 53). Within this verse it can be seen that “the Koran refers to all things as 
‘signs’ (ayat) of God, which is to say that Koranically, the meaning of things is determined by 
the mode in which they signify the God”7 and that “the Divine Speech guides through its ‘signs’ 
(ayat) or verses, just as the cosmos – which is also the Speech of God, articulated within the 
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‘Breath of the All-merciful’ – gives news of God through its signs, which are the phenomena of 
nature.”8 In order for individuals to be able to read the signs (ayat) on the horizons and within 
themselves Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah displays and encourages the development of what is here being 
termed a soteriological semiotics. It is a study of semiotics in that it examines creation in such a 
way as to determine “the mode in which they signify the God” and it is soteriological in that this 
study of symbols aims to bring about the perception and embodiment of the metaphysics of 
tawhid.   
 
As Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s goal is to lead people to a correct understanding of Allah’s signs, he does not 
explicitly discuss those individuals who fail to reach the soteriological goal. There are two 
possible ways that an individual can fall short of consciously embodying tawhid either a) they 
are attempting to and die before it is achieved or b) they do not even attempt any sort of 
soteriological development. Of these two cases, the condition of the latter is easier to assess for 
the Qur’an states 
Say: “Shall we tell you who are the greatest losers in whatever they may do? 
[It is] they whose labour has gone astray in [the pursuit of no more than] this 
world’s life, and who none the less think that they are doing good works; it is 
they who have chosen to deny their Sustainer’s messages (ayat) and the 
truth that they are destined to meet Him.” Hence all their [good] deeds come 
to nought, and no weight shall We assign them on resurrection Day. (18: 103 
– 105) 
The literal meaning of this Qur’anic verse is clear in stating that those who do not attempt to 
develop a soteriological semiotics by denying “their Sustainer’s messages (ayat)” will have to 
contend with it in the hereafter. The case of those who fall short in their soteriological 
development is not so clear. That these people do not “deny their Sustainer’s messages (ayat)” 
then their condition is different from the former group. Given Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s focus on Allah’s 
attributes of mercy it is conceivable that he would quote the Hadith that “the reward of deeds 
depends upon the intentions,”9 which would increase the possibility that people in this 
condition would be included amongst “those who attain to faith and do righteous deeds – the 
gardens of paradise will be there to welcome them” (18: 107). However, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah would 
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be cautious to add ‘Allah knows’ (Allahu ‘alam) for theirs is a condition that cannot be 
reasonably known about.    
 
Signs (ayat) in the Qur’an 
 
The Qur’an provides insight into the semiotic schemata by repeatedly mentioning Allah’s signs 
(ayat). The Qur’an states that “among His signs” are “the night and the day, as well as the sun 
and the moon: [hence,] adore not the sun or the moon, but prostrate yourselves in adoration 
before God, who has created them - if it is Him whom you [really] worship” (41: 37), the 
“creation of the heavens and the earth, and of all the living creatures which He has caused to 
multiply throughout them” (42: 29), “the ships that sail like [floating] mountains through the 
seas” (42: 32), and “how He gives life to the earth after it had been lifeless” (30: 50). The 
highlighting of “His signs” is not arbitrary for “never did We send those signs for any other 
purpose than to convey a warning” (17: 59). However, these signs (ayat) are not always readily 
apparent and require the exercise and development of faculties latent within the human being 
for the Qur’an states that “We have made all the signs manifest unto people who are endowed 
with inner certainty” (2: 118), “We have indeed made the signs [thereof] clear unto you, if you 
would but use your reason” (3: 118), and that “on earth there are signs [of God’s existence, 
visible] to all who are endowed with inner certainty” (51:20). The necessity for developing a 
soteriological semiotics is evident in the verse which states that “verily, in all this there are 
messages indeed for those who can read the signs” (15:75). Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “created 
entities are the mirrors of the [divine] attributes,”10 thus, it could be said that “the signs (ayat) 
of God” are “those manifestations of the divine reality that make up the cosmos.”11 By 
understanding these signs it becomes possible to affirm unity (tawhid) through multiplicity. 
 
It could be said that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s task, at least as far as his writings are concerned, is to 
develop the individual’s potential to be amongst “those who can read the signs.” For this Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah enjoins on his readers to reflect upon the Qur’an. The reason for this is twofold, a) in 
as far as it is composed of verses (ayat), it is to be considered the book of signs (ayat) and b) the 
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symbolic interplay is, at times, more overt than within creation.12 To begin with, when reciting 
the Qur’an, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah enjoins the individual to “consider in you recitation what qualities 
and attributes God praises therein, the ones with which He describes those servants of His 
whom He loves ... and see what God Most High reproves in the Qur’an” for “God Most High did 
not mention them to you ... except to have you act accordingly.”13 Whilst this instruction 
involves reflection on that which explicitly meets with Allah’s approval/disproval, it provides an 
entry point to further reflection upon the symbolic content of the Qur’an. He cites specific 
examples of this as including those “who, whenever they are moved to anger, readily forgive” 
(42: 37) and whom later may reach the point where they “hold in check their anger” (3: 134).14 
It is important to note that this reflection is not simply idle, for in acting accordingly Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is reiterating that “the purpose of knowledge is action.”15 In order to enact such 
knowledge it is useful to remember that Muhammad was described as a “walking Qur’an” for a) 
it highlights a clear example of where the knowledge in the Qur’an has been put into action and 
b) it provides a resource or model of how creation, with their inherent ontological contingency, 
through action, come to embody the metaphysics of tawhid, as the Qur’an states “in the 
Apostle of God you have a good example” (33: 21). 
 
Signs (ayat) upon the horizons and within themselves 
 
The ability to read Allah’s signs has a singular end. The Qur’an states that “in time We shall 
make them fully understand Our messages [through what they perceive] in the utmost horizons 
[of the universe] and within themselves, so that it will become clear unto them that this 
[revelation] is indeed the truth” (41: 53). Furthermore, the Qur’an states that “anyone who 
honours the symbols set up by God [shall know that] verily, these [symbols derive their value] 
from the God-consciousness in the [believers’] hearts” (22:32). The challenge of developing a 
soteriological semiotics is in correctly honouring, or interpreting, “the symbols set up by God” 
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for once this is achieved “it will become clear unto them that this [revelation] is indeed the 
truth.” In grappling with this issue, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah asks “how can created entities bring about 
the knowledge of Him when He is the One who has brought about knowledge of them?”16  
 
The challenge of correctly interpreting the signs of Allah is further complicated given the 
metaphysics of tawhid. Everything is a sign of Allah for “He appears even in those entities 
through which He is veiled.”17 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah comments on this, stating that “the truth has thus 
been veiled from His servants by the very magnificence of His appearance, while their sight has 
been prevented from witnessing Him by the very brilliance of His light.”18 In order to resolve 
this issue it is useful to bracket off the various domains, as has been done here, even though 
such bracketing is artificial. Ontologically each creation is a sign of Allah, though it is only 
through the epistemic outlook of the individual that the semiotic value of said creation is 
determined. Furthermore, the soteriological development of the individual may foreground 
particular signs (ayat), at the expense of others, in order to highlight certain areas of 
development.  
 
Soteriological Development 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as humans were created noble, each individual has the potential for 
regaining their nobility. Commenting on the Qur’anic verse “We have conferred dignity on the 
children of Adam, and borne them over land and sea, and provided for them sustenance out of 
the good things of life, and favoured them far above most of Our creation” (17: 70), Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah states that “the substance of man was originally created noble and honourable” and “as 
there was honour in the original prototype, then man’s being purified is in accordance with his 
prototype, while his being defiled is in opposition to his original prototype.”19 On this the 
Qur’an states “We create man in the best conformation, and thereafter We reduce him to the 
lowest of the low” (95: 4 – 5). While this can be read as a cosmological description of creation’s 
descent (tanazzul), soteriologically it shows a) that the human’s inherent disposition is “in the 
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best conformation” and b) that, for the generality, this conformation has been, temporally, lost 
as they are “the lowest of the low.” That the soteriological goal is to regain “the best 
conformation” becomes apparent in the verse directly following, which states “excepting only 
such as attain to faith and do good works: and theirs shall be a reward unending” (95: 6). 
“Faith” can be understood as affirming la ilaha illa’llah and “good works” would be those that 
are consistent with one’s faith and as such would follow the prophetic example.  
 
The process of attaining to faith and doing good works, for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, means affirming 
tawhid. Quoting the verse “those who ascribe divinity to aught besides God are nothing but 
impure” (9: 28), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “impurity is in opposition to the prototype, and his 
being who affirms the Oneness of God necessitates purity to begin with, because he is in 
conformity with the prototype.”20 This is further confirmed in his statements that “amongst the 
signs of success at the end is the turning to God at the beginning” and “He who is illumined at 
the beginning is illumined at the end.”21 Thus, the process of soteriological development 
involves affirming the Oneness of Allah through embodying the metaphysics of tawhid. 
 
Without the individual’s adherence to the law (Shari’a) wavering, its pedagogical function 
means that the relationship to the law (Shari’a) changes with soteriological development. Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah writes that each individual 
must not practice dissimulation but must observe the code of conduct of the 
Law, both in its minor and major points, if he knows them. If he does not 
know them, then with respect to every situation in which he finds himself, he 
asks, ‘What does the Law prescribe therein?’ Whosoever betrays the code of 
the Law is more likely to betray the divine secrets. God Most High only 
bestows His secrets on the trustworthy.
22
  
In the beginning, adherence to the law (Shari’a) aids in curbing the ego’s inclinations. This, in 
turn, moves to manifesting good actions, namely those prescribed by the law, and abstaining 
from bad actions. Once the ego’s inclinations have been curbed, it becomes possible to realise 
that adherence to the law (Shari’a) is an affirmation of tawhid. This is partly because, as Abu’l 
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Hassan states, “the Qur’an and Sunna is guaranteed by God Most High”23 and in adhering to the 
Divine law the individual curbs to the point of effacing the ego’s inclinations in preference to a 
God-centred consciousness.   
 
The Soteriological Function of Knowledge 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the metaphysics of tawhid requires a radically different 
epistemological framework than that normally utilised in engaging with creation. This is 
because it is founded on Allah’s Unity, rather than treating the multiplicity of creation as 
fundamental. From this it is apparent that knowledge is crucial for soteriological development. 
While it has been mentioned that “the purpose of knowledge is action,”24 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah further 
states that “when knowledge (‘ilm) is mentioned in the Qur’an or in the statements of the 
Messenger of God, it refers to that knowledge which is beneficial, which suppresses passionate 
craving, and suppresses [earthly desires], and which is attended by reverent fear and 
repentance.”25 The kind of knowledge that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah sees being referred to is that which 
lessens a self-centred consciousness so that it can be replaced with a God-centred 
consciousness, for “God’s path is far from discord and from the manifestations of the ego’s 
inclinations.”26 In support of this point he quotes the verse “of all His servants, only such as are 
endowed with knowledge stand [truly] in awe of God” (35: 28), indicating the intimate 
connection between servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) and being “endowed with knowledge.”27 
Knowledge is transformative in as far as its acquisition affects the individual’s interaction with 
creation and because it has the potential to affect it is soteriological. 
 
For soteriological development, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to be advocating a radical re-
orientation of the epistemological framework. The affirmation and embodiment of tawhid, 
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which is central to soteriological development, requires an epistemological, rather than 
ontological, shift for 
Your union with God is union through knowledge of Him (al-‘ilmu bihi). 
Otherwise, God is beyond being united with anything or anything being 
united with Him.
28 
The importance of this statement cannot be underestimated as it cuts to the centre of the anti-
Sufi polemic and undermines one of the main accusations levelled against the Sufis, namely the 
accusation of unity with Allah (ittihad), used in attempts to illustrate Sufism’s supposedly 
heterodox views. Without denying that claims of unity (ittihad) have abounded within the 
history of Islam, it is clear from Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s statement that claims of ontological unity are 
not consistent with the metaphysics of tawhid and are therefore invalid. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
undermines any accusation of ontological unity with Allah (ittihad) by indicating that it is only 
through an epistemological shift, “through knowledge of Him (al-‘ilmu bihi),” that an individual 
can willingly integrate the metaphysics of tawhid into their ontological contingency.  
 
Arriving at the Qualities of the faqir 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, realising the metaphysics of tawhid can be simply stated. Succinctly stated, 
the soteriological process and goal is to “cling to the attributes of His Lordship and realise the 
attributes of your servanthood.”29 In unpacking this statement it becomes apparent that an 
aspect of realising servanthood (‘ubudiyyah) involves a conscious awareness of creation’s 
inherent ontological poverty, for which the company of the faqir, as was mentioned previously, 
is indispensible.  
 
While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is not alone in indicating that there are two paths to Allah, his intention of, 
and reasons for, focusing on one rather than the other is clear. These two paths are those of 
the spiritual wayfarers (al-salikin) and the divinely possessed (al-majdhubin). The former type is 
categorised by “the saint who has allied himself with God”30 and “comes about through sincere 
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effort for God and loyalty to Him in pursuit of His reward.”31 The latter is categorised by “the 
saint with whom God has allied Himself”32 and “comes about through annihilation to everything 
other than God, while remaining present in everything through God.”33 As the divinely 
possessed (al-majdhubin) are taken by Allah, rather than arriving at Allah through work, Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah states that “the first might be thought of as a lesser sainthood, as it were, and the 
second, as a greater sainthood,”34 though “this is an imperfection, because God, may He be 
praised, only revealed the kingdom in order that He might be seen therein” such that “if 
someone is absent to the created universe, he will likewise be absent to the vision of the Truth 
therein.”35 According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, to be annihilated to everything other than Allah is to 
miss the soteriological function of creations for “created entities were not set up in order for 
you to see them, but rather, in order for you to see their Master within them” such that “if 
someone is absent to the created universe, he will likewise be absent to the vision of Truth 
therein.”36 On this point the Qur’an, in stating “for, all who ally themselves with God and His 
Apostle and those who have attained to faith - behold, it is they, the partisans of God, who shall 
be victorious” (5: 56), can be seen to affirm the view each individual allying themselves with 
Allah and achieving nearness through consistent efforts at attaining to faith is the higher of the 
two paths to Allah. 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, soteriological development involves adherence to a definite and established 
order. He encourages his readers “engage in spiritual discipline, namely, in refining moral 
character, in avoiding levity, and in bearing wrong” for “it is rare that any good fortune can 
come from him whose illumination precedes his spiritual discipline.”37 Thus, soteriological 
development involves a rigorous process that is intimately connected with the development of 
good moral character (adab). Commenting on what it means for those “who ally themselves 
with God” (5: 56), Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “your alliance with God emerges from spiritual 
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warfare, your alliance with His Apostle emerges from your emulation of his Sunnah, and your 
alliance with those who believe emerges from you imitations of the imams.”38 From this it can 
be seen that alliance with Allah requires moving from a self-centred consciousness to a God-
centred consciousness which is evident in the Prophetic example and is achieved through 
adherence to the Prophetic example, as can be seen in those most knowledgeable of the 
Prophetic example. From another perspective, with regard to the divinely possessed (al-
majdhubin), being annihilated “to everything other than God,”39 it is considered “rare that any 
good fortune can come from him whose illumination precedes his spiritual discipline”40 because 
they do not fulfil the obligations of creation in that they are “absent to the created universe.”41 
 
Whilst it is necessary to struggle in order to achieve soteriological development, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
indicates that it is not as a result of the individual’s struggle that soteriological development 
occurs. He states, 
If you were to be united with Him only after the extinction of your vices and 
the effacement of your pretensions, you would never be united with Him. 
Instead, when He wants to unite you to Himself, He covers your attribute 
(wasf) with His Attribute and hides your quality (na’t) with His Quality. And 
thus He unites you to Himself by virtue of what comes from Him to you, not 
by virtue of what goes from you to Him.
42 
This statement can be taken to indicate that the ontological error of the perception of 
independence, being an aspect inherent in contingency, does not leave the individual. The 
perception that soteriological development is the result of the individual’s effort is false, as can 
be seen in the case with the divinely possessed (al-majdhubin), for it posits causative power 
with the individual who, as was previously stated, is ontologically poor. In order for the 
metaphysics of tawhid to be maintained throughout the process of soteriological development, 
the individual is required to adhere to an epistemic framework that maintains that any effort 
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expended is bestowed on the individual by Allah as “He unites you to Himself by virtue of what 
comes from Him to you, not by virtue of what goes from you to Him.”43  
 
Similarly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is aware that this perceived ontological independence can result in an 
epistemological error that hinders soteriological development. He states that 
It is not the existence of any being alongside of Him (wujud mawjud ma’ah) 
that veils you from God, for nothing (la shay’a) is alongside of Him. Rather, 
the illusion of a being alongside of Him (tawahhum mawhud ma’ah) is what 
veils you from Him.
44
   
The faulty perception of Allah is not the result of an ontological entity but rather the attribution 
of existence to some such entity. The perception of ontological entities alongside of Allah’s 
ontic manifestation results from an epistemological error of apprehending the implications of 
the metaphysics of tawhid. In order to avoid perpetuating the soteriologically stagnant cycle of 
moving from creature to creature, like the above mentioned “donkey at the mill,”45 it is 
necessary to deploy a soteriological semiotics that sees the Cosmos (al-kawn) “illumined only 
by the manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.”46 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah this is a Qur’anic 
injunction, as he states 
He has permitted you to reflect on what is in created being but He has not 
allowed you to stop at the selfsame creatures. “Say: Behold what is in the 
heavens and the earth!” Thus, with His words “Behold what is in the 
heavens” He opened up the door of instruction to you. But He did not say, 
“Behold the heavens,” so as not to lead you to the mere existence of 
bodies.
47
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Thus, by advocating for an epistemology that is underpinned by the metaphysics of tawhid, Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah can be seen to deploy a method of apprehension that perpetuates soteriological 
development.  
 
Contentment (rida) and Soteriological Development 
 
In chapter six the necessity of showing contentment (rida) when faced with difficulty was seen. 
The kind of contentment (rida) discussed previously aimed at developing steadfastness through 
adversity and focused on events where the individual could not affect the outcome. Yet, Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah raises the example of “a man [who] was sitting in the shade, and then the sun shone 
over the container he was drinking from, but he did not move it.”48 His decision not to move it 
because he is “ashamed to follow my self’s desires by moving it to the shade,” while being 
indicative of “a servant who seeks truthfulness from his self” is not indicative of complete 
adherence of the Divine.49 This state of contentment (rida) is being utilised in its soteriologically 
transformative aspect in that it enjoins steadfastness in opposing a self-centred consciousness. 
True contentment (rida) involves adhering to Allah’s injunctions, two of which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
raises with regard to this example being “God wills that you shall have ease, and does not will 
you to suffer hardship” (2: 185) and “God wants to lighten your burdens: for man was created 
weak” (4: 28). Given this “had his station been perfected he would have lifted the water away 
from the sunlight, intending by that the fulfilment of the rights of the self, which Allah ordered 
to be fulfilled.”50 This would be more in line with Moses actions, having watered a flock of 
animals “he withdrew into the shade and prayed: ‘O my Sustainer! Verily, in dire need am I of 
any good which Thou mayest bestow upon me” (28: 24), for this indicates both fulfilling the 
rights of the self and displaying trust (tawakkul) and contentment (rida) with Allah’s choice of 
the good bestowed, which the individual has no choice in. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah relays 
this incident indicating the soteriological benefit of keeping the water cool: 
Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan said: “My Shaykh said, ‘My Son, cool the water. If you 
drink other than cold water you will say ‘praise be to Allah’ (Alhamdulillah) 
out of a sense of obligation but without feeling. But if you drink cool water 
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and say ‘praise be to Allah’ each and every one of you organs will respond to 
the Benevolence of Allah with praise.”
51 
Thus, in avoiding unnecessary hardship there is soteriological benefit for a) it affirms a Divine 
injunction, b) by being unburdened the individual’s resolve for further soteriological 
development is not weakened, and c) it eases the development of contentment (rida) by 
satisfying the body with that which is pleasant. 
 
The Pedagogical Function of the Problem of Rizq 
 
Given what has been said of the problem of rizq in the preceding chapters, the existence of this 
problem makes sense when seen in light of soteriological development. The problem of rizq has 
been seen to arise within the ontological domain. Due to creation’s inherent contingency, it is 
an epistemological problem that can be seen to result from the conflation of the metaphysical 
and ontological domains. The existence of this problem seems to be connected with changing 
the condition of the individual for the hereafter, which is achieved through correct 
comportment within the herenow. Whilst this is an aspect of the problem of rizq, given Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s overarching concern, that of soteriological development, the preceding seems 
insufficient. If this was the case then the inhabitants of paradise would receive Allah’s enduring 
provision and the inhabitants of hell would be deprived of it. Yet, given that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
view is that “deprivation (al-man’) hurts you only because of the lack of your understanding of 
God in it,”52 in the case of the inhabitants of hell, they are receiving both the provision of hell 
and the provision of being deprived of inhabiting paradise.   
 
Whilst rizq embraces all aspects of creation, at its highest levels it has a strictly soteriological 
function. Giving a sort of typology of rizq Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah writes that 
Sustenance of the outer man comes from the movements of the body; 
sustenance of the inner man comes from the movements of the heart; 
spiritual sustenance of one’s most interior being is through tranquillity; and 
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the sustenance of the intellect is through extinction of one’s consciousness of 
tranquillity, so that the servant is tranquil for God and with God.
53
  
Whilst these can be seen as differing kinds of rizq, operating on different levels, they can also 
be seen as differing conceptions of rizq according to soteriological development. The 
individual’s tranquillity “for God” can be seen to engage the ethical and epistemological 
domains in as far as doing something “for God” implies injunctions that a) are to be followed, 
hence are ethical injunctions and b) requires knowledge of why and for whom these injunctions 
are being carried out, hence a shift in the epistemological paradigm of the individual. The 
individual’s tranquillity “with God” can be seen as covering the epistemological and ontological 
domains in that being “with God” implies a) knowledge of how the individual’s mode of being 
can willingly reintegrate them in accord with Allah, thus involving an epistemological shift and 
b) the congruence of being “with” implies acceptance of creation’s ontological disposition. This 
can be seen to culminate in the “extinction of one’s consciousness” which draws the individual 
back to the metaphysical domain in that in accepting creation’s ontological contingency results 
in a shift away from a self-centred consciousness to a focus on the metaphysics of tawhid and 
the development of a God-centred consciousness. Thus, in this short passage Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
describes a hierarchy through which the problem of rizq can take an individual in order that 
they may ultimately affirm the Unicity of Allah (tawhid).  
 
The Problem of rizq as a Sign (ayat) 
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that the existence of the problem of rizq is one of the 
signs of Allah. In being a sign (ayat) it functions to inform the individual of their relation with 
Allah and their affirmation and embodiment of tawhid. In affirming and embodying tawhid the 
individual must come to a position where they realise their complete dependence on Allah and 
defer from contesting with the Divine will through self-direction (tadbir) for ”God grants 
sustenance unto whom He wills, beyond all reckoning” (2: 212). Provision, like all other aspects 
of creation, is a sign (ayat) indicative of the individual’s relation with Allah and its bestowal, 
whether given or withheld, can be seen to come such that the individual is given the greatest 
possible potential of affirming tawhid. The lack of trust on Allah’s bestowal of provision, due to 
a misunderstanding of the function of the problem of rizq, is easily recognised for “one of the 
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signs of relying on one’s own deeds is the loss of hope when a downfall occurs.”54 Regarding 
this Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be considered to be expanding this point when he states that 
Know that the people of insight consider [self-direction] tadbir with Allah to 
be a form of contention with His Lordship. And that is because if He makes 
some undesirable affair descend upon you which you want lifted, or if He lifts 
away some desirable affair which you want Him to set down with you, or if 
you accuse Him of neglecting something you know He has taken charge of 
and established for you (like sustenance), then all that is considered 
contending with His Lordship, and leaving the reality of pure servanthood.
55
 
Thus, the existence of the problem of rizq is to act as a sign (ayat) which affirms creation’s 
ontological poverty and inherent contingency. As a result, the problem of rizq can be seen to an 
entry point, for those who delve into it, into soteriological development. 
 
The Solution to the Problem of rizq 
 
At the opening of the Lata’if al-Minan Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states “to God, exulted is He, do I turn for 
aid, upon Him do I rely … God is our sufficiency.”56 In this statement two things are apparent, 
firstly, the key to the solution to the problem of rizq, secondly, evidence that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah had 
solved this problem. In turning to, and relying on, Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is echoing an opening 
verse of the Qur’an, “Thee alone do we worship; and unto Thee alone do we turn for aid” (1: 5). 
This verse is recited repeatedly throughout the day by Muslims everywhere. Yet, unless they 
are willing to undergo soteriological development, this verse will merely describe an 
unavoidable ontological condition. If the individual is to make this declaration along with the 
epistemological implications that it has, then the individual will have reached the point where 
they cannot but “stretch out your hand to take from creatures unless you see that the Giver (al-
Mu’ti) amongst them is your Lord”57 because “God is our sufficiency.”58 Allah is sufficient for 
the individual in as far as they are aware of Him. 
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For the individual to find their epistemological sufficiency in Allah,59 the individual is required to 
realise, know, and remember that what comes to them through creation ultimately comes to 
them from Allah. Regarding this, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “verily, the remembrance of God 
Most High is the key to salvation and the lamp of souls”60 as remembrance of Allah (dhikr) 
involves both the awareness of tawhid and creation’s contingency. Furthermore, as tawhid and 
creation’s contingency are constant irrespective of the individual’s soteriological development, 
they cannot be ignored or forgotten. For this reason, “the remembrance of God is the 
foundation of the Path and the pivotal support of the realised sages.”61 As a result, the 
remembrance or invocation of Allah is necessary as “the invocation is the nourishment of the 
soul just as food is the nourishment of the body.”62 Invocation, or the practice of remembrance 
(dhikr), involves the process through which the individual comes to the constant awareness of 
their inherent contingency and Allah’s Oneness, for “invoking polishes the heart of its rust, 
which is forgetfulness (ghaflah) and the pursuit of its passions.”63 Forgetfulness of creation’s 
ontological poverty is a prime hurdle that is to be overcome in order for the affirmation and 
embodiment of tawhid.  
 
That the individual was created to worship Allah alone is the means and goal of soteriological 
development. It is the means of soteriological development in that through a deepening 
sincerity of practice the individual embodies their inherent ontological contingency, which, in 
turn, makes possible the virtues discussed in the preceding chapters, such as trust, certainty, 
contentment, patient endurance, and obedience, amongst others. In attempting to bring about 
an epistemology that relegates creation to an ontological position consistent with the 
metaphysics of tawhid, the individual takes on a particular ethical comportment that, rather 
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than diminishing once established, increases to the point where they are said to have reached a 
stage of servanthood. Servanthood is marked by a greater degree of worship because the 
individual, in embodying tawhid both unwillingly, through their ontological existence, and 
willingly, through their epistemological realisation and acceptance of their existence, realises 
that “unto God do we belong and, verily, unto Him we shall return” (2: 156) and Allah alone will 
suffice for any and all needs.  
 
The solution to the problem of rizq is for the individual to find their sufficiency in Allah. Due to 
the contingent nature of creatures, sufficiency cannot be found in creation, as Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
recognises in stating “travel not from creature to creature, otherwise you will be like a donkey 
at the mill: roundabout he turn, his goal the same as his departure.”64 The journey from 
creature to creature is never-ending and unfulfilling because “the Cosmos (al-kawn) is all 
darkness,”65 however the individual is saved from remaining relegated to “the lowest of low” 
(95: 5) and can regain their potentiality of “the best conformation” (95: 4) solely because the 
Cosmos “is illumed only by the manifestation of God (zuhur al-Haqq) in it.”66 Allah’s signs (ayat) 
within creation are not arbitrary, and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah advises that the individual “do[es] not look 
forward to being free from alterities (al-aghyar), for that is indeed what cuts you off from 
vigilant attention (al-muraqaba) to Him in that very state He has assigned to you.”67 Nor is 
there a lack of provision, for “He does not give them sustenance except as a result of His 
knowledge that the state in which they are is not actually due to themselves” for “rather, it is 
due to God”68 In “that very state He has assigned you” is all the provision (rizq) necessary for 
realising, affirming, and willingly embodying Allah’s Oneness (tawhid) and creation’s poverty 
(faqr). Thus, to say, along with Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, that “God is our sufficiency”69 is to realise that 
the problem of rizq is only a problem in as far as the individual has yet to find their sufficiency 
with Allah. 
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Chapter 10 - Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Islamic Orthodoxy 
 
This work has thus far has attempted to elucidate Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview. In doing so his 
commitment to Islam has been highlighted through foregrounding his utilisation of the primary 
texts of Islamic orthodoxy, the Qur’an and the Hadith, and how indebted his work is to an 
Islamic paradigm. Another approach can be made to further support claims for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
orthodoxy. Given the emphasis that has been placed on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s supposed opposition to 
Ibn Taymiyya one could be led to believe that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah held heterodox views, given Ibn 
Taymiyya’s fervour for opposing what he saw to be heretical beliefs. However, this chapter will 
attempt to show that, far from being heterodox, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah agrees with Ibn Taymiyya’s 
opposition of such beliefs, as he too would consider them to be heretical. However, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah does disagree with Ibn Taymiyya on who can be deemed to have held such beliefs. Given 
the view, held by many both historically and today, that Ibn Taymiyya is a champion of Islamic 
orthodoxy, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s support of such view would further strengthen claims of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s orthodoxy.1  
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are generally considered to be opponents. This position is 
based on the former’s support and the latter’s rebuttal of specific Sufi tenets. There is also the 
fact that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah provided evidence which contributed indirectly to Ibn Taymiyya’s 
imprisonment. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah supposed opposition to Ibn Taymiyya, more often than not, 
overshadows Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s achievements. This chapter utilises the text of the alleged debate 
between these two, which is said to have occurred upon Ibn Taymiyya’s release from prison, to 
foreground and assess Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position with regard to his relationship with Ibn 
Taymiyya. Irrespective of the historical authenticity of this debate, the text is important 
because it touches on several key issues within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre.  
 
This chapter has two main sections. The first surveys the modern scholarly literature, showing 
that it generally overstates Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s opposition to Ibn Taymiyya. In re-examining their 
relationship, it becomes possible to see that, rather than having a strict opposition, their 
differences are due to different ontologies. The second utilises the key issues raised by Ibn 
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Taymiyya against the Sufis in the text of the debate. It will be seen that, rather than hitting his 
target, Ibn Taymiyya’s accusations stem from an ontology foreign to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works. 
Crucial in highlighting their differences is the role given to the Unicity of Allah (tawhid). It will be 
shown that Ibn Taymiyya’s criticisms elicit from a misunderstanding of the Sufi approach to 
tawhid, of which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is an advocate. Rather than dismissing Ibn Taymiyya’s concerns, 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah agrees with his interlocutor that individuals who hold such views deserve to be 
rebuked as heterodox, however that such accusations need to be aimed correctly.   
 
Without denying that they were opponents, this traditional reading maybe overly strong which 
imposes a limited and limiting interpretation on some of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s comments. While it is 
documented that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, amongst others, marched against Ibn Taymiyya,2 this 
opposition has been taken further and read into the former’s works. An example of this is Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah criticism of strictly exoteric interpretations of Islamic law. Without dismissing the 
possibility that Ibn Taymiyya is implied within these comments, it should be remembered that 
in his youth Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was of the view that “beyond the letter of the Law there is nothing 
else to seek,”3 that is, a strictly literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine. With this in mind, it is 
possible that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in his comments cautioning his readers against the “shallow-
minded doctors of Islamic exoterism,”4 is referring to the folly of his youth, as well as those 
inclined towards such views and particular figures whose interpretation he disagrees with. The 
limited and limiting interpretation of this phrase alone gives good reason to delve into and re-
examine the relationship and debate between these two figures. 
 
The Opposition between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya 
 
Of the events of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s life, those surrounding the trial, imprisonment, and 
subsequent release of Ibn Taymiyya all but obscure the other aspects of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s life. It 
has been stated that “the most remarkable event in his [Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s] life was his 
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confrontation with the Hanbali theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyya.”5 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is 
“conventionally regarded as having been doctrinally opposed to Ibn Taymiyya, in much the 
same way as Ibn Taymiyya is usually regarded as having disapproved of Sufism and the Sufis” 
with “the best-known conventional accounts [giving] scant indication that this view might be 
questioned.”6 He has been called “one of the foremost adversaries of the Hanbali jurist and 
theologian,”7 “one of the most vigorous opponents of Ibn Taymiyya,”8 and is considered to be 
“among the most vociferous critics of Ibn Taymiyya.”9 It is said that Ibn Taymiyya’s “very first 
fatwa at Cairo, which was directed against the cult of the saints, earned him the enduring 
hostility of two personages, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Iskandari (d. 709 AH) and Karim ad-Din al-Amuli”10 
and that Ibn Taymiyya was “attacked by the Alexandrian [Ibn] ‘Ata’ Allah al-Iskandari ... one of 
al-Shadhili’s fervent disciples.”11  Furthermore, assertions that “Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah made a lasting 
contribution to the consolidation and expansion of the Shadhiliyya tariqa by the leading role he 
played in defending Sufi beliefs against their detractors” and that “Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah made a name 
for himself as an articulate and determined defender of Sufi beliefs against these attacks [by 
Ibn Taymiyya]”12 all but ignores all other achievements of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Such comments seem 
to make Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah a footnote in the life of Ibn Taymiyya, despite the fact that Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is rarely mentioned in the literature regarding the latter. They further overlook the fact 
that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s march against Ibn Taymiyya occurred during one of the last few years of 
his life, obscuring all earlier achievements, amongst which is the composition of the Kitab al-
Hikam, which was completed during the life of his Shaykh and has, since its composition, been 
widely held in high regard.  
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One of the main events used to support Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s opposition to Ibn Taymiyya is his being 
at the head of a march in protest against the latter. He is known to have supported the charges 
that led to the latter’s arrest in 707 AH/1308 CE13 and was “at the head of a vast stream of 
hundreds of fuqara and Shaykhs ... [who] confronted Ibn Taymiyya under the watchful eyes of 
the religious authorities.”14 Another account states that “a crowd of over 500 commoners (al-
‘amma) joined Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and the master of the Sufi khanqah of Sa’id as Su’ada in their 
march to the Citadel ... to protest against Ibn Taymiyya.”15 The historian Ibn Kathir reported 
that “in the presence of the authorities (al-dawla) ... Ibn ‘Ata’ [Allah al-Sikandari] made a 
number of accusations against [Ibn Taymiyya], none of which was proven.”16 However, 
contemporary accounts of their opposition are often too simplistic despite a lack of historical 
evidence. In considering the content and tone of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, it appears implausible 
that words as strong as “adversary”17 or “vociferous critic”18 can be applied unquestioningly.  
 
Furthermore, the text of their alleged debate, as it stands,19 presents its own difficulties.20 One 
of these issues is that “Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are too polite,”21 so much so that it is 
with reluctance that the text of their alleged encounter is referred to as a debate in the 
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conventional sense. Also, it would not be a stretch to make a case that Ibn Taymiyya is little 
more than a trope, though there are other possible explanations for his curt replies. If, as the 
text makes out, this conversation occurred almost immediately after Ibn Taymiyya was 
pardoned and released from prison, one would expect the supposed antagonism to be evident. 
If the rivalry was rife, as reported, one would expect that they denounce each other rather than 
acknowledging that “the difference between them is no more than a question of approach and 
interpretation.”22 Another issue regarding this encounter is that Ibn Taymiyya supposedly 
arrived “back in Cairo on 8 Shawwal 709 AH/11 March 1310 CE”23 while Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is 
considered to have died “in the middle of Jumada II 709 AH/November 1309 CE,”24 making it 
impossible that their debate occurred upon Ibn Taymiyya’s release and return to Cairo if these 
dates are correct. Yet, despite these issues, the text of their debate is useful in that it covers 
many of the key points of difference between these two scholars. 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Charges against the Sufis 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s charges against the Sufis that take precedence within the debate with Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah fall into three categories, antinomianism, calling for help (istighatha) and seeking a means  
(tawassul) other than Allah, and the ideas that individuals can indwell in Allah (hulul) and attain 
unity with Allah (ittihad). The charge of antinomianism arises as a result of Ibn Taymiyya’s other 
charges. Istighatha and tawwasul relate to the affirmation of Allah’s unicity (tawhid) and 
accusations of associationism (shirk). These two are grouped together because within the 
debate Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah states that “istighatha or calling for help is the same as tawassul or 
seeking a means and asking for intercession (shifa’a)” and both he and Ibn Taymiyya agree that 
it is “the Messenger, on him be peace, [who] is the one whose help is sought since he is our 
means and he is the one whose intercession we seek.”25 Hulul and ittihad, while related to 
tawhid and shirk, depend upon differing conceptions of tawhid to those advocated for by Ibn 
Taymiyya. While hulul has several connotations, the kind that Ibn Taymiyya can be seen to be 
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arguing against is “any doctrine which upholds the idea of Divine incarnation in human form”26 
for this would mean, amongst other things, that a) there are two eternals, namely “God and the 
receptive object,” and b) “God would become divisible through the division of the receptive 
object.”27 Amongst the different ways ittihad is understood, the sense in which it is rejected by 
Ibn Taymiyya is that “a thing becomes another while remaining itself” such that “it can be said 
that one is the other and reciprocally,” which is problematic within Islamic theology for, when 
related to Allah, outlandish claims can be made regarding identity.28 These two are grouped 
together because “ittihad and hulul are here generally taken as synonymous, and the concept 
of a ‘union’ of divinity with humanity is regarded as contradictory.”29 It should be noted that Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah does not advocate for any of these issues. Rather, within the text, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can 
be seen to be attempting to illustrate how these charges are not applicable to the ontology that 
he and those like him advance.  
 
Despite the text being of an alleged debate, there is some historical evidence that the issues 
raised were the main issues in Ibn Taymiyya’s relationship with Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. Regarding 
tawassul and istighatha, it is said that “following a popular demonstration, he [Ibn Taymiyya] 
was summoned” where he was questioned “on his interpretation of the doctrine of the 
intercession of the saints (tawassul; istighatha),” as a result of which, while “he was authorised 
to return to Syria,” he was “nevertheless held in Cairo and imprisoned for several months.”30 
Furthermore, it is asserted that “following a demonstration by some 500 Sufis at the Cairo 
citadel against his teachings on the Ittihadiyya Sufis, Ibn Taymiyya was again brought to trial”31 
and that “in Shawwal 707 AH/1308 CE, he [Ibn Taymiyya] was examined regarding a work which 
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he had written against the Ittihadiyya,”32 indicating that the event involved the charge of 
ittihad. Thus, while there is some doubt regarding the text of the alleged debate, the content 
that it covers has historical legitimacy.  
 
No attempt is made in this chapter to examine the issues raised by Ibn Taymiyya. These charges 
have a long history within Islam and are not confined to Ibn Taymiyya. Nor is there any attempt 
to explore their relation to Ibn Taymiyya’s work as a whole. The importance of these seemingly 
disparate issues, aside from being raised with the debate, is that all three categories of charges 
can be seen to depend on two differing conceptions of tawhid. It will be suggested that from 
the way these issues are raised by Ibn Taymiyya within the debate, while affirming tawhid, his 
conception of tawhid gives an ontological primacy to creation (khalq), whereas Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
conception gives ontological primacy to Allah, with no second. 
 
Tawhid, Allah, and creation (khalq) 
 
One of the key issues within this debate centres on an understanding of tawhid. As seen in 
chapter one, tawhid is “the act of believing and affirming that God is one and unique 
(wahid).”33 It is not contended that either of these two figures denied tawhid. However, it is in 
the application of the implications of this phrase that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya can be 
seen to differ. While the term is absent from the Qur’an, “the principle that God is single is 
definitely proclaimed there in many instances” and beyond this the “oneness of God is 
something which the theologians ... are at pains to demonstrate rationally,” with the most 
common argument being that of “reciprocal hindrance” (tamau’),34 a method that Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah is well acquainted with. 
 
Tawhid can be seen to be at the centre of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview. As it appears within the 
text of the alleged debate, the affirmation of tawhid underpins each point. This is evident from 
the beginning where Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in response to Ibn Taymiyya’s presence, remarks “look how 
                                                          
32
 Mohammed Cheneb, “Ibn Taimiya,” in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 151. 
33
 Daniel Gimaret, “tawhid,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), vol. X, 389. 
34
 Ibid., 389. 
194 
 
the Divine plan works itself out”35 indicating the ontological primacy the former accords to 
Allah. As will be seen, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s conception of tawhid leaves no room for anything 
alongside Allah. Without denying the contingent existence of creation, in accordance with Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s conception of tawhid, it would not be possible to assert that his remark gives 
precedence to the Creator, and the Divine plan, over the creation (khalq) because this would 
place Creator and creation on the same ontological level. Rather, as will be argued, it is the 
ramifications of the exclusivity of Allah’s unicity that is the mark of difference between Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s and Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptions of tawhid. This difference is highlighted by the fact that 
Ibn Taymiyya considers istighatha and tawwasul or hulul and ittihad possible for, as will be 
argued, this would mean that there is something that has ontological co-existence alongside of 
Allah. 
 
For Ibn Taymiyya’s accusations to hold, it would seem that he is reading into Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
soteriological cosmography the collapse of formal structures which conflates creation and 
Creator. Yet this does not hold for Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in that his argument can be construed as 
asserting that despite creation’s dominance within empirical data its cosmographical status is 
hierarchically inferior to the position generally assigned to it. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s response appears 
to emphasise the hierarchical prominence of Allah, though he is aware that no such hierarchy 
formally exists, in order to evoke within his adherents a performative cosmography. On the 
other hand, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be seen as dismissing Ibn Taymiyya’s support of formal 
structures in as far as it creates a false dichotomy between Creator and creation.    
 
As a result of Allah’s ontological primacy, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, and those who share this conception 
of tawhid, cannot be charged with istighatha, calling for help, or tawassul, seeking aid, from 
other than Allah. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah does not respond directly when Ibn Taymiyya questions “are 
you claiming that I am misguided when I deny the validity of calling on anyone save Allah for aid 
(istighatha)”36 for it is obvious to both of them that to do so would involve shirk as Ibn 
Taymiyya states it “smacks of idolatry.”37 In seeking evidence for his point, Ibn Taymiyya cites 
that “the Prophet commanded his cousin ‘Abd Allah Ibn ‘Abbas not to ask of anyone to help 
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him other than Allah.”38 Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s response opposes Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of 
istighatha on several fronts. Firstly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in clarifying the example raised by his 
opponent, protects Ibn Taymiyya from criticising and imputing shirk on one of the companions 
of Muhammad, which is considered blasphemous, by explaining that Muhammad “wanted him 
[Ibn ‘Abbas] to draw near to Allah not through familial relationship to the Prophet but through 
his knowledge.”39 This is followed by the challenge “is there any Muslim possessed of real faith 
and believing in Allah and His Prophet who thinks that there is someone other than Allah who 
has autonomous power over events” or “someone who can reward him for his good deeds and 
punish him for his bad deeds other than Allah.”40 In posing this question, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah can be 
seen to be narrowing the scope of their inquiry to those who affirm tawhid which limits Ibn 
Taymiyya’s response for if he were to reply in the affirmative he would be accused of shirk. 
Furthermore, in light of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s conception of tawhid, this question highlights the 
subtle difference in the ontology’s of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya. For, if Ibn Taymiyya were 
to reply in the affirmative then this would be an implicit denial of Allah being the master of all 
possibilities and having power over all possibilities. 
 
The differences between the two ontologies proposed by these two figures are brought to the 
foreground in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s example of the sentence “this food satisfies my appetite.”41 Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah queries “does the food itself satisfy” or “is it the case that it is Allah who satisfies 
your appetite through the food.”42 While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s questions are left open, their 
implication is clear. If satiety is ascribed to food, in the same way that aid can be ascribed to 
individuals, then, in light of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s conception of tawhid, it must be considered shirk 
because it is an ascription of power to something other than Allah. In no way can Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
be construed as advocating for a prohibition of food, or, by proxy, on seeking aid from 
individuals, for two reasons. Firstly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah acknowledges that Allah “satisfies your 
appetite through the food,”43 indicating the necessity of food. Secondly, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah deftly 
illustrates that Ibn Taymiyya’s position implies a reduction ad absurdum, namely that if 
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“istighatha or seeking help is forbidden in the Shari’a because it can lead to idolatry, if this is 
the case, then we ought to prohibit grapes because they are a means to making wine.”44 Food 
and aid, like grapes, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, are licit as long as they are accompanied with 
the awareness and knowledge that it is Allah who satisfies needs through them. This is an 
important example of where Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah admits formal structures while assigning them an 
inferior hierarchical importance than Ibn Taymiyya. In arguing against istighatha, Ibn 
Taymiyya’s position can be seen to imply a subtle form of shirk in that he, in a sense, is either 
giving ontological primacy or co-existence to contingent objects, whereas Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
arguing from  his understanding of tawhid, presents a position that gives ontological primacy to 
Allah alone. 
 
The implications of tawhid for ontology 
 
Another of Ibn Taymiyya’s criticisms is that he felt that the conception of tawhid advocated for 
by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and others implied antinomianism.45 This accusation can be seen to stem 
directly from Ibn Taymiyya’s ontology being applied to a conception of tawhid similar to that of 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s. For, if, in accordance with Ibn Taymiyya, one holds that creation has 
ontological primacy or co-existence, then, confronted with the position that there is nothing 
alongside of Allah, as is held by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and others, it would appear that creation does 
not have to do anything to obey Allah’s commandments, hence antinomianism. From this, 
according to Ibn Taymiyya, follows “the idea that man can incarnate Allah (hulul) or attain unity 
with Him (ittihad).”46 There are two parts to this accusation. Firstly, there are groups who make 
claims of hulul and ittihad and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah acknowledges the existence of such individuals, 
such as “the phenomena of pseudo-Sufis,”47 and accepts Ibn Taymiyya’s criticisms of them. 
Secondly, such accusations are understandable if and only if there is a confusion regarding the 
ontological domain. If one holds that creation has independent ontological existence, when 
confronted with the view that Allah is the sole ontological existent, is liable to make an error 
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equivalent to confusing panentheism with pantheism.48 If Creator and creation is ontologically 
conflated, as appears to be the case with Ibn Taymiyya within this debate, then accusations of 
creation’s identity with the Creator are liable to run rife. However, it follows from Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s conception of tawhid that both hulul and ittihad involve forms of associationism (shirk) 
in as far as both views posit two existents, the Incarnator and the incarnated, in the case of 
hulul, and the identifier and the identified, in the case of ittihad. For this reason Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
and those who share his conception of tawhid, would agree with Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of 
both ideas. In this agreement it becomes apparent that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn Taymiyya are not 
opponents in the sense of two individuals holding mutually exclusive positions. 
 
Within the text of the debate, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah cleverly side steps all possible accusations of 
antinomianism. At the beginning of their encounter Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah queries “what is it you know 
about me” to which Ibn Taymiyya responds that he believes his interlocutor to be “a man of 
scrupulous piety, abundant learning, integrity and truthfulness in speech” and that there is “no 
one like [Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah] either in Egypt or Syria who loves Allah more nor who is more self-
effacing in Him nor who is more obedient.”49 Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya later states that Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah is “from the men of Shari’a.”50 It is important to see that such praise is neither 
arbitrary nor self-serving. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah narrowed the scope of their discussion to those 
“believing in Allah and His Prophet” who also affirm that only Allah “has autonomous power 
over events.”51 As a result of this their respective positions can be considered to have meaning 
in as far as they themselves are included amongst such individuals. In this context an ad 
hominem argument is a legitimate rebuttal of one’s opponent if it shows them not to believe in 
Allah and His Prophet. In eliciting this response from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah precludes this 
line of argument, with regard to himself, from his opponent’s arsenal. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
acknowledgement that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is obedient to Allah and follows the Shari’a indicates that 
his practices are contrary to antinomianism. Furthermore, as an adherent of the Shadhiliyya, 
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Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is an advocate of Abu’l Hassan Al-Shadhili’s position on this matter, who stated 
that “if your mystical unveiling (kashf) diverges from the Qur’an and Sunnah, hold fast to these 
two and take no notice of your unveiling,”52 illustrating that he cannot be considered an 
advocate of antinomianism. 
 
For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, adhering to the Shari’a is the means to affirm tawhid and the safeguard 
against associationism (shirk). This culminates in ridding oneself of “inward and outward 
associationism (shirk).”53 The degree of subtlety involved might not at first be apparent. Beyond 
the obvious attribution of partners to Allah, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah quotes Abu’l Abbas al-Mursi as 
having said “kindness is a veil which conceals the One who is Most Kind.”54 Regarding this Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah comments that “kindness is a veil when one finds repose in it and is tempted to be 
content with the kindness itself.”55 This point is further emphasised in al-Wasiti’s statement, 
quoted by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, that “the enjoyment of obedience is a deadly poison,” to which Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah explains that enjoyment of obedience often results in a missed “opportunity to 
demonstrate sincere devotion” as one’s devotion continues “because of the sweetness and 
enjoyment that you find in them” and “not out of loyalty to your Lord.”56 
 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position regarding the contingent existence of formal structures is evident in 
his discussion of the phrase “there is no gods but Allah” (la ilaha illa’llah). For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
the affirmation of this phrase, being an affirmation of tawhid and a denial of shirk, contains an 
assertion that ontological existence belongs solely to Allah, while being aware that Allah is not 
confined by that which is ontologically existent. According to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, in affirming la ilaha 
illa’llah “attention is turned away from the created universe only with respect to its 
creatureliness, not with respect with the Truth’s appearance therein”57 because it is “not to His 
failure to appear in everything but rather, to their [creation’s] inability to perceive Him in 
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everything.”58 For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, tawhid is not strictly an effacement of creation, rather the 
contingently existent must acknowledge their contingency for “[earthly] causes must needs 
exist, while at the same time, one must be absent to them in order to witness [the divine 
causality behind them].”59 From this it is possible to see that, according to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, 
without denying the contingent existence of the formal structures, the empirical nature of such 
structures has a dramatic epistemic impact. For Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, while creation has contingent 
existence, it does so only in as far as it the means through which Allah communicates with each 
creation, just as in the case with food, grapes, and aid.  
 
By paring back the traditional reading of the relationship between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Ibn 
Taymiyya a new picture emerges. While they did not agree with each other’s positions, they 
cannot be considered opponents in the sense of holding contrary positions regarding any of the 
issues raised within the course of the text of their alleged debate. Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah repeatedly 
illustrates that he does not occupy the space that Ibn Taymiyya accuses him of and that, as a 
result, such accusations bypass Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as well as those who share his position. Ibn 
Taymiyya’s accusations do not affect Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s position. Contrary to their supposed 
staunch opposition, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is seen to agree with the conclusion of his interlocutor on 
each of the issues raised. While this chapter has taken a different approach, it can be seen to 
confirm what has been shown in each of the preceding chapters, namely that, while it is not 
always explicit, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is staunchly committed to an Islamic paradigm. Furthermore, Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s commitment to an orthodox Islamic paradigm, while advancing views labelled 
“Sufic,” is openly acknowledged by his supposedly hostile critic in the course of the debate they 
allegedly had.      
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has had two objectives. First, to contextualise and redefine the category “Sufism” 
and secondly, to show that a more refined conception of Sufism is needed in order to account 
for the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. While it was assumed that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was indebted, to some 
degree, to an Islamic paradigm, it can now be seen that unless his works are contextualised 
within an Islamic framework they would lack much of their coherence.    
 
This thesis has argued that the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is best understood within Islamic 
paradigms. Nevertheless, the thesis only makes a modest contribution towards rethinking the 
category and the field. There are strict limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
study of one Sufic thinker. However, it has been shown that more attention to 
contextualisation is necessary to account for the diverse thinkers and works that are included 
within the vast, complex, and contested category of “Sufism.” In the case of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it 
can now be seen that unless his works are contextualised within an Islamic framework they are 
likely to be misunderstood. This one example points to the limits of Sufism as a generic 
category, especially if it is interpreted in anachronistic terms as a form of mysticism or as a 
manifestation of the perennial philosophy.  
 
Thus from this work two things become apparent. Sufism is not merely a form of Islamic 
mysticism. It is a dynamic and complex phenomenon whose function, while differing and 
adapting across temporal and geographical localities, can be seen as constant. Furthermore, 
Sufism generally, and the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah specifically, cannot but be understood within 
an Islamic paradigm. However, in utilising this category for understanding Islam it must be 
acknowledged that it is unlike other genres of Islamic learning due to its pan-discipline 
approach to the material that it draws on in order to maintain its function. While this work has 
emphasised the proactive element of Sufism within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, due to a prevailing 
view that his achievements are bound up with the reactive element of Sufism and his response 
to Ibn Taymiyya, it can be seen that a) he combines both elements of Sufism and as such 
maintains the function of Sufism, keeping open the salvific potential for both the individual and 
the community and b) like Sufism generally, his oeuvre indicates the work of an inherently 
Islamic thinker.  
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Appendix 1 - The Lacuna 
 
This sample of translations of the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has a twofold function. Firstly, it 
shows the importance of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah through the range of languages into which his works 
have been translated. Secondly, and more importantly, it shows that, despite the wide 
dissemination of his works, there is yet to be an attempt to analyse the relationship between 
the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in any of these languages. It is understandable that such an analysis 
has not been made within the works cited here, as their purpose is primarily to present the 
works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah to the non-Arabic reading world. Nevertheless such an analysis has yet 
to be made within a non-Arabic language. This sample of translations is of primarily European 
languages, however, without being definitive, it is sufficient for illustrating the above two 
points. It will be shown that, despite the translation of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s work into multiple 
languages, there is a lacuna in the analysis of the interrelations within Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre 
which this work partly bridges.   
 
The works cited below can be divided roughly into two groups, representing two 
complementary ways used to present a work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. One approach has been to 
contextualise the text by focusing on the history of its genre and its reception, as typified by the 
work of Nwyia.1 Another approach has been to contextualise Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s historical 
significance by focusing on his position within Mamluk Egypt and within the Shadhiliyya, as 
typified by the works of Danner.2 These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; however, 
the method of contextualisation is often dependant on the degree of influence of or 
dependence on the works on Nwyia and Danner respectively. This has resulted in translations 
developing a sort of standardised introduction, which varies, not in content, but in the depth of 
detail. One point of difference in these two approaches is in regard to mentioning works of Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s other than that being translated, which generally follows, either explicitly or 
implicitly, Danner’s overview, which has been quoted in full in the introduction. 
 
That there is a sort of standardised introduction to the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah goes someway 
to illustrating why the lacuna has persisted. As mentioned above, and elaborated below, the 
                                                          
1
 Nwyia, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, especially 46 – 71. 
2
 Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 1 – 14; Book of Wisdom, 13 – 34. 
202 
 
majority of the works dealing with Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah have been translations. While most of these 
succeed in presenting Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works to an audience who cannot read Arabic, there is 
little room for any analysis of the material. The standardised introduction generally includes 
some introductory comments on Sufism in general, and the Shadhiliyya particularly, some 
biographical information on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, sometimes extending to include his two 
predecessors, some comments on the genre of the text, and some comments on the 
translation. While there are some variations on the standardised introduction, they are mostly 
minor differences, which in no way rectify the lacuna highlighted within this work.  
 
Before proceeding to illustrate the depth and consistency to which this lacuna persists, a 
preliminary note is necessary. Without the work of the individuals mentioned below this work 
would not be possible. It should be noted that no comment is made regarding the translations 
of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, nor is any comparative approach between translations attempted, for 
this is beyond the scope of this work. With the majority of these works the primary intention 
has been the translation and, as a result, not much attention has been given to analysing the 
content of the text, even less on its relationship with Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other works. 
Acknowledging this is important because it explains why most follow the standardised 
introduction. Furthermore, acknowledging the standardised introduction format should not be 
seen as either a lack on the part of the translator or criticism thereof. The point remains 
throughout to show that despite the work of these translators, across numerous languages, an 
analysis of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has yet to be significantly pursued within a European language.  
 
English 
 
While Danner was the first to translate the kitab al-Hikam into English as a whole, it was 
preceded by two partial translations. These were Archer and Austin respectively. Archer’s early 
translation preceded the now two standard translations of Nwyia and Danner by almost forty 
years. Archer’s stated intention was to secure “a body of information on the character of 
Muhammadan Mysticism (Sufism) [sic] to be found in the Dutch East Indies, and particularly 
that type of mysticism found in the Island of Sumatra.”3 Archer’s interest in Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, and 
the Kitab al-Hikam specifically, extends only so far as it is indicative of Sumatran Sufism. His 
sole entry on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah merely mentions that he was “a member of the Shadhili order,” 
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“was a most vigorous opponent of Ibn Taimiya,” and “died in the Madrasa al-Mansuriya in Cairo 
in the year 1309.”4 Aside from attempting to “make the meaning of the Hikam easier” by 
providing a “gist of the translation”5 before the translation itself, Archer has no concern for Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah or his other works. As a result, Archer’s translation does not follow the standardised 
introduction, which is perhaps a result of his interest in Sumatran Sufism taking precedence 
over any interest in the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah.  
 
As a precursor, Austin’s partial translation does not follow a standardised introduction. The 
Kitab al-Hikam is singled out for particular attention as it “must rank amongst the finest works 
of spiritual counsel, not only in Islam, but in the world.”6 Austin gives the briefest of overviews 
of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s life, though manages to cite his supposed antagonism with Ibn Taymiyya. 
There is some mention of the commentary literature as well as a short discussion of the works 
central themes.   
 
Danner released two versions of the Kitab al-Hikam. While these two works are essentially the 
same translation, the earlier is aimed at a scholarly audience, more so than the latter. The 
earlier work has key terms transliterated throughout the text, while the latter omits these. 
While the introduction to the earlier work presupposes a greater depth of understanding of 
Sufism than the latter, the method of introducing Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is essentially the same. Danner 
places emphasis on situating Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah within his cultural milieu, detailing his place within 
“the revitalisation of Sufi gnosis (ma’rifa) that was so evident in the 7th/13th century,”7 while 
locating him amongst the earliest Shadhiliyya adherents to gain repute, due to his works being 
“the earliest written documents of the Sufi order Shadhiliyya.”8 While both works contain 
sections on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other works, the earlier of which was quoted in full in the 
introduction, little emphasis is placed on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s use of genre, nor is his work 
contextualised within the literary genre he utilises. Regarding what Danner calls Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
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“literary legacy,” he writes “we can easily see his importance, historically speaking.”9 Danner is 
here referring to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah being the earliest of the Shadhiliyya to compose any known 
literary works, rather than commenting on his use of specific writing styles. Danner’s use of 
historical contextualisation represents one of the primary methods for introducing Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah, which has been continuously referred to throughout a large portion of the material on 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah.    
 
As mentioned above, Danner’s summation of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works has become standard and, 
along with Nwyia, is the work most frequently cited. Shoshan’s work, while not explicitly about 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, relies heavily on it, especially the Taj al-arus, for an understanding of Mamluk 
Egypt.  Regarding Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre, Shoshan10 reiterates Danner’s work,11 while adding a 
few references not available to Danner. However, Shoshan emphatically disagrees with 
Danner’s view that the Taj al-arus is “of minor importance,” 12 countering that it is a “unique 
source” that “allows us to glimpse the ideas that were preached to the ordinary people by a 
leading Sufi shaykh.” 13 While this refutation reinstates the importance of the Taj al-arus, it 
does not provide any detailed insight into its relation to the rest of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre. 
 
Danner-Fadae essentially follows the same outline.14 Danner-Fadae includes a few more details, 
highlighting and repeating passages, including that the Kitab al-Tanwir is “a kind of 
commentary” on the Hikam, though no further details on this comment are provided.15 While 
neither Shoshan nor Danner-Fadae intended to explicitly bridge the hiatus in the existing 
literature, nor was their intentions to examine the corpus of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, both have helped 
                                                          
9
 Danner, Sufi Aphorisms, 14. 
10
 Shoshan, Popular Culture, 90 – 91. 
11
 Cited in full above. 
12
 Shoshan, Popular Culture, 91 n. 61. 
13
 Ibid., 14. 
14
 Danner, Key to Salvation, 13 – 21. Mary Ann Danner-Fadae, as she is now known, is referred to as Danner-Fadae 
within this section of the text to differentiate her work from that of her late husband Victor Danner. 
15
 Ibid., 15. 
205 
 
maintain the view that, aside from a few repeated passages, the content of each text is 
independent of the others.   
  
Like Danner-Fadae and Shoshan, Roberts’ work follows the method of Danner. Roberts does 
not consider it necessary to restate the available material, writing “for a detailed and scholarly 
overview of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s literary corpus, as well as additional biographical information ... see 
the Translator’s Introduction to Dr. Mary Ann Koury Danner’s The Key to Salvation and the 
Lamp of Souls.”16 While Roberts does direct the reader to one of the most through 
introductions to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, as mentioned above, Danner-Fadae does not present any 
information regarding the relationship between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s various works. Furthermore, by 
directing readers away to another work, Roberts fails to locate and adequately discuss the 
importance of the Lata’if al-Minan. This is surprising as it is, after the Kitab al-Hikam, Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s most sighted work, though primarily for the biographical information that it contains. 
While Roberts’ work does not explicitly contribute to the gap, there is nothing within it that 
would help dismiss it.   
 
That the lacuna exists within Shoshan, Danner-Fadae, and Roberts is perhaps a result of their 
works depending, to varying degrees, on the initial work of Danner. The work of Durkee, while 
acknowledging Danner’s “great service to the readers of the English language through his 
magnificent translation of the Hikam,”17 does not. The work of this contemporary Shaykh of the 
Shadhili order, while not unscholarly, is more devotional than those previously discussed. While 
the section on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works is too long to quote in full here,18 it is readily apparent 
that, like the others, the intention is to present an overview of the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. 
While similar in format to Danner’s work, Durkee’s overview contains more details on both the 
content of the texts as well as their history. While Durkee does acknowledge the scholarly 
works that have been done, he allows Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah to convey the content and tone of some 
works by including quotes from the texts. Despite the significant differences, Durkee, like the 
others discussed, does not examine any possible interrelations between the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah. Thus, despite approaching the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah from a different angle, Durkee 
does not make any contribution towards dismissing the lacuna.     
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Reliance on Danner’s work cannot be considered the sole reason for this lack of inter-textual 
analysis. Hakim, a student of Durkee, makes no reference to any of the other works relating to 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in his translation of the kitab al-Tanwir. Instead of introducing the works of Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah, he focuses on the importance of the kitab al-Tanwir, of which he writes, “it deals 
with a cardinal doctrine of the Shadhdhuli teaching,” also citing that of this work it has been 
said it “combines completeness with conciseness.”19 That Hakim’s concerns do not venture 
beyond this work are understandable in light of the fact that his Shaykh told him to take on the 
task of translating this book20 “for his own and others spiritual and intellectual development.”21 
While Hakim’s work keeps to the instructions given to him in translating the kitab al-Tanwir, it 
does not help to fill the gap. 
 
Kugle22 makes some moves towards filling the gap, though this is not his focus and the links are 
not developed. Kugle’s focus is to show that comments regarding the Kitab al-Tanwir, such as 
“companion piece” to and “a kind of commentary” on the Hikam, are too soft.23 Kugle asserts 
that, not only is the Kitab al-Tanwir an introduction to the Hikam, “this text serves as an 
introduction to Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other texts.”24 His view is that the Kitab al-Tanwir aims at 
developing virtues while the Hikam aims at developing insight, the Miftah al-falah draws on the 
structured practice advocated for in the Kitab al-Tanwir to implement the invocation it 
prescribes, and the anecdotes of the Lata’if are commented on and explained in the Kitab at-
Tanwir.25 While these views could be deemed correct, they are far from comprehensive, 
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dealing with the relation of one text to the others rather than the interrelations within the 
corpus. Furthermore, without disagreeing with Kugle’s view, it must be acknowledged that his 
broad sweeping statement lacks all but the most minimal evidence and thus cannot be said to 
rectify the lacuna.  
 
at-Tarjumana’s translation of Unwan al-Tawfiq fi adab al-Tariq26 provides no introduction to 
either Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah or the text. It does provide a translation of the Qasida of Abu Madyan,27 
upon which it is based, as well as two other commentaries of the Qasida alongside of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s. at-Tarjumana does include Shar’ani’s short biography of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, which does not 
state much more than his soteriological lineage, his death, the place of his tomb, and a list of 
some of his better known works.28 While this work does not “introduce” Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in the 
standardised method mentioned above, it does show that Danner’s method of introduction 
could be seen as an extension of Shar’ani’s biography.  
 
Schwein’s work, while involving the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, focuses on the lacuna within 
contemporary Islamic studies regarding commentary literature. Schwein acknowledges the 
importance of the Kitab al-Hikam as “a succinct exposition of the principles and practices of 
mystical awakening,”29 noting that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s most important other works are the Lata’if 
al-Minan and the Kitab al-Tanwir.30 However, his focus is not so much on the Kitab al-Hikam as 
it is on its commentary literature. Schwein’s goal to expose the importance of commentary 
literature within Islamic studies is achieved through an inter-commentary analysis which 
focuses on six of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Hikam and their commentary by Ibn ‘Abbad, Ahmad Zarruq, 
and Ibn ‘Ajiba. Although Schwein’s work does not directly relate to the work undertaken here, 
its importance lies in highlighting a further and important gap in the literature concerning Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah.  
                                                          
26
 at-Tarjumana, Self Knowledge, 6 – 18. While this translation is less scholarly than that of Kugle’s, especially given 
that a) there are no explanatory footnotes and b) some of the technical terms have been left untranslated, it is 
given precedence over Kugle’s translation for the reasons cited above, see footnote 22. 
27
 Another translation of this Qasida can be found in Vincent Cornell, The Way of Abu Madyan (Cambridge: Islamic 
Texts Society, 1996), 162 – 165. 
28
 at-Tarjumana, Self Knowledge, 23. 
29
 Schwein, “Illuminated Arrival,” 3. 
30
 Ibid., 4. 
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Sambur’s work on the psychology of prayer is heavily indebted to Danner’s work and as such it 
is not surprising that it uses a Danner style biography to contextualise Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah.31 Aside 
from this, a comment should be made on Sambur’s understanding of the Shaykh-student 
dynamic, especially as presented by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. While there is an authoritarian aspect to 
this dynamic, Sambur sees the Shaykh as occupying the position of intermediary between Allah 
and the individual. In discussing the function of soteriological practices he writes that “the 
[Divine] Names and the worship become tools in the hands of Shaykhs in order to maintain 
their authoritarian power.”32 This does not entertain the possibility of a Shaykh acting as a 
facilitator to the student to realise their inherent relationship with Allah. Rather than being 
seen as an “aim to preserve the ‘power elites’ of Sufi orders”33 or a form of “spiritual 
militarism,”34 the Shaykh-student dynamic can be viewed in a manner that is borne out by Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s soteriological semiotics. The Shaykh, like all of creation, can be seen as a sign (ayat) 
of Allah, though, being in the same form as the student, is less subtle than other signs and is 
more easily comprehended, thus providing more direct feedback for the student’s 
soteriological development. Nevertheless, there is potential for the Shaykh-student dynamic to 
be exploited, which is why many Sufis, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah included, have written on the necessity of 
finding an authentic Shaykh and what constitutes one. 
 
While I am aware of Danner’s thesis on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Roberds partial translation of 
Shadhiliyya devotional literature, I have been unable to consult them. Furthermore, while I am 
aware of Jackson’s translation of the Taj al-‘arus, it became available after the substantive 
research for this work had been concluded and has not been included at the time of 
submission.35 
 
French 
                                                          
31
 See Sambur, “Prayer in the Psychology,” 191 – 198. 
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 Ibid., 233.  
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 Ibid., 233. 
34
 Ibid., 234. 
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 Sherman Jackson, trans., Sufism for Non-Sufis? Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Sakandari’s Taj al-‘Arus (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
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Of the languages that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works have been translated into, French is probably the 
most common; having translations of almost all of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s known works. The earliest, 
and best known, is Nwyia’s translation of the Kitab al-Hikam. Nwyia does situate Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah 
within the history of Sufism generally, and within the history of the Shadhiliyya more 
specifically, giving a brief history of the rise of this order. However, greater attention is given to 
documenting multiple examples of the aphoristic genre utilised throughout the history of 
Sufism and locating this work within this tradition. By contextualising Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah according 
to the literary genre of the Kitab al-Hikam, Nwyia does so at the expense of examining the 
relation of this particular genre to the rest of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre.  
 
Similarly, Gloton, though not as explicitly as Nwyia, locates Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s work al-qasd al-
mujarrad fi ma’rifa al-ism al-mufrad Allah within the genre of commentaries on the Divine 
names. Through a series of etymological discussion, Gloton situates this work amongst other 
Sufi works dealing with the names of Allah, such as Fakh ad-Din al-Razi,36 Ibn ‘Arabi, and Abd al-
Karim Jili,37 amongst others. While Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah has written elsewhere on the soteriological 
benefits of the invocation (dhikr) of various Divine names, as Gloton recognises,38 the primary 
focus of this work being the solitary name (al-ism al-mufrad) places this text alongside of those 
works that deal with various Divine names, such as those by al-Ghazali or Fakh ad-Din al-Razi, 
due to the all-comprehensive nature of the Divine name “Allah.” Thus, without explicitly 
following Nwyia’s lead, Gloton follows a similar method in contextualising this work of Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah.  
 
Thibon, in the preface to Penot’s translation of the kitab al-Tanwir, approaches the text from 
different angles in order to contextualise the work. From an examination of the main concepts 
of the text, namely tadbir and rizq,39 to highlighting key points in the method of presentation 
and some notes on apparent influences,40 Thibon sees within the work of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, and 
                                                          
36
 Gloton, sur le nom Allah, 39. 
37
 Ibid., 47 – 47, 66. 
38
 Ibid., 67 – 75.  
39
 Thibon in Abd Allah Penot, trans., De l’Abandon de la Volnté proper (Lyon: Alif, 1997), 12, 16. 
40
 Ibid., 18, 21. 
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the Kitab al-Tanwir specifically, a melting pot of variegated influences from Ibn ‘Arabi and al-
Ghazali,41 to the malamatiyya42 and Abu Yazid Bistami.43 While Thibon concedes that a 
thorough study of these influences need to undertaken, in bringing these influences to the fore 
the kitab al-Tanwir is seen to occupy an important place within the history of Sufi literature. In 
contextualising the work in this manner, Thibon’s preface can be seen to follow a Nwyia style 
introduction. 
 
While Geoffroy’s introduction to his translation of the Lata’if al-Minan has a Danner style 
contextualisation of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah, it is short, only capturing some of the main events in his life. 
However, in the postscript, Geoffroy delves into some of the themes of the Lata’if al-Minan, 
including the Muhammdean inheritance,44 Sainthood,45 and the Unicity of Being,46 and in doing 
so can be included amongst those of Nwyia’s style of contextualisation. Interestingly, Geoffroy’s 
study of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s conception of the Unicity of Being shows that it is closer to Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
conception than has been previously thought, especially by Nwyia.47 Nevertheless, the 
interrelations between Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works remain unexamined. 
 
Geoffroy has also provided a more comprehensive introduction than the above to the French 
translation of al-Bouti’s extensive commentary on the Kitab al-Hikam.48 Geoffroy takes much of 
the biographical information presented here from his previously mentioned translation of the 
Lata’if al-Minan, though it is interesting to note that he states that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah was born in 
1259 CE, where as all other sources merely state that he was born sometime around the middle 
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 Eric Geoffroy, trans., La sagesse des maîtres soufis (Paris: Grasset, 1998), 285. 
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of the 13th century.49 If it was not enough to side this introduction with the Nwyia style 
contextualisation simple due to the degree to which it draws on the work of Nwyia, it is 
interesting that not only is there a section titled “the genre of the Hikam before and after Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah,”50 there is also material contextualising al-Bouti’s commentary within the existing 
commentary literature on the Kitab al-Hikam.51 Geoffroy does comment that “in the opinion of 
all the commentators and observers, the Hikam is impregnated, often implicitly, with the spirit 
of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet” and that it is “of course the conformity to the 
Sunni model from which appreciation” of this work stems,52 a point that, while known in 
traditional circles, is not often acknowledge in academic discourse. Yet, despite taking quotes 
from the Lata’if al-Minan and the Kitab al-Tanwir to illustrate how Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah comments, 
often implicitly, on his own work, this introduction does not bridge the gap in the existing 
literature. 
 
It is only Macnamara’s translation of the Miftah al-Falah that has a truly Danner style 
contextualisation of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah. The focus on the biographical elements of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
life shows him to be a forerunner of the literary tradition of the Shadhiliyya. While giving an 
overview of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s literary output, the analysis is brief. While acknowledging the 
popularity of the Kitab al-Hikam,53 Macnamara, contrary to the majority, does not view it as Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s most important work, stating “of all of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, the work presented 
here [the Miftah al-Falah] is the most important and most needed as it concerns and discloses 
the practices and general method of the Shadhiliyya.”54 Without doubting that this is one of the 
reasons that the Miftah al-Falah is important, Macnamara would have to delve deep into Ibn 
‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre to substantiate this claim.   
 
Of the remaining translations into French, neither could be categorised into either a Danner or 
Nwyia style contextualisation. Penot’s translation of the Taj al-arus does not have an 
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introduction or postscript and thus cannot be placed into either category. Burckhardt’s short 
introduction to his and Buret’s translation of the Kitab al-Hikam focuses on the “spiritual 
psychology” inherent within the text. While there is basic biographical information, 
Burckhardt’s focus can be summed in the following passage: one “would not just say that the 
Hikam contains all the Shadhiliyya (Shadhilite) teaching or better – that this amounts to – the 
total Sufi doctrine; to make this, these contents must above all be applied to the life of the soul 
in all situations and at every moment.”55 Burckhardt is highlighting that, while the Kitab al-
Hikam is full of metaphysical insights, they remain empty words until they are embodied. For 
Burckhardt the aphorisms of the Kitab al-Hikam are continuously alluding to “the extremely 
subtle and precarious issue of the point of contact between the created and uncreated, the 
limited and the limitless, man and God,”56 which has been highlighted in the preceding chapters 
through the problem of rizq. Rather than focusing on the genre of the text or too much on the 
author of the words, Burckhardt is encouraging the readers to partake in the soteriological 
process presented within the text. In this manner, Burckhardt’s introduction cannot be placed 
alongside either Danner or Nwyia.   
 
Spanish 
 
Of the works of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah available in Spanish, two have come indirectly from the Arabic. 
The Kitab al-Hikam appears to have come from Danner’s English translation with a translation 
of introduction, endnotes, and glossary of his more accessible and less scholarly English 
edition.57 The Spanish edition of the Lata’if al-Minan is a translation of Geoffroy’s French 
translation.58 These include nothing more than what is in the original and thus, aside from 
making these works available in Spanish, do not contribute anything further to the analysis of 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s oeuvre.  
 
Of the translations that have come direct from the Arabic, González’s translation of the Kitab 
at-Tanwir is particularly important. This is because, aside from general comments on the 
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importance of the Kitab at-Tanwir, González notes that his translation was the first complete 
translation into a European language.59 González relies primarily on the work of Nwyia and 
Palacios, yet, while aware of his own contribution, does not acknowledge any other 
forerunners. Aside from noting that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is the first commentator for the 
Shadhiliyya,60 that the Kitab al-Hikam is his most widely read work, and that the Lata’if al-
Minan is a sort of spiritual history of the Shadhiliyya,61 there is no further analysis of the 
oeuvre.  
 
Two other translations have been made directly from the Arabic, both of which are translations 
of the Kitab al-Hikam. Laraki’s introduction has a short biography, though it does place the 
Kitab al-Hikam in the tradition of al-Ghazali’s Ihya ‘Ulum ad-Din, al-Qushairi’s Risala, Abu Talib 
al-Miakki’s Qut al-Qulub, and Suhrawardi’s ‘Awarif,62 and for this, while brief, can be counted 
amongst those of Nwyia’s style of contextualisation. Gutiérrez’s more extensive introduction 
draws out some of the soteriological aspects of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s work, similar to Burckhardt, 
though places it with the more widely known aspects of the Sufi soteriological framework. 
Gutiérrez writes that “man in this world is plunged into spiritual oblivion, in an egoistic state, 
believes it is an ‘I’ independent and autonomous with respect to the will of God”63 and that 
rectifying this and reaffirming the covenant that the humankind made with God testifying to 
the latter’s Lordship as mentioned in the Qur’an (7: 172) is the driving force behind Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s writings, amongst others. It is difficult to side Gutiérrez’s work with Nwyia for while it 
does contextualise the content of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s main themes, with little biographical 
information, it does so solely within the Shadhiliyya without contextualising it within a wider 
framework.  
 
The work of Palacios, as an early forerunner within this field, is worth noting. The work that is 
closest to the topic at hand focuses on Ibn Abbad of Ronda,64 who is renowned for, among 
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other things, his commentary on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s Kitab al-Hikam. The bulk of this work consists 
of a partial translation of Ibn Abbad’s commentary. Palacios mentions that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s 
most famous works after the Kitab al-Hikam “are entitled Tanwir and Lata’if, and are the ones 
that Ibn Abbad used so much in his commentaries on the Hikam.”65 Yet, despite this early 
acknowledgement of the traditional commentators’ realisation of the interconnectedness of 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works this has still been overlooked by modern scholars and commentators. 
 
German 
 
Schimmel’s introduction to her translation of the Kitab al-Hikam follows the above mentioned 
standardised biographical overview. It is mentioned that Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah is to be counted among 
the great early adherents of the Shadhiliyya.66 Moving to the events and catastrophes that 
shaped the 13th century Islamic world, such as the Mongol invasion and the fall of Baghdad, 
Schimmel noted that only Egypt was left standing, which shifted the existing political 
landscape.67 After giving a summary of basic Sufi doctrine, as well as mentioning some of their 
practices, she moves onto Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works. However, aside from common comments 
regarding the Kitab al-Hikam, such as its succinctness,68 the difficulty of translation,69 its 
handbook nature,70 its lack of apparent logical order,71 and its focus on themes such as 
obedience, thankfulness, and wisdom, the only other work mentioned is the Lata’if al-Minan, 
which is done so only in passing.72 It is surprising that there is not a Danner style summary of 
Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works, though this is understandable in light of the fact that, while 
acknowledging Danner’s work, in Schimmel’s eyes, Nwyia is considered the greatest interpreter 
and translator of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah in the west.73 Considering that Schimmel did not deem it                                                           
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necessary to even mention Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other works, it is not surprising that this lacuna has 
persisted.  
 
While I am aware of Sobieroj’s partial translation of the Miftah al-Falah and Schwarzmüller’s 
comparative study of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Meister Eckhart, I have been unable to procure copies 
of these theses.  
 
Italian 
 
Valdrè, while relying heavily on Nwyia’s work, finds a middle ground between the two 
approaches in her translation to the kitab al-Hikam. Initially there is a biographical overview of 
the Shadhiliyya74 and Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s place within it.75 This is immediately followed by a study 
of the Kitab al-Hikam, mainly drawn from Nwyia’s work, though it does include some 
comments from Ibn ‘Ajiba’s commentary on the Kitab al-Hikam. While Valdrè is not the only 
one to include both biographical and literary comments, her introduction seems to find a 
balance between the two, whereas others give greater attention to one aspect, sometimes at 
the expense of the other.    
 
Swedish 
 
Ogén’s translation of the Kitab al-Hikam follows the standardised pattern. While Ogén draws 
from both Danner and Nwyia, he attaches more weight to the former than the latter. He 
includes the Danner style overview76 and, while acknowledging that commentary literature 
exists, closes his introduction by stating that Danner was “absolutely right” in writing that “the 
Hikam itself, when properly understood and assimilated, ends up by being its own best 
commentary.”77 To conclude with this, without elaborating, at best, causes confusion, or, at 
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worst, contributes to the lacuna. While Danner’s comment is correct, it is so for those with an 
advanced understanding, and consistent practice, of Sufism, for these individuals would have 
passed through a point where they utilised Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s other works as well as the extensive 
literature. As Schwein’s work illustrates, it is through the commentary literature that the extent 
to which the Kitab al-Hikam is commentary on itself becomes apparent. Like the other works 
mentioned above, while Ogén successfully brings one of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s texts into another 
language, it does not bridge the gap in our understanding of the relationship between Ibn ‘Ata’ 
Allah’s works. 
 
Arabic 
 
Mention must be made of Abu l-Wafa al-Taftazani’s work Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Sikandari wa-
tasawwufuh (Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah and Sufism) for it, aside from commentary literature, represents 
the only apparent attempt to understand Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s worldview. Despite a long held 
intention of Durkee to translate this work into English, it has yet to be done, and has not been 
consulted.78 Without commenting on the content of this work, a few comments can be made, 
extending those made in the introduction. It should be remembered that al-Taftazani was 
writing under a regime where “modernism, secularism, socialism and Islamism (in that order) 
were dominant as official (or, in the case of Islamism, disguised) state ideologies in which the 
adherents of Sufism were often portrayed as fatalists, obscurantist or heretics.”79 These no 
doubt, at best, influenced his mode of expression or, at worst, curbed it, such that his work, in 
one way or another, had to be curtailed in order for it to find acceptance under the regime 
within which it was written. Without having read the work, it is comments such as “it was in his 
MA thesis on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Sikandari … that he used psychological theories to explain 
religious experiences for the first time” and that “al-Taftazani used the arguments of European 
psychologists of mysticism such as J. H. Leuba, R. H. Thouless and W. James, who argued that 
religious feelings are an autonomous region of human experience,”80 that would cause the 
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reader to proceed with caution.81 While these comments in no way invalidate the value of al-
Taftazani’s work, caution is necessary because a) the Sufi thinkers cannot be construed as 
presenting the views of modern rationalist psychologists, b) the manner in which the regime 
influences his manner of expression must be taken into account, and c) rather than 
representing his own views, especially given that he was the head of the Shadhiliyya in Egypt 
for a time, may have been written to increase the acceptance of Sufism within a regime that 
dismissed this mode of Islamic expression. Despite these cautions, his work, once translated, 
will be a welcome addition to the literature on Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah.   
 
Other Languages   
 
As stated, the above is a sample of the available translations of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works. It would 
take this work too far afield to detail all the currently available translations for, while the above 
deals primarily with European languages, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works are available in Turkish, Malay, 
and Indonesian, name a few of the languages that have been left out. Nevertheless, of these 
other languages into which Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah’s works have been translated, aside for general 
introductory comments, there does not seem to be an analysis of the interconnections of his 
oeuvre or a study of the worldview presented therein.  
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